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Standards and open source development are both 
processes widely adopted in the ICT industry to develop 
innovative technologies and drive their adoption in the 
market. Innovators and policy makers assume that a 
closer collaboration between standards and open source 
software development would be mutually beneficial. 
The interaction between the two is however not yet fully 
understood, especially with regard to how the intellectual 
property regimes applied by these organisations influence 
their ability and motivation to cooperate. This study 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the interaction 
between standard development organisations (SDOs) and 
open source software (OSS) communities. The analysis 
is based on 20 case studies, a survey of stakeholders 
involved in SDOs and OSS communities, an expert 
workshop, and a comprehensive review of the literature. In 
the analysis, we differentiate according to the governance 
of SDOs and OSS communities, but also considering the 
involved stakeholders and subject matter. We discuss 
the preconditions, forms and impacts of collaboration, 
before we eventually focus on the complementarity of the 
different Intellectual Property Right (IPR) regimes. Finally, 
we derive policy recommendations addressing SDOs, OSS 
communities and policy makers.
Abstract
Foreword
This report has been initiated by the Digital Economy Unit 
of the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC). 
It was prepared in the context of the three-year research 
project on Research on Innovation, Start-up Europe and 
Standardisation (RISES), jointly launched in 2017 by JRC 
and DG CONNECT of the European Commission. The 
report was developed in the framework of the 2017 
Communication of the European Commission ‘Setting 
out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents’ 
(COM(2017) 712 final). This research builds on the 
previous work and expertise of the JRC gathered in the 
field of standardisation and intellectual property rights, 
namely the JRC reports:
■ 2015 ‘Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory 
(FRAND) Licensing Terms; Research Analysis of a 
Controversial Concept’ EUR 27333 EN.
■ 2015, ‘Intellectual Property and Innovation in 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT)’ EUR 
27549 EN.
■ 2016 ‘Patent Assertion Entities in Europe; Their impact 
on innovation and knowledge transfer in ICT markets’ 
EUR 28145 EN.
■ 2017 ‘Licensing Terms of Standard Essential Patents; 
A comprehensive Analysis of Cases’ EUR 28302 EN.
■ 2019 ‘Making the rules. The Governance of Standard 
Development Organizations and their Policies on 
Intellectual Property Rights’ EUR 29655 EN.
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In the Communication of the European Commission 
“Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential 
Patents”, the Commission announced to fund a study 
to analyse complementarities, ways of interacting and 
differences between open source and standardisation 
processes and to recommend solutions for smooth 
collaboration between standardisation and open source 
communities. The Report “The Relationship Between Open 
Source Software and Standard Setting” aims at gaining a 
deeper understanding of the motivators and inhibitors of 
a closer collaboration between standards development 
organisations (SDOs) and open source software (OSS) 
communities. This report completes a series of JRC studies 
in the field of standardisation and intellectual property 
rights released in the last years.
Our report first reviews the existing literature focusing on 
the interface between OSS and standardisation (chapter 
2) and continues to outline the results of 20 case studies 
focusing on the interaction between OSS and standards 
development (chapter 3) as well as the analysis of 
a stakeholder workshop and survey (chapter 4). The 
insights from the literature review, the case studies and 
the stakeholder survey have been used as input for a 
comprehensive analysis (chapter 5). We finally provide our 
recommendations.
A comprehensive review of the scientific literature as 
well as publications by SDOs, OSS communities and 
governments, focusing on the general interface between 
OSS and standardisation in general and their licensing 
schemes in particular, revealed only a limited number of 
relevant publications and studies. However, the insights 
from the literature combined with suggestions from a 
steering committee served as guidance for the case study 
research design. The steering committee, including seven 
members, was set up with the aim to assure a balanced 
view with contributions from representatives from OSS, 
patenting industry participating in formal standardisation 
processes, and SDOs. The committee had the opportunity 
to comment on all parts of the study throughout the 
project. A series of preparatory interviews to the case 
studies has been performed to which organisations 
and individuals were openly invited to participate. 
Interviewees included representatives of European and 
international SDOs and major open source communities, 
standardisation consortia, umbrella organisations and 
Standard Essential Patent (SEP) rights holders. Twenty 
case studies have been selected so that they exhibit a 
relevant connection between standards and open source 
development based on an existing collaboration or 
interaction with a preference to collaborations that excel 
in essential community metrics, especially the number 
of participating entities and the amount of contributions 
raised, and a significant market impact. The case studies 
include major research and development collaborations 
that shaped the ICT sector in recent years, for example in 
the areas of cloud computing, programming languages 
or operating systems. A workshop with more than 50 
experts representing all relevant stakeholder groups 
provided additional input to the further steps of the 
study. Following the workshop, a comprehensive online 
questionnaire was developed that builds upon literature, 
the results from the case studies and suggestions 
from the steering committee. The questionnaire 
contained questions about participating organisation’s 
characteristics, including their intellectual property 
management, their activities in both standardisation and 
open source communities, and eventually the usage of 
licences and experienced conflicts. The stakeholder survey 
has been broadly distributed both among SDOs and OSS 
communities confirmed by more than 300 respondents 
answering at least parts of the questionnaire. The mix of 
empirical methods delivers a comprehensive picture of 
the interaction between SDOs and OSS communities in 
general and OSS and FRAND licensing related to certain 
fields of standardisation.
Methodology
Executive Summary
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1. Governance
We find that the role of governance is perceived very 
differently between SDOs and OSS communities. 
Governance of SDOs develops – at least in Europe – 
primarily within the constraints of the legal framework of 
the European Union, the relationships within the integrated 
network of SDOs and the competition between them. 
OSS community governance refers to the coordination of 
individuals, corporates and organisations within an OSS 
development project to which they jointly and voluntarily 
contribute. 
Moreover, the leadership of SDOs is more formally 
established and in a position to manage and implement 
the goals of the organisation and of policy makers, 
whereas leadership in an OSS community is more fluent 
and acts in a facilitating role since the community relies 
on voluntary participation. 
Finally, the recognised status of SDOs enables them to 
make and implement decisions that an important minority 
may not agree with. In general, actors do not have the 
opportunity to realise a “fork”, i.e. making a copy of an 
open source project and continues to develop it separately. 
In OSS communities, however, relevance depends on the 
ability of the community to represent the consensus of 
a critical mass of contributors in terms of both technical 
direction and governance norms. The case studies highlight 
that participants experience this as a strength of OSS 
communities, because it prevents the organisation from 
developing own interests that possibly diverge from the 
contributor interests. 
However, formalized decision making in SDOs provides 
stability and acceptance, for example in the interaction 
with policy makers or anti-trust authorities. Voting rules 
and election processes differ strongly both between SDOs 
as well as between different OSS communities. We find 
that there are many commonalities, like the voluntariness 
of contributions, in the self-organisation, approaches to 
governance and culture between the OSS and standards 
development communities. 
The comparison of key aspects of governance between 
SDO and OSS communities, however, also shows that as 
of now, significant differences exist that need to be bridged 
to achieve efficient collaboration. One key issue is that OSS 
communities as well as most SDOs cannot be directed 
to collaborate and also cannot direct their participants 
to do so. This currently acts as a barrier to collaboration, 
since most attempts apply a top-down approach. It is, 
however, also an enforcing corrective to make sure that 
collaboration only emerges where its benefit is apparently 
clear and convincing.
2. Stakeholders
The case studies and the survey reveal a large overlap 
of stakeholders involved both in standardisation and OSS. 
The incentives to join standardisation activities and OSS 
development are quite similar but generally rated higher 
for OSS among the respondents of the stakeholder survey. 
For them, only the inclusion of own Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) is slightly more relevant for the participation 
in standardisation than for joining OSS. In addition, 
standards are obviously a more effective approach to 
specify regulations, in particular in the European Union in 
the context of a Council Resolution on the New Approach 
to technical harmonisation and standards in the internal 
market and meanwhile the New Legislative Framework. 
The largest differences can be found for the incentive of 
lower and pooled cost for R&D and shorter development 
times which are found to be important drivers for joining 
OSS communities. In addition, the personal interest is 
assessed to be more relevant for the involvement in OSS. 
However, in addition to finding technical solutions, for the 
respondents of the stakeholder survey the free use of code 
under an open source licence, which is also connected to 
a positive return of investment in R&D, is more important 
for an involvement in OSS than the royalty free use of 
standards. 
In summary, the analysis of the stakeholders involved 
in standardisation and OSS reveals some interesting 
complementarities. In SDOs we find heterogeneous 
stakeholders with an overrepresentation of larger 
and patenting companies. Despite the very visible 
involvement of large multinational enterprises, 
OSS communities are also characterised by 
smaller companies without patents and by 
independent software developers. SDO processes 
engage a broadly defined set of stakeholders. They 
are also integrated with industry and policy making, 
Key Findings
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in particular formal SDOs in Europe. In general, 
OSS communities mostly involve enterprises, other 
organisations and individual software developers without 
a systematic multi-stakeholder engagement. There is a 
strong overlap of participants in standards and 
open source development especially for large 
enterprises. Overall, most OSS processes are focused 
on the contribution of code and currently less accessible 
to policy makers. Therefore, it is difficult to influence OSS 
communities according to industrial and innovation policy 
goals.
3. Areas and scale of collaboration
Both in SDOs and OSS communities, collaborations 
exist that span hundreds or thousands of participants 
and produce complex, marketable outputs. They act as 
platforms for collaboration and consensus building as well 
as industry and personal networks. 
SDOs and OSS communities complement each other and 
compete for relevance at the same time, but for different 
aspects of the functions they provide. They complement 
each other in the results they produce (specifications 
versus implementations). Both are challenged in handling 
large-scale ground-breaking research that requires 
significant upfront investments, like the development of 
pharmaceuticals or mobile communication protocols.  
With the exception of international SDOs, like IEC, 
ISO and ITU and others, neither SDOs nor the wider 
open source community have developed truly 
global collaboration yet, even though benefits 
would be maximized by the widest possible 
adoption of a standard. Market actors pragmatically 
choose combinations of OSS with proprietary hardware 
and software. Today, such combinations are the norm 
and seen as the working model of most industrial OSS 
consortia, like the projects hosted by the Linux Foundation 
or the Eclipse Foundation. Technology areas with high 
cost of change as well as competitive, differentiating 
product features are favouring open source development 
models less. Voluntary participation also means that 
contributors are unlikely to choose such areas for their OSS 
development work. 
The viability of collaboration between SDOs and OSS 
communities is influenced by the following three layers of 
interaction, i.e. cultural fit, governance models and legal 
framework in that collaboration has to be possible and to 
be preferable over working separately. Since neither side 
can instruct the other, collaboration probably needs to be 
envisioned as an integrated cyclic process with feedback 
loops between specification and implementation, and 
shared responsibility for both aspects between all 
participants.
Three archetypical scenarios, specification-first, 
implementation-first and parallel standardisation 
can be observed in the case studies. The specification-
first approach declines in relative relevance but is still 
important in specification-driven technology areas. Some 
cases transitioned from a traditional specification-first to a 
parallel approach as the necessary collaboration methods 
became available. Especially the parallel approach 
to standardisation represents some of the successful 
interactions between standards and OSS development, 
e.g. due to the higher transparency, and can result in 
higher quality standards, more innovativeness and better 
implementations based on the insights from the case 
studies and the responses of the stakeholder survey.
Where SDOs and OSS communities’ processes 
are combined, the processes and governance 
in the working groups and communities often 
converge. This may lead to parallel OSS development 
processes that incubate new features combined with 
standardisation processes to establish consensus, as well 
as a choice for participants of two alternative platforms 
for collaboration and consensus-building. It appears 
that a well-working relationship develops if standards 
developers and OSS implementers largely overlap and 
many entities potentially contribute to the development 
process. Where there is no such overlap or in situations 
where there is a strong concentration of few suppliers in 
the market, no cooperation develops, and the majority of 
market participants are merely (commercial) consumers of 
technology with no participation in standards development.
From the perspective of participants in SDOs, the 
interaction with OSS communities is mutually 
beneficial and serves their interests in a specific 
technical area. The OSS contributors help to incubate 
the developed technology and to test the specification, 
which supports maintaining high quality in standards. 
The partner OSS community often creates the first or 
only reference implementation, which might become the 
de-facto standard implementation later in the process. 
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Interaction with the OSS community also inspires the 
modernisation of SDO processes, e.g. through the 
adoption of new collaboration methods and platforms 
and increased transparency of decision making. Since 
experts in the specific market segments are rare, there is 
a noticeable overlap between the individuals involved in 
standards development and OSS implementation.
The SDO and OSS communities describe their 
mutual interaction as fruitful and productive. 
The collaboration and consensus building processes 
encourage the stability of specifications that would 
otherwise change quickly and cause interoperability 
issues. OSS implementations sometimes overshoot 
the functionality specified in the standards based 
on the faster pace of development. This may cause 
a shift in the scope of the technical development. In such 
cases, SDOs may be slower to update working group 
mandates and charters compared to the self-selection 
processes in OSS development.
There is no indication that the market pulls towards a 
situation where only open source solutions are used.
4. The evolving role of standards
Some of the larger collaborative projects do not 
consider the creation of multiple, standards-
compliant implementations as useful, since 
they prefer all potential investments to be combined 
into a single project. While standards help achieve 
interoperability of proprietary products that do not share 
an implementation, OSS users tend to choose a joint 
implementation for that purpose. In such a scenario, 
the best interoperability can be achieved by reducing the 
number of implementations, ideally to one. Based on that, 
some cases explicitly exclude participating in standards 
development from their organisations remit.
The wider adoption of implementation-first and 
parallel approaches to standardisation influences 
the utility of specifications relative to the value 
of joint implementations. Where standards used to be 
considered necessary to achieve interoperability, at least 
the OSS development process now offers an alternative 
to achieving it. This changes the role of standards 
themselves as standards and OSS development are 
becoming alternatives in achieving market diffusion for 
a technology. Actors now have a choice regarding which 
process they consider more suitable to their business 
needs. OSS changes the landscape for managing 
innovation by immediately providing an implementation for 
newly developed solutions, eliminating the gap between 
invention and the availability of implementing products 
which used to be bridged by developing a standard. OSS 
provides innovative state of the art technology that at the 
same time is a commodity, which have traditionally been 
considered opposites. 
Freedom to operate is a key precondition for 
contributors to participate in the development 
process. Confidence in access to the implemented 
functionality, e.g. through patent grants in OSS licences 
or contributor IPR policies, are considered necessary for a 
fast-paced development process. This confidence reduces 
investment risks and is expected to be achieved at the 
beginning of collaboration. The ex-ante acquisition of all 
required IPR from the contributors and the absence of later 
negotiation are key advantages of the OSS development 
process.
The combination of SDO and OSS processes may, 
however, lead to trade-offs, especially to a slower 
pace of development and lower innovativeness 
caused by the overhead of coordination, while especially in 
areas of high technical complexity, detailed specification in 
standards and working OSS implementation may support 
each other and lead to both higher quality standards and 
better code. 
Even in an open source development collaboration, 
participants are uncomfortable with the possibility that 
other actors may use the OSS product, including their 
contributions, to create competing products. While 
permissive licences like the MIT licence do not provide 
any protection against such scenarios, reciprocal licensing 
terms have been mentioned repeatedly as a viable IPR 
regime that protects contributors from future competition 
based on their own investments. The risk of competitors 
creating commercial, proprietary derivative work is a 
relevant concern to those participants. An IPR regime 
based on reciprocal licences like the GPL is considered 
sufficient protection by those participants.
All three approaches, i.e. standards as input into OSS, OSS 
as input into standardisation and parallel development in 
addition to the general interconnectedness of standard 
development and OSS activities, are used based on the 
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assessment of respondents to the stakeholder survey. 
However, standards development and OSS activities 
are relatively much more interconnected for smaller 
organisations, which much more often transfer OSS as 
input into standardisation, whereas this transfer and even 
the parallel development is not so common for larger 
organisations. According to the responses from the survey 
to the question on the likelihood of the interconnection 
between standards development and open source 
activities, small organisations contribute relative 
to their size much more to the integration of OSS 
and standardisation than large organisations.
Comparing all the assessments about the interconnection 
on efficiency and results, it becomes obvious that smaller 
organisations perceive knowledge flows from 
OSS to SDOs as providing the latter with new 
ideas as inputs for technical solutions. Larger 
organisations see advantages for SDOs from OSS 
in the implementation of technical solutions. In 
contrast, smaller organisations experience positive impacts 
of standardisation on OSS on the validation and diffusion 
of technical solutions. There exists a complementarity of 
effects, which is explained by the size of the organisations.
5. IPR regimes in OSS and SDOs
An effective interaction of SEP licensing and open source 
software requires legal compatibility of open source 
licences with FRAND licensing of SEP, which is a key 
component for example of ETSI’s standardisation activities 
in the area of mobile communication technologies. This 
is one important dimension of the interaction, since any 
directly contradicting terms in a specific combination 
of open source and FRAND licence would prohibit a 
combination of the two works in a product. However, legal 
compatibility is a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for possible collaborations of SDOs 
and OSS. IPR regimes serve partially different 
purposes in SDOs compared to OSS communities. 
OSS licences mirror and follow collaboration models and 
represent how participants envision the jointly created 
products to be used, resulting in the strong-copyleft, 
weak-copyleft and permissive classes of OSS licences. The 
governance within open source communities develops as a 
collaboration model first and is reinforced through a choice 
of licence, whereas IPR frameworks at SDOs regulate how 
participants engage and how conflicts are resolved. In both 
cases, the founders get together and agree on their mode 
of governance and IPR rules. Special attention is given 
to how participants may later exit the pre-competitive 
cooperation at SDOs and compete again on products that 
implement the developed standard.
Most commonly, participants adjust to the 
collaboration methods and IPR policies employed 
by the communities they engage with, entering into 
a trade-off between contributing own IPR in return for 
getting access to the aggregate contributions by the other 
participants. For activities at the boundary of standards 
and OSS development, this typically involves adopting a 
royalty-free patent licensing policy while being aware of 
the option of agreeing to various additional side conditions. 
This expectation of royalty-free licensing is considered 
acceptable and not to be a barrier to collaboration or to 
the development of relevant standards. Multiple parties 
mentioned as a precondition for this model to work well 
that all participants invest goodwill into making the 
collaboration work and are open and transparent about 
their intentions.
Only a smaller number of OSS licences are 
relevant in recent practice. The Apache License 
2.0, the MIT License and the GNU General Public 
License (GPL 2.0) are quite popular followed 
by GNU General Public License 3.0 and the BSD 
License 2.0. In addition to the significant differences 
between the general attractiveness of the various OSS 
licensing models, there are discrepancies between larger 
and smaller organisations. The latter have much stronger 
preferences for both the GNU General Public License 3.0 
and the GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) 3.0, 
whereas the former are inclined to the MIT License and the 
various versions of the BSD Licenses. In general, licence 
choices in communities follow the envisioned collaboration 
model of the contributors. More recent projects more often 
opt for licences with explicit, as in the Apache License 
2.0 or the GNU General Public License 3.0 as opposed to 
implicit or absent patent licensing terms.
Regarding the existence of conflicts between the 
various copyright licences and the licensing models in 
standardisation, in particular FRAND, both the GNU 
General Public Licenses GPL 2.0 and 3.0 and 
the GNU Lesser General Public License LGPL 2.1 
and 3.0 are mentioned by the majority of the 
stakeholders. For the BSD Licenses only one third report 
conflicts. Overall, small organisations report fewer conflicts. 
In the successful case studies, even if incompatibilities 
between OSS licences and SDO IPR frameworks may 
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theoretically exist, the participants always resolved these 
issues or worked around them driven by the common 
interest in the collaborative development of a standardised 
technology. Licensing incompatibilities have not 
been observed as a practically relevant problem 
in the investigated cases.
In case of conflicts, the strict separation between 
OSS and FRAND licensing is still the preferred 
option followed by negotiations to find solutions 
supported by the experiences reported in the case studies. 
If no solutions are found, in particular small organisations 
withdraw from standardisation. Another less popular 
option is the use of copyright-only licences explicitly 
excluding patent licence rights, which are negotiated 
separately. 
Whereas there seem to be no convincing constructive 
solutions for conflicts between OSS and licensing 
models in standardisation in general, some approaches 
of collaboration between standardisation and OSS are 
more promising, in particular in the perspective of smaller 
organisations. First, the stakeholders ask for more tractable 
SDO patent policies. Secondly, new processes to integrate 
OSS in standardisation are suggested. Thirdly, not only 
more tractable patent policies are asked for, but some 
stakeholders even suggested that SDOs should explicitly 
offer a royalty free option. Below medium, but above 
low effectiveness we find new governance and conflict 
solution models, the use of copyright-only OSS licences 
explicitly excluding patent licence rights and finally a 
direct combination of SDOs and OSS communities. Finally, 
OSS licences should not include FRAND-based patent 
grants and definitions of OSS should not be more flexible, 
because both options are perceived by the stakeholders as 
being not very effective. Interestingly, larger organisations 
perceive these options as much more effective than 
smaller organisations.
Recommendations
We have structured our recommendations into three 
sections addressing SDOs, OSS communities and policy 
makers in general, but also the European Commission in 
particular.
Recommendations addressing SDOs 
In principle, these recommendations address all SDOs, 
acknowledging however that individual SDOs have already 
implemented some of them or are currently addressing 
them.
 1. We recommend SDOs to consider addressing 
software and OSS explicitly within their 
IPR policies in order to adequately handle the 
peculiarities of software in general and OSS in 
particular.
 2. The elaboration of more comprehensive IPR 
policies including software and OSS requires 
a better coordination between SDOs and the 
consideration of the views of public authorities and 
other stakeholders. 
 3. Some SDOs depend on selling access to standards. 
The inclusion of OSS in standards might have an 
impact on SDOs’ financing models. We recommend 
these SDOs to consider this trend and to 
reduce their dependencies on revenues from 
selling standards. This has been realised by some 
SDOs that apply open access solutions already or 
practice a closer collaboration with OSS communities.
 4. Stakeholders and policy makers have complained 
about the limited speed of standardisation processes 
at SDOs. We recommend a closer collaboration 
with OSS communities, because it might 
support SDOs in efforts to speed up the 
processes and to increase the agility of 
standards development.  
 5. Small organisations, in particular SMEs, face problems 
in actively contributing to standardisation processes 
at SDOs. We recommend SDOs to integrate in 
particular SMEs active in the software sector 
more effectively in their standardisation 
processes by closer collaboration with OSS 
communities.
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Recommendations addressing OSS 
communities 
 6. Despite existing attempts to define open source 
independently, we recommend keeping and 
strengthening the existing Open Source 
Definition. The definition is broadly supported by 
the OSS community as well as the overwhelming 
majority of industry actors and therefore the basis for 
possible collaboration between them and SDOs. 
 7. Larger OSS communities should consider 
in engaging in the development of future 
strategies according to WTO standardisation 
principles, which includes openness, consensus 
and transparency, because SDOs that develop 
standards must meet these governance 
requirements. In addition, standards that include 
software specifications may be referenced in 
legislation. Consequently, OSS communities have 
a choice to produce the specifications themselves 
or to collaborate with SDOs. We encourage OSS 
communities to collaborate with SDOs to benefit 
from their reach, brand, and network for that purpose. 
 8. Attempts to combine elements of OSS licences 
with conditions for FRAND licensing of SEP are in 
general of limited success. We recommend both 
OSS communities and stakeholders active in 
SDOs to continue developing new models of 
collaboration and to test them in the market. 
Innovative approaches may either be successful 
or provide new impulses to improve existing SDO 
and OSS processes. Market actors will indicate the 
usefulness of these new approaches by way of their 
decisions to participate.
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Recommendations addressing policy 
makers 
Since there is a general justification for public authorities 
to support both standards and OSS development, 
there are good reasons to improve the interface 
between SDOs and OSS. In general, the involvement of 
governments in markets should be justified by market 
or system failures.
 9. Standardisation is utilised as a channel of knowledge 
and technology transfer for publicly funded research, 
development and innovation projects. We recommend 
policy makers in the Member States and the 
European Commission in particular to promote 
OSS in addition to standardisation as a 
further channel of knowledge and technology 
transfer. In this context, the interface between 
OSS and standardisation must be defined 
and elaborated further as a parallel and 
complementary transfer channel to exploit 
possible synergies and minimize redundancies and 
conflicts. 
10. The current regulatory frameworks both related to 
copyright and patents neither reflect the relevance of 
standards nor software as such and OSS in particular. 
Policy should consider OSS and standards in 
future revisions of European copyright and 
patent legislation. 
11. Public procurement as an important demand-side 
innovation policy is already recurring on standards, 
but in official policy documents rarely on OSS despite 
the already existing option to reference OSS in 
public procurement. We recommend the explicit 
inclusion of OSS in public procurement policies, 
e.g. in updating the public procurement 
directives or the public procurement strategy. 
Equally, we recommend investigating the 
interrelation between standards and OSS in 
public procurement.
12. The involvement of SMEs in SDOs is still limited. 
Policy makers, in particular in Member States, 
should further promote SMEs’ involvement 
both in SDOs and OSS communities within EU 
and national SME policies.  
13. SDOs and OSS engage in a healthy competition 
from the process perspective. We recommend the 
European Commission to create a level playing 
field between SDOs and OSS communities to 
foster innovation. This requires creating exchanges 
between the evolutionary selection process in OSS 
communities and the formalization within SDOs, but 
also may add additional obligations, like working with 
multi-stakeholder platforms or adherence to minimal 
standards for governance norms. 
14. Policy makers have provided substantive guidance on 
the legal boundaries and requirements applicable to the 
substance of IPR policy choices of SDOs with the safe 
harbour approach defined in the guidelines to horizontal 
co-operation agreements. No such guidance exists 
with regard to OSS communities. We recommend 
developing specific requirements for horizontal 
co-operation that apply to both SDOs and OSS 
communities and their collaboration. 
15. SDOs are already well-integrated into the European 
research and policy making frameworks, while for 
OSS communities such integration is still at the 
beginning. We recommend integrating OSS 
communities into the European research and 
policy making frameworks where justified by 
their generation of positive externalities in 
the European Union.
16. Today, OSS runs a large part of the technical 
infrastructure of an information and knowledge driven 
society. OSS should be considered as an infrastructure 
of the information age of similar importance to 
highways and bridges. It is worth investigating the 
benefit of public medium-to-long term investments 
into OSS infrastructure that supports European Union 
policy goals. We recommend further evaluating 
policy options for the European Union to 
contribute directly to OSS. This may require 
changing the regulatory framework or establishing 
European OSS development organisations either next 
to or integrated with existing European SDOs.
1  INTRODUCTION
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With the generally accepted notion that innovation is 
essential for European welfare and economic growth, 
policies that aim to foster innovation have become a focal 
point of activity for policy makers for the last decades. 
Research and experience suggest that in order to obtain 
successful innovations – meaning innovations that are used 
in the markets – respective policies need to address more 
than just the funding of research and development (R&D), 
which has been traditionally at the heart of innovation and 
R&D policy. In this context, the interplay of different policies 
and herein the collaboration between the main institutions 
implementing these policies has grown in importance. 
The right “configuration” of these fields in relation to each 
other – which includes R&D funding, tax schemes, public 
(innovative) procurement, regulation, Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR), technology transfer, open source software and 
standardisation – can be seen as key to success for an 
overall innovation (as well as industrial) policy.
This applies particularly to the two fields under investigation 
in this study, open source software and standardisation. 
The IPR system – comprised of the four main instruments 
of patents, trademarks, copyrights and designs – aims 
to foster innovation by providing time-limited monopoly 
rights for innovators to recuperate investments made into 
R&D. In the past, IPR has been a field of activity largely for 
lawyers and patent agents, mostly unconnected to other 
actors of innovation systems. However, broader usages 
of IPR than mere protection for the purpose of insuring 
against unlawful copying – e.g., for funding by venture 
capital firms, for directly generating licensing revenues, for 
allowing collaboration on joint R&D projects, for enabling 
new business models – have propelled a need for IP to 
become a topic to be dealt with in more strategic ways 
(e.g. Blind et al. 2006 for patents and Block et al. 2015 
for trademarks). This also implies the integration of IP into 
other policy fields.
1 | Introduction
In the context of current advances in 
technology, open source software (OSS) 
implementation is, in addition to standards, 
also driving innovation, and is becoming 
increasingly widespread, including in the 
area of ICT standards. Integration between 
open source projects and standards 
development processes is a win-win 
situation: on one side the alignment of 
open source and standardisation can 
speed-up the standards development 
process and the take-up of ICT standards 
(especially for SMEs) and on the other side 
standards can provide for interoperability 
of open source software implementations. 
Activities in this direction are taking place 
within different SDO. 
Open source and standardisation processes 
both have similarities in common (e.g. 
collaborative open processes, contribution 
to innovation) and differences (IPR policies, 
agility, maintenance, transparency, balance 
of the processes etc.). There is therefore 
a need to pay attention to the interaction 
between open source community projects 
and SDOs processes. 
The Commission supports open source 
solutions, i.e. through R&I projects funded 
under Horizon 2020. Flexible and effective 
interactions between standardisation and 
open source communities will promote 
and accelerate the uptake of advanced 
technology developments. 
The Commission will continue to collaborate 
with stakeholders, open source communities 
and SDOs to promote an effective 
relationship between standardisation 
and open source. It will also fund studies 
to analyse complementarities, ways of 
interacting and differences between the 
two processes, and recommend solutions 
for smooth collaboration between the two 
communities.
Framing of the study
Source: European Commission 2017.
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Similarly, standards have seen a surge in relevance for 
innovation over the past years. They can support innovation 
by codifying and spreading the state-of-the-art in various 
areas, as well as by bridging the gap between research 
and end-products and services (Blind and Gauch 2009). 
In principle, information codified in standards is accessible 
to everybody, and so the different actors of the innovation 
systems can use this knowledge to adopt innovations 
or generate new ideas (e.g. small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) make obviously use of this source Blind 
and Mangelsdorf 2013, 2016). Another important benefit 
is in allowing for interoperability, an issue when products 
and processes supplied by various providers must interact 
with each other. This is especially relevant for the ICT 
industries (Blind et al. 2010). In such cases, standards 
allow for mutual compatibility between and among the 
interacting products and processes. 
The intersection of IPR and standards occurs particularly 
in case a standard depends, for its functioning, to draw 
on several pieces of IP-protected inventions and works, 
such as different patented technologies (with the patents 
then being so-called standard-essential patents (SEPs)) 
or copyrighted pieces of software including open source 
software (OSS). Numerous challenges arise. In the case of 
patents, some of the challenges are the identification and 
selection of patented technologies relevant for standards, 
the adequate reimbursement of the IP holders and the 
maintenance of the standards due to technological 
dynamics, but also due to changes in the ownership of 
patents. A well-functioning interaction can generate large 
economic benefits for the owners (e.g. Pohlmann et al. 
2016), but also societal impacts by providing access to 
digital technologies. A dysfunctional relationship can in the 
short run generate litigation costs both for patent owners 
and standards implementers, but also disincentives 
related to investments in research and innovation and 
contribution to standardisation processes. Therefore, the 
need to look at this intersection from a policy perspective 
has been agreed upon since at least a decade, however 
there is no agreement as of yet about the solutions to 
deal effectively with the challenges raised in order to 
maximize the benefits for innovators and for society as 
whole.
European policy has taken up the issue of interplay of 
standards and IP in several ways. At the highest level, 
in the Europe 2020 Strategy released 2010 (EC 2010), 
the flagship initiative “Innovation Union” aims to re-
focus R&D and innovation policy on societal challenges. 
Understanding innovation as a complex phenomenon 
that requires the interplay of several until now more 
isolated policy fields, the strategy also aims to improve 
framework conditions for businesses to innovate. In this 
context, IPR and standards-related initiatives are explicitly 
mentioned. In addition to Europe 2020, the Investment 
Plan (EC 2014a) is also to be considered. Reacting to 
weak investment climate, the Investment Plan intends to 
remove obstacles to investment, to provide visibility and 
technical assistance to investment projects and to make 
smarter use of new and existing financial resources. The 
starting point of the plan is to improve the investment 
environment in the EU by fostering the predictability and 
quality of regulation and removing regulatory barriers in 
key sectors acknowledging the impact of regulation on 
innovation (Blind 2012, 2016). 
Standardisation can take different forms, 
ranging from the adoption of consensus 
based standards by the recognised 
European or national standards bodies, 
through consortia and fora, to agreements 
between independent companies. We 
call all these organisations Standard 
Development Organisations (SDOs), but 
the recognised bodies formal SDOs.
Standard means a technical specification, 
adopted by a recognised standardisation 
body, for repeated or continuous application, 
with which compliance is not compulsory.
Technical specification means a document 
that prescribes technical requirements to 
be fulfilled by a product, process, service 
or system.
Definition of standardisation, 
standards and technical 
specifications
Source: European Commission 2011d. European Commission 2012.
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In parallel, the Joint Initiative on Standardisation (JIS) 
adopted in 2016 aims to modernise the way standards are 
developed in Europe. It specifically focuses on promoting 
faster standards development, closing the gap between 
research priorities and European standardisation, clearer 
prioritization, and a stronger international presence.
More specifically and in relation to ICT, standardisation has 
a crucial role to play in increasing interoperability of new 
technologies within the Digital Single Market Strategy (EC 
2015). The development of new technologies such as 5G 
wireless communications, digitalisation of manufacturing 
(Industry 4.0) and construction processes, data-driven and 
cloud-based services, cybersecurity, eHealth, e-transport 
and mobile payments are listed as examples and in gener-
al confirmed in the communication on ICT Standardisation 
Priorities for the Digital Single Market (EC 2016a). 
Particularly in the context of ICT technologies, a strategic 
approach is needed according to the EC (EC 2016a). This 
is because
— There is a need to ensure that standardisation output, 
but also the stock of standards, keeps pace with the 
development of new technologies.
— There is a challenge for Europe, since standards devel-
opment is increasingly taking place outside of Europe, 
threatening European companies’ innovativeness and 
competitiveness.
— In this context, the fact that standardisation is driven 
“bottom-up” by industry players must be accounted for 
(i.e., the activity of industry-driven ICT fora and consor-
tia) – whereas the implications for the citizens of the 
EU have to be considered, too.
— SEPs in particular have become an increasingly rele-
vant feature in standardisation in the area of digital 
communication with increasing implications for the 
traditional manufacturing sectors (e.g. via Internet of 
Things or Industry 4.0) and crucial for the business 
models of research-focused companies and organisa-
tions.
— Finally, the increasing relevance of OSS calls for more 
use of open source elements by better integrating 
open source communities into SDOs’ standard setting 
processes endorsed by the recent communication of 
the European Commission (EC 2017) on SEPs.
One important specific strategic response at the European 
level is the establishment of the EU Rolling Plan for ICT 
Standardisation. According to the 2017 edition of the 
Rolling Plan, the European Commission, with the Rolling 
Plan and in collaboration with a multi-stakeholder platform 
(MSP), “…provides a unique bridge between EU policies 
and standardisation activities in the field of information 
and communication technologies (ICT) and thus, it allows 
for increased convergence of the efforts of standardisation 
makers towards European policy goals in the ICT domain” 
(EC 2016a). Whereas as far as SEPs are concerned, the 
European Commission addresses in its Digital Single 
Market Strategy (EC 2015) and the recent communication 
on SEPs (EC 2017) the need for a framework to balance 
the interests between right holders and implementers of 
SEPs. In the 2018 edition of the Rolling Plan, patents are 
not mentioned any more. In contrast, the relationship to 
OSS was not yet mentioned in 2015, but only the “use of 
open source elements by better integrating open source 
communities into SDOs’ standard setting processes” (EC 
2016b). However, this communication concludes with the 
objective that “the Commission will work with stakeholders, 
open source communities and SDOs for successful 
interaction between open source and standardisation, 
by means of studies and analyses” (EC 2017, p. 13). 
The 2018 edition of the Rolling Plan announced that the 
European Commission in collaboration with SDOs and OSS 
organisations launched an action to analyse the impact 
of open source in the cloud standardisation process (EC 
2018). As further action in this area, activities are foreseen 
to strengthen the interlock between standardisation and 
OSS in the area of Cloud and establish and support 
bilateral actions for close collaboration of open source 
and standardisation. Besides the area of cloud, the 
standardisation related to blockchain should be closer 
coordinated with open source projects in this area. In the 
past, robot operating systems have been developed and 
maintained as OSS by universities and research institutes 
without reaching yet the stability and maturity to become 
full standards. Here, no specific action is proposed.
The question then arises, coming from the general 
strategic vision, of how standards development can 
be supported in practice in order to reap the possible 
benefits of OSS. This also includes proper dealing with 
the relationship between IP and standards in general and 
OSS and standards in particular. One first requirement is 
that the positive economic benefits of standards, which 
also justify public support for their development process, 
e.g. in form of mandates, are only exploited if they are 
implemented at a large scale. Against this backdrop, 
public procurement plays an important role. Companies 
could be incentivised via public procurement (Blind 2008) 
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to implement the most recently developed standards. 
This could be achieved, for example, by catalogues of 
standards that guide public procurers in drafting their 
tenders. In addition to the promotion of standards, even 
including SEPs, via public procurement, the procurement 
of OSS based products could be promoted even further 
by standards relying on OSS addressed in the open source 
software strategy of the European Commission. 
Other areas are the EU funded research, technological 
development and innovation (RTDI) and pilot projects, 
as well as Public Procurement for Innovation. The current 
European research and innovation program Horizon 
2020 includes standardisation processes as transfer and 
implementation mechanism and standards as additional 
success indicators for innovation in addition to scientific 
publications and patents (European Commission 2011a, 
2011b, 2011c). The EU Rolling Plan for ICT Standardisation 
2016 provides input to H2020, as “…the impact of 
standards on R&I may be on different levels: R&I projects 
may contribute to standardisation work; standardisation 
may be a tool for adopting and exploiting new technologies; 
and standardisation may contribute input to R&I work or 
R&I activities may build on standardisation work that is 
available or in progress” (EC 2016b) as already elaborated 
by Blind and Gauch (2009). Consequently, in the Rolling 
Plan 2017 it is even claimed that “initiatives linking ICT 
standardisation and ICT R&I appear to be most effective 
when carried out at the research planning stage (see 
Goluchowicz and Blind 2011 on need of standardisation 
foresight). Standardisation awareness is therefore 
essential in the research life cycle. Standardisation bodies 
have partially set up links into research activities for 
facilitating the uptake of standardisation deliverables in 
research projects and the transfer of research results into 
standardisation” (EC 2016c). In addition, recent initiatives, 
like Responsible Research and Innovation (EC 2014b), ask 
for sharing research results, e.g. via open access, to improve 
research and innovation. Finally, Moedas (2016) promotes 
openness leading to the vision that in 2030 open source 
communities and others offer “free public access to all 
scientific data as well as to all publicly funded research”. 
However, he also is aware that the EU has to preserve 
“its economic interests, notably as regards intellectual 
property rights and standards” despite open innovation, 
open science and international collaboration enabling 
“global standard-setting”, allowing global challenges to 
be tackled more effectively, and facilitating participation 
in global value chains and new and emerging markets. 
Finally, “Europe needs to create the right regulatory 
environment that removes obstacles to innovation and 
encourages innovators and entrepreneurs, while rules 
and standard-setting must keep up with rapidly changing 
technologies”. In summary, we face not only the tension 
between openness and intellectual property rights, but 
also the trade-off between developing global standards in 
rather complex and lengthy processes and adapting them 
to the increasing dynamics in science and technology in 
order to exploit their innovation promoting impact, as 
shown by Blind et al. (2016).
In parallel, the European Commission supports OSS with 
funding under the EU research and innovation funding 
programme Horizon 2020 and has called for greater use 
of open source elements by better integrating open source 
communities into SDOs’ standard setting processes, 
notably for cloud computing (Open Forum Europe 2017b). 
It has a dedicated and publicly available open source 
software strategy in place for its own use.
The overall conclusion at the level of operational support 
is that standardisation is playing an increasing crucial role 
in Europe’s innovation system by being more closely linked 
both to research and innovation programs, like within 
Horizon 2020, and to demand-driven innovation policies, 
like public procurement and regulation, e.g. via Public 
Procurement of Innovative solutions (PPI) and the New 
Legislative Framework, former known as New Approach, 
but also to the numerous general EU and specific ICT-
related policy initiatives.
Having looked at the operational policies, we turn our 
attention now to the institutional level. In general, IPR 
regimes have to follow the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which we 
have to take into account. However, the modernisation 
of the EU copyright rules, e.g. related to data bases, 
might have also implications on OSS being relevant for 
answering the research questions and the derivation of 
policy recommendations.
Standards are developed by various stakeholders within a 
process following the WTO (1995) criteria of transparency, 
openness, impartiality and consensus, effectiveness, 
relevance and coherence. Whereas traditional industries 
in manufacturing have been successfully triggered by 
national standards, already the development of mobile 
communication required at least a European approach 
illustrated by the successful GSM standard (Pelkmans 
2001). Furthermore, the great success of the Internet has 
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only been possible by globally organised standardisation 
consortia like the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). 
Consequently, future developments in ICT, like the Internet 
of Things (NIST 2013) and the next generation of mobile 
communication, i.e. 5G, require global solutions, i.e. 
standards, to become globally successful innovations.
Consequently, such globally accepted standards require 
standardisation processes and SDOs, which are effectively 
and efficiently able to involve all relevant stakeholders. 
Changing existing rules, e.g. by opening standardisation 
processes, as well as effective governance of the agreed 
rules is necessary. SDOs are platforms representing 
the interests of their stakeholders or the countries 
they are accredited by, e.g. national SDOs. In order to 
achieve cooperation between the various SDOs requires 
coordination of the governance especially, related to 
the standardisation processes and their results, i.e. the 
coherence of standards and their contents, but also their 
accessibility.
Governance of standardisation processes in terms of 
coordination between SDOs, and particularly in view of IPR 
policies, is tricky. On the one hand, the treatment of IPRs, 
especially patents, requires a coordinated approach in 
order to avoid negative impacts of phenomena like forum 
shopping, e.g. both in standardisation and in IP litigation 
(Lerner and Tirole 2006). Besides the challenge of 
designing and implementing efficient patent policies, the 
interaction between patents and OSS is creating a further 
tension. On the other hand, the business models of SDOs 
are quite different. For example, some SDOs are funding 
their activities by asking for significant membership fees 
(mainly consortia). By contrast, the “traditional” national 
SDOs still generate a significant share of their revenues 
from selling standards documents, which might be 
challenged by OSS being an important input into the 
standards.
One important key aspect of SDO activities (and also 
a major issue for policymakers) is the balancing of 
competing objectives and interests. In the Communication 
“A strategic vision for European Standards” (COM 
(2011)311), the European Commission focuses on the five 
strategic objectives for European Standardisation:
— Quick availability of standards
— European standards to support the competitiveness of 
European businesses
— Standards to support EU legislation and policies
— Inclusiveness of the standardisation process
— Standards to support the competitiveness of European 
businesses at global level
There are inherent conflicts of objectives, not the least 
from an institutional point of view. For example, including 
all relevant stakeholders might not be compatible with 
increasing the speed of standardisation. Furthermore, 
standards are asked not only to support EU legislation, 
according to the New Legislative Framework defined in EU 
regulation 1025/2012 on European Standardization, but 
also EU policies in general, and programmes like Horizon 
2020, as well as European business at the European and 
international level. Overall, a challenging set of objectives 
is expected from European standards. 
The objective of the study is to identify possible 
commonalities and barriers for interaction between 
standardisation and opens source processes. The study 
should clarify the role of open source in the context of 
standard setting, in particular its interplay with proprietary 
knowledge solutions included in the standard (FRAND 
licensing) and should provide an overview of OSS and 
FRAND features in standardisation. The analysis should 
also provide clarification of the different concepts of 
openness: ‘openness’ in standards, ‘open source’, ‘open 
standards’ etc. It should consider in particular the following 
issues on the compatibility of OSS and FRAND licensing:
— The general compatibility of OSS licensing with FRAND 
licensing differentiated by type of OSS licensing (e.g. 
General Public License).
— What is the impact of GPL licensing and other OSS 
licensing forms (considering passing on the rights to 
next users of the software without need to obtain a 
licence from the original IPR owner) on interoperability?
— As to how far is the interplay of OSS and FRAND licens-
ing directed by the borderline between software and 
hardware? Is this borderline shifting or vanishing over 
time?
— What is the relevance of software patentability in this 
respect? What is the degree of computer-implemented 
inventions (often called software patents) in relevant 
technologies (e.g. cloud computing; geospatial tech-
nologies)?
— To which extent do the different practices of software 
patentability in Europe, the US (and other countries/
regions in the world) matter for shifting this border-
line and for shaping the interplay of different licensing 
models?
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In addition, the following issues should be addressed:
— Other possible barriers (beyond licensing issues) for in-
teraction between OSS and standardisation processes.
— Differences in development processes of OSS Commu-
nities and SDOs.
— Stability, sustainability and maintenance of OSS pro-
jects supporting the standardisation process and OSS 
community building issues.
— Interoperability of OSS applications and products.
The study will provide a comprehensive overview of the 
relevant existing policies with SDOs and of existing col-
laboration actions between SDOs and OSS. It includes an 
overview of OSS/FRAND combining practices by industry 
in relevant sectors (namely cloud computing, 5G, IoT, cy-
bersecurity, big data, geospatial technologies, robotics and 
others) and the feedback from a representative stakehold-
er dialogue. While taking into consideration the available 
literature in the field the analysis will in particular consider 
the following questions:
— What is the degree of participation of OSS projects, 
implementing standards with FRAND licensing?
— How do large companies combine open source and 
FRAND licences in their business models?
— How does this shape their contributions to standard 
setting?
— Is a combination of both concepts feasible also with 
SMEs (considering the risk of litigation and lack of re-
sources to negotiate FRAND contracts)?
— What are the existing IPR policies combining OSS and 
FRAND practices at leading SDOs?
— How is OSS involvement into the standardisation 
process impacted by the standardisation maturity of 
the digital technology domain (e.g. standardisation in 
mobile networking), the speed of technology develop-
ments (e.g. cloud, IoT) and the market characteristics 
(e.g. intensity of competition)?
— Is there a need for regulation or other kind of public 
action at European or global level?
The final analysis will come up with a list of policy recom-
mendations and a roadmap of future actions at EU level. 
It should compare policy objectives of OSS and FRAND 
licensing and it should provide a systematic overview of 
relevant IPR policies. It should analyse and compare best 
practice examples of OSS and FRAND licensing co-exist-
ence and develop policy guidelines therefrom.
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. In 
chapter 2, we summarise the insights from the review 
of the literature. In chapter 3, the insights from the case 
studies are displayed in a condensed form. Chapter 4 
sumps up the results of the stakeholder survey. In chap-
ter 5, we present the comprehensive analysis of our find-
ings of the three approaches of our study concerning the 
governance architecture of SDOs. Finally, we derive poli-
cy recommendations in the last chapter. In the Annex, the 
complete literature review, the whole case study analysis 
and the detailed results of the stakeholder survey are 
presented.

2  LITERATURE REVIEW
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The literature review used two types of sources. On the 
one hand, we searched for all academic literature on 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and standardisation 
in information and communication technologies with a 
specific focus on patents and copyright issues, open source 
software in particular. On the other hand, we screened the 
publication of the standardisation organisations and other 
associations for recent publications related to open source 
software.
2 | Literature Review
2.1. Methodology of the literature review
2.2. Results of the literature review
within formal or informal standardisation bodies but are 
eventually implemented as OSS projects. The second 
option is the initial implementation of software via OSS 
projects followed by a standardisation process. The third 
and final option is the parallel development of standards 
and their implementation as OSS. 
In order to structure our review of academic papers, we 
divide the studies into three categories following Lundell 
and Gamalielsson (2017), but also Clark (2016) without 
immediately considering the tension between OSS 
licences and the FRAND regime related to patents. First, 
we consider cases, which start as standardisation projects 
FRAND commitments are designed to 
ensure that essential IPR protected 
technology incorporated in a standard is 
accessible to the users of that standard 
on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms and conditions. In particular, FRAND 
commitments can prevent IPR holders 
from making the implementation of a 
standard difficult by refusing to license or 
by requesting unfair or unreasonable fees 
(in other words excessive fees) after the 
industry has been locked-in to the standard 
or by charging discriminatory royalty fees.
FRAND Commitments 
Source: European Commission 2011d.
There are examples of the implementation of standards 
via OSS discussed in the literature. However, these 
standards are mainly developed in SDOs following 
a royalty free (RF) licensing scheme, for example at 
the Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS) and the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C). According to Phipps (2019), these SDOs 
are characterised by an implementation-led rather than a 
requirement-led standardisation approach. There are also 
some standards released by SDOs applying the FRAND 
regime. However, there are no declarations of SEPs related 
to these standards. Nevertheless, there is still the latent 
fear of conflicts with potential SEP holders, because of 
the general contradiction between the FRAND regime and 
OSS licences. In particular, the popular GPL is incompatible 
with FRAND, but there are several other OSS licences, like 
the MIT or BSD licences, being compatible with FRAND 
according to Kappos and Harrington (2019). However, 
there is no general consensus about this conclusion (see 
also EC 2012b), because others argue that they are just 
complementary, but not compatible (Phipps 2019). In 
addition, the notion of the incompatibility of the licensing 
regimes is endorsed by a significant percentage of open 
source programmers (Bekkers and Updegrove 2013). Due 
2.2.1. Scenario 1: Standards implemented as OSS (“standard first”)
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to the highlighted relevance of standards implementation 
for their quality and success, the concerns of the OSS 
communities related to the ambiguity in the licensing 
conditions gain further in relevance.
The second scenario according to Lundell and Gamalielson 
(2017) is characterised by the initial implementation 
of software, which eventually leads into technical 
specifications of standards also called implementation-
led standardisation by Phipps (2019). Under this scenario, 
a software implementation precedes the development 
and endorsement of the technical specifications of a 
standard released either by a formal and or informal SDO. 
According to Li (2017), it is in general more complex for 
SDOs to utilise open source working practice to develop 
standards. She differentiates between two sub-scenarios. 
On the one hand SDOs can use source code directly in 
specifications. One the other hand, specifications refer to 
the same functions they derive from open source projects. 
The direct use of running code requires at first the check 
of the copyright issue over this specification, because 
SDOs own the copyright of specifications, while in the 
open source project developers remain the right holder. 
The major problem is that it is uncertain whether SDOs 
still can claim the copyright if code is included as part of 
the specifications. This problem is confirmed by Lundell 
and Gamalielsson (2017), who conclude their paper not 
only with the open question of which open source licence 
should be used, but more important which organisation has 
or should have the copyright for the developed software 
in which the technical specification of the standard is 
implemented.  
In the second sub-scenario presented by Li (2017), the code 
included in the specifications of the standards becomes 
essential, like patent-protected knowledge in the case of 
essential patents. Here, addressing the copyright issue 
becomes even more crucial. According to her analysis of 
ETSI, ITU and IEEE, none of them have a particular clause 
regarding essential copyright. The ETSI IPR policy even 
emphasizes that software embedded in specifications 
shall not be used as mandatory for compliance (ETSI 
2017). 
In addition to including software code in the technical 
specifications of standards, the functions from OSS 
code can also be adopted in a standard. Here, Li (2017) 
distinguishes between the licences applicable to the OSS 
code. If the OSS licence does not contain any patent 
clauses, the patent issue could only be left to the policies 
of the relevant SDO, which might eventually subject to the 
FRAND commitment (according to Li 2017). However, if an 
OSS licence includes a patent clause, the patent right is 
granted on a RF base. The open question is whether SDOs 
can require the patent owners who contribute patents to 
the standard to licence it under FRAND licence even if 
there is already an OSS licence with RF patent licensing. 
However, Li (2017) cannot find any entitlements for SDOs 
to do so in their current IPR regimes.
Since most SDOs have no specific rules regarding the 
licensing of OSS code integrated in the specifications of 
standards, Li (2017) concludes that the OSS licensing 
terms are the “only clear applicable rule”. Consequently, 
granting RF licences should be applied to use the code 
in standard embedded technologies. However, such rules 
might be a strong disincentive for at least some patent 
owning innovators, because the option to collect royalties 
on SEPs might be one of the main incentives for many 
innovators to contribute standardisation (e.g. Lerner 
and Tirole 2015). However, in the survey by Blind et al. 
(2011) patent owning companies rate the relevance of 
the freedom to operate achieved by a standard as much 
higher.
In addition to the conflict regarding the licensing terms for 
OSS and patents, there is a systemic difference in licensing 
software according to the OSS licensing terms and patents 
according to FRAND. OSS licences follow a cascade 
effect, which restrict the implementers of OSS in other 
areas not applicable to FRAND (Li 2017). Although using 
patents for free, OSS licences contain in general a “patent 
retaliation” clause, which discourages recipients from 
litigating against the work that incorporates the patented 
contribution by terminating the patent right. The idea is 
to prevent implementers from filing lawful litigation, if 
they find their patents included in the same work have 
been infringed. However, the current IPR regimes of SDOs 
guarantee patent owners this opportunity.
In summary, the current frameworks of formal SDOs and 
informal consortia obviously allow the integration of OSS 
into their standard development process and standards. 
2.2.2. Scenario 2 OSS code as input into a standard (“software implementation first”)
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Whereas in the previous two scenarios a more or less 
clear distinction between the starting point of the process 
and the transfer in the other area has been drawn, 
Scenario 3 represents the reciprocal action between the 
development of technical specifications of a standard 
together in parallel with the development of one (or 
several) implementations(s) of technical specifications of 
a standard in OSS software.
Lundell and Gamalielsson (2017) further developing 
Gamalielsson et al. (2015) analyse the bi-directional 
influences between the OSS project Drupal provided 
under the GPL licence version 2 being a copyleft type 
and the development of the RDFa (Resource Description 
Framework in Attributes) standard for the interchange 
of data on the Web at W3C. Support for RDFa 1.0 was 
achieved in the OSS project Drupal by its first implemented 
in the core of Drupal 7 (RDFa is implemented in a separate 
module in Drupal). 
Summarizing the insights related to the third scenario of 
parallel developments in OSS and standardisation confirm 
on the one hand the observations related to the first and 
second scenario. In the early days of the Internet, IETF as a 
consortium driven by individual members, like OSS projects, 
has been involved in the development of an email format 
in parallel to OSS projects. However, the few cases of close 
interaction between OSS and standardisation are mainly 
focused on consortia, which have strict RF and rather 
patent intolerant licensing policies, i.e. W3C or OASIS. 
They have been already been identified as being in a good 
position to integrate input from OSS projects in contrast to 
formal SDOs applying the FRAND scheme. The recursive 
integration of inputs from standardisation respective OSS 
may lead to a virtuous circle of standards of higher quality 
and broader distribution. In contrast, the challenges for the 
FRAND based SDOs and consortia already elaborated for 
the unidirectional relations also will create difficulties for 
the parallel developments. In the long run, higher quality 
standards due to inputs from OSS and their broader 
diffusion via OSS will put further pressure on formal SDOs 
and informal consortia following the FRAND regime.
The limited focus of SDOs on copyright in general and 
software or open source software in particular has certainly 
economic implications in various dimensions. First, the few 
SDOs or consortia explicitly addressing software are able 
to develop a stronger profile in standardising topics based 
on software alone or on the combination of software and 
hardware. Here, the actors with standardisation needs 
obviously decide according to the perceived competencies 
of the SDOs including the governance related to software. 
Second, the FRAND regime relevant to the licensing of 
standard-essential patents established in traditional 
SDOs, i.e. members of ISO and therefore guided by the ISO/
IEC/ITU IPR policy, is not necessarily attracting contributors 
to OSS, which are used by rather royalty free dominated 
licensing schemes. Therefore, a separation or division 
of work can be expected also in the future despite the 
significant efforts in particular by ETSI to find solutions for 
the coexistence of FRAND licensing and OSS licences as 
expressed by some of their members organised within the 
Fair Standards Alliance (2017). Secondly, the rather strict 
royalty free based policies of OASIS and W3C following 
the OSS licensing schemes facilitate the implementation 
of their standards. Third, the IPR policies of SDOs related to 
software are linked to their business models, in particular 
those that do not make their deliverables freely available. 
It seems more difficult to sell standards under a royalty 
free regime integrating OSS in standards. However, this 
tension has not yet been addressed in the publications of 
SDOs and consortia.
2.2.3. Scenario 3: OSS and standardisation in parallel (“standard and implementation 
of standard in parallel”)
SDOs, like W3C and OASIS, which have meanwhile more 
a RF culture related to patents and consequently rather 
limited number or no SEPs at all, are forerunners in starting 
proactive initiatives to include OSS in their standards. 
Despite the challenges for SDOs applying FRAND, the 
strict exclusion of OSS code in standards’ specifications 
is certainly no sustainable strategy, because the 
available OSS code is already large and further growing. 
Furthermore, some OSS communities already claim to set 
de facto standards, which is challenging both formal SDOs 
and informal consortia (Updegrove 2015). Finally, both 
the increasing competition between SDOs and consortia 
and the additional competitors from the OSS communities 
as additional standard setters are likely to increase the 
pressure to cooperate with the latter. Industry standards 
may also be developed by competition between OSS 
communities, forgoing formal specification altogether.
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The background as presented in the literature review leads, 
first, to very general conclusions as regards the growing 
importance of standard setting processes and their use 
of IPR, not only patents, but also copyrights on software. 
The general assessment is, secondly, that standardisation 
has a multidimensional role. It intermediates between 
science and technology driven research and innovation 
and demand-sided innovation policies (OECD 2011) 
framed by various regulatory framework conditions. 
Patents and copyright-protected software including open 
source software are the major IPRs used as inputs for ICT-
standardisation and also relevant for the accessibility of 
the output of ICT standardisation. Therefore, IPR utilisation 
in standardisation processes adds a further dimension.
In general, standards are developed by a number of 
different actors within a voluntary consensus-oriented 
process. Considering the accompanied increasing variety 
of interests of actors involved in standard setting, standard 
setting governance determines the success of SDOs in the 
sense of integrating the different interests at stake also 
asked for the European Commission. Effective rule setting 
and governance of SDOs are crucial for the successful 
development and eventually the implementation of 
standards. The IPR policy approaches developed by SDOs 
will have to consider not only specific rules and procedures 
for FRAND licensing relevant for patents, but even more for 
the treatment of open source software.
2.3. Summary

3  CASE STUDIES
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The case studies report was developed following these steps.
First, insight into the specific area of interest was gathered 
through multiple open-ended, qualitative, in-depth 
interviews with representatives of key stakeholders, 
especially organisations that participate in standards 
development, open source activities or both, SEP rights 
holders, European and international SDO, and major 
open source communities, standardisation consortia 
and umbrella organisations. The interviews followed an 
interview guide approved by the European Commission 
and steering committee established to accompany the 
study. They are tailored to gain a deep understanding 
of the experience of the participants regarding the 
interaction between FRAND licensing and open source 
from a cultural, governance and legal perspective. The 
individual interviews are not targeted towards a specific 
case study. However, the exchange with the participants 
revealed interesting cases. 
The interviews resulted in a set of findings and an initial 
understanding of the subject. Based on these findings, 
data about the case studies has been gathered in a 
second step, through field work, directed research and 
direct interaction with the case study subject entities. The 
interviewees had been informed about the selected cases 
and encouraged to provide more specific input if they can.
In the final step, the findings from the interviews and the 
case studies have been aggregated into informed insights 
about the motivators and inhibitors of SDO and OSS 
collaboration.
3 | Case studies
3.1. Concept and methodology
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Motivators and barriers to collaboration
The terms and conditions under which 
others can use Open Source code are 
defined in Open Source licences chosen 
by the authors. All Open Source licences 
give users the rights to use, study, 
modify and redistribute the code. The 
licences are anchored in the copyright of 
the authors; however, they establish an 
agreement that may include additional 
obligations, including patent grants. 
Reciprocal Open Source licences obligate 
the user to distribute their modifications 
under a similar licence. Permissive 
Open Source licences do not require 
reciprocity. Licences from both groups 
may or may not contain patent licensing 
requirements. Many Open Source licenses 
exist, however only few of them are 
widely used in recent practise. The choice 
of Open Source licence that a community 
makes strongly influences community 
governance and interactions with other 
stakeholders, including SDOs.
Types of OSS licences  
and relation to patents
The case studies indicate that all three layers of interaction 
identified in the expert interviews – cultural fit, governance 
models and legal framework – are relevant influences 
on the viability of collaboration between SDO and open 
source communities. Collaboration has to be possible 
and to be preferable over working separately. One key 
aspect to understanding this interaction is the principle 
of voluntary participation. Neither side can instruct the 
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other to perform certain tasks or to focus for example 
on implementation versus specification. Collaboration 
probably needs to be envisioned as an integrated cyclic 
process with feedback loops between specification and 
implementation, and shared responsibility for both aspects 
between all participants. A positive influence may be the 
match of the timelines for producing results between 
SDOs and open source communities, while businesses 
may be driven by shorter development cycles under time-
to-market pressure.
It is obvious that the availability of the product of the wider 
open source community partially disrupts existing business 
models, especially if they are built on the exclusivity of 
implementation details, trade secrets and patent protection 
of functionality that gradually grows to be implemented 
as a public open source good. Usually, this is the result 
of a well-functioning market with competition between 
different collaboration models, as long as this gradual shift 
is caused by market pull. Care should be taken if business 
models are made viable or invalidated by external push. 
Most of the presented cases developed without noticeable 
regulatory encouragement or investment, indicating that it 
can be assumed that the coordination of standardisation 
processes is achieved through competition in the market. 
Regulatory interventions into the market need to be 
assessed carefully for the balance of the possible positive 
effects and welfare losses.
The assumption that committee work at SDOs is 
necessary to produce complex standards that cover a wide 
range of functionality across different technology areas, 
which was raised during some of the expert interviews, 
cannot be confirmed. Communities like Cloud Foundry or 
OpenStack produce comprehensive software platforms 
that require research and development investment, long-
term commitment and effective governance norms and 
IPR regimes of similar or larger efforts compared to some 
standards development efforts. All these aspects have 
been found implemented in open source communities as 
well as in SDOs. The success of the development effort 
seems to depend more on momentum, the intention to 
overcome obstacles and work towards a common goal, 
and the personal motivation of the participants involved. 
The diligent review of specifications performed in SDOs 
has shown a positively stabilising effect that enables 
implementers to produce conforming products. 
The expectation that “open source is welcome to join but 
must accept our established SDO governance framework” 
illustrates that especially long-term participants in SDO 
activities assume a mixed perspective of peers in the 
standardisation process and authority. As peers in the 
standardisation process, they interact with others, including 
open source communities, as equal market participants 
that compete at eye level. When they assume a position 
of authority, they project the gravitas of the institution 
(usually the formally recognised SDO) they are embedded 
in and demand that potential collaborators accept its 
relevance and follow its IPR regime. The cases indicate 
that formal recognition (which with regard to this study 
currently only exists for SDOs) is helpful but not enough 
to entice parties to mutual collaboration. Other drivers for 
example are technical relevance, effective processes and 
a cultural fit.
Interfering with market forces to enable specific business 
models carries the risks of perpetuating historical 
developments or missing promising new approaches. 
Regulators usually attempt to create a legal framework 
for innovators that enables competition between 
alternative approaches and let different business models 
compete in the market for viability. From the perspective 
of the standardisation process, SDOs and open source 
communities should be considered peers and equal actors 
in a “standardisation market”, especially because of their 
partially differing characteristics that cater to different 
market needs.
3.2.2. Business and collaboration models
3.2.3. Collaboration models
3.2.4. Creating a level playing field
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Hardware and software exhibit different economics 
based on unit marginal cost being the equilibrium price in 
markets with efficient competition. The commoditisation 
and virtualisation of hardware functions in software does 
not just drive down prizes, they also transition functionality 
from physical to information goods. The growth of open 
source communities is one piece of evidence for this more 
general shift towards commoditisation and hardware 
function virtualisation. The case studies show that 
even in the same market segment, the IPR frameworks 
applied cannot easily be transferred from hardware to 
software implementations, as they will not necessarily be 
accepted by participants. Instead, a new set of separate 
and disjunctive behavioural norms for collaborative and 
competitive environments emerged. Where collaboration 
is the dominant model, the common expectation is that 
all contributing entities that form the community jointly 
act as a steward over the created technology and make it 
available to everybody. Where collaboration is not suitable, 
actors compete as before and focus on differentiating 
product features. Institutions have emerged that facilitate 
participation in the collaboration process, like the major 
open source umbrella organisations as well as SDOs, like 
IETF or W3C, and that create IPR frameworks representing 
the concept of joint stewardship in the collaborative 
environment, like the Open Invention Network.
3.2.5. Suitable IPR regimes
Since networking and telecommunications technology 
are especially affected by the tensions between SDO and 
open source IPR regimes, stakeholders in these specific 
technologies have been particularly motivated to provide 
input to the case studies. However, the interaction between 
standards and open source development most noticeably 
affects software/software and software/hardware 
interfaces, so that the cases still describe a representative 
subset of the relevant subject matter for the study. The 
following paragraphs try to summarise a number of take-
aways from the case studies.
First, fruitful collaborations between standards and open 
source development exist, as for example in the case 
of the White Rabbit project, the different programming 
languages or the Linux operating system. The processes 
applied by these collaborations evolved over time, and 
continue to do so, resulting in well-established governance 
models.
Open source approaches are suitable for the development 
of research and development heavy innovations that 
require significant up-front investments in large, diverse 
stakeholder networks. Open source communities are 
commonly driven by their own set of motivations mostly 
based on technical needs. Non-contributing entities have 
little impact on setting their technical roadmaps. Based 
on that, a collaboration between standards and open 
source development is difficult to enforce especially 
considering the generally voluntary nature of participation 
on both sides. Some projects even adopt implementation-
only policies, which potentially leaves a gap where no 
specifications will be produced that can be referenced by 
regulators or other stakeholders.
While individual open source projects may serve a specific 
technical need and may remain relatively small in terms of 
contributor and contribution counts, with the adoption of 
their products they become part of a complex upstream/
downstream network of continuously integrated open 
source technologies that develop in lockstep based on 
decentralized coordination and a normalised, negotiation-
free IPR regime. 
Different widely adopted open source projects have 
developed IPR regimes that combine source code 
licensing and patent licensing. They all however effectively 
implement royalty-free patent licensing schemes.
In cases where larger organisations decide to participate in 
open source development, the benefit from gaining access 
to the totality of contributions made by other collaborators 
commonly outweighs the potential gains from royalty-
bearing patent licensing.
Once actors in a market segment congregate to establish 
open source collaboration for the provision of foundational 
software technologies for that segment, the focus of the 
collaboration sometimes shifts away from specification 
to joint implementation. The jointly developed solution 
effectively solves the interoperability and software quality 
problems.
3.3. Assessment of the interaction
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Technology areas where specifications communicate 
the basic uses of the technology independent of the 
use of specific implementations, as in the case of the 
programming languages covered by the cases, remain 
standards-development driven, but adopt collaborative 
open source methods to develop new standard features. 
They may for example make draft specification or 
discussions of new features openly available, even if the 
balloted standards still need to be purchased for a fee.
In some cases, the wider open source community actively 
invests to prevent business-critical technology from being 
dominated by single or small numbers of companies. The 
number of independent contributing entities to a specific 
software product is an important metric of community 
health in practice. 
Software-focused standards development projects rarely 
take the technical lead with specifications that are then 
implemented by the wider open source community as 
reference implementations. SDOs are usually not the 
entities developing new and innovative technologies. It 
is more common that vibrant open source communities 
incubate new technologies that then become candidates 
for standardisation.
One of the most successful software innovations in 
general, Java, provides an example where specification, 
reference implementation and test suite are jointly 
developed in presence of royalty-free licensed SEP, but 
outside an SDO.
Voluntary open source contributions and contributions 
generated through direct research and development 
investments of companies are complementary and 
can lead to similar results in terms of technical 
development underlining the argument that both are 
alternative approaches to the development of technical 
standards. Open source methods result in freely available 
implementations but depend on the willingness of 
contributors to create them. Proprietary research and 
development results in potentially patented inventions 
but can be funded through commercial investments. The 
approach selected for a specific scenario needs to take 
the composition and business models of the potential 
contributors to a new technology into account. Both 
approaches can be combined in a way that they compete 
for market share in the same market segment.
Innovative new technologies over time become commodity 
and tend to be collaboratively implemented as open 
source technologies. This open source implementation 
then demonstrates the state of the art and rarely leaves an 
opportunity for competitive inventiveness, since this would 
require a single inventor to compete with a consortium 
representing many of the relevant stakeholders in a 
market segment.
The traditionally separate assessment of SDOs and open 
source umbrella organisations becomes more difficult to 
maintain. Different aspects of standards development, 
like consensus building and ensuring interoperability and 
quality levels, are increasingly provided by open source 
umbrellas as well. Membership models of industry-
driven open source organisations also show similarities to 
models applied by some SDOs. For a better understanding 
it may be necessary to assess the individual functions 
of standards development separately with a utilitarian 
approach and less focused on the established institutional 
framework.
In summary, fruitful collaboration between standards and 
open source development can be observed in the cases. 
Successful royalty-bearing licensing of SEP in combination 
with open source development cannot be observed. Most 
SDOs represented in the cases as for example W3C or 
OASIS have adopted royalty-free or FRAND-Z SEP licensing 
schemes over time. Through the evolution of open source 
governance towards standardised behavioural norms, 
the wider open source community continues to build 
a commons of freely available foundational software 
technologies and grows and extends it also through patent 
cross-licensing and the increasing adoption of open source 
licences that include patent grants.
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4  STAKEHOLDER SURVEY
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The aim of the stakeholder survey was to gather and 
analyse the views of a broad set of stakeholders on the 
topic of the interplay between patents and OSS within 
standardisation processes in general and FRAND and OSS 
licences in particular, hereby creating a robust empirical 
representation of the opinions and issues at stake.
4 | Stakeholder survey
4.1. Methodology
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Respondents
Based on the insights from the literature review, the case 
studies, which already followed a rather detailed interview 
guideline, an online survey was designed. In parallel, a 
database of experts being active in the field, who have 
for example the workshop performed in the context of the 
other projects related to patents and standards, has been 
built up. By the middle of November, these experts, but 
also the several mailing lists have been informed about 
the survey.
In the following sections, we are presenting the man 
results of the stakeholder survey. Overall, 315 respondents 
started to complete the survey. However, the majority of 
the respondents did not continue to answer the following 
questions to the very end. 
More than 200 participants revealed their position in their 
organisation. On the one hand, around 20% are the Chief 
Executive Officers or in the top management. In general, 
responses from small organisations having below 250 
employees or younger organisations are provided by their 
CEOs, which has to be taken into account interpreting 
the differences in the answers between small and large 
organisations. Overall and in particular in larger companies, 
members of the R&D department, members of the R&D 
departments, but also of the legal and standardisation 
department have responded to the survey. The location 
of the participants’ countries is broadly distributed among 
20 countries with around one third of answers from France 
and Germany, but also 20% from the United States and 
Canada.
The information provided about the basic economic 
characteristics of the organisation is rather limited. 
Whereas the information about the annual turnover 
is rather incomplete and skewed with a median value 
of just above EUR 3 million, the average number of 
employees is above 20,000, but the median at 80 
employees. Therefore, we have a significant share of 
small- and medium-sized organisations, which enables 
us to split the sample in 31 organisations with more and 
45 organisations with less than 250 employees. This 
distinction will be used for a differentiated analysis of 
the responses.
Around 20% of the organisations are providing software, 
another 10% are independent software developers mainly 
working for small- and medium-sized organisations. 
Another third of the respondents are representing mainly 
larger organisations producing final goods, supplying 
components, being systems integrators or network 
operators. In addition, almost 20% are employed by 
private or public research institutes or universities. Finally, 
respondents also represent organisations providing 
private or public services, i.e. the latter by governmental 
institutions.
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Not even half, but mainly larger organisations has applied 
for global patent families. This share is higher than the 
ratio reported in the Community Innovation Survey. In 
contrast, almost 60% have registered trademarks, two 
thirds even claim copyrights and even three quarter have 
globally registered domain. Industrial designs have only 
been registered by a third of the organisations. 
Since less than half of the organisations have applied 
for patents, consequently even a lower share of one 
third is licensing out or even selling patent families 
to third parties (Figure 1). If we just focus on those 
organisations applying for patents, 70% of them licence 
out their patents, which is a rather high share compared 
to value derived from the Community Innovation Survey. 
Regarding licensing in or buying patents, the share of 
organisations is almost identical at around one third. 
Obviously, there is a significant exchange of patent 
rights between the organisations owning patents, but 
the expected higher share of organisations licensing in 
patents cannot be observed.
4.2.2. Use of Intellectual Property Rights
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FIGURE 1*: LICENSING AND TRADING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS BETWEEN 2015-2017.
One third of the organisations own patents which 
refer to standards and open source. A slightly lower 
share of organisations has declared patent families 
to SDOs as potentially essential. Only one quarter of 
the organisations, i.e. almost half of the patent owning 
organisations, generate revenues out of these standard-
essential patent families. Slightly less than one quarter 
of the organisations have patents which are implemented 
in OSS projects and products. Finally, one quarter of the 
organisations are involved in other forms of licensing, in 
particular cross-licensing is mentioned. If we focus on 
the small organisations, then all the mentioned options 
are not used by more than 90% of the respondents. Only 
almost 15% of the small organisations mentioned that 
they licence in or buy patents and just above 10% own 
patent families which refer to standards or OSS.
In summary, the patent related activities of the responding 
organisations are concentrated at larger organisations, 
whereas the smaller organisations are almost completely 
excluded. However, the high licensing activities both inward 
and outward, which are much more than the number found 
in the Community Innovation Survey, are in line with both 
the high patent intensity of the sample and the need of 
the complex ICT industry to integrate technologies from 
producers of complementary products.
* Labels next to the bars in the figures indicate number of valid responses received in the survey.
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Around one half and mainly larger organisations are active 
in at least one of the different types of standardisation 
organisations. On average, an organisation is active 
in almost three different types of standardisation 
organisation. Most common is participation in international 
consortia, like OASIS, the Open Geospatial Consortium 
(OGC) and W3C, but in summary the majority is active in 
formal standardisation bodies, in particular ETSI.
Whereas only around half of the respondents are active 
in standardisation, almost 90% of the responding 
organisations are currently involved in open source 
development activities. In general, all organisations are 
using OSS, in particular as input into the application 
level. Around 80% of the responding organisations 
are occasionally contributors to OSS projects. The 
differentiation in larger and smaller organisations reveals 
that larger organisations are, in general, more involved 
in all activities with one important exception. Small 
organisations claim slightly more often to be a regular 
contributor to OSS despite their size disadvantage.
In order to identify the motivations of organisations to 
join both standardisation activities and OSS development, 
the respondents were asked to assess the relevance of a 
set of incentives (Figure 2). Starting with the incentives 
to standardise, we find that developing standards of high 
quality, carrying forward the state of the art of technology 
and finding technical solutions are most relevant for the 
respondents. The following motives, like company interest, 
knowledge creation, establishing networks, increasing 
reputation, specifying regulations, knowledge seeking, and 
market access are slight above medium relevance. Only 
of low relevance is the inclusion of own IPRs in standards. 
4.2.3. Involvement in standardisation and open source software
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FIGURE 2: INCENTIVES TO JOIN STANDARDISATION ACTIVITIES (SCALE: 1 = “VERY LOW”; 2 = “LOW“; 3 = “MEDIUM”; 4 = “HIGH“; 5 = “VERY HIGH”).
Looking at the motives to join OSS development (Figure 
3), we find the two incentives of developing code of high 
quality and carrying forward the state of art of technology 
on the two top position reaching an overall assessment 
above high relevance. Slightly below high relevance 
ranks finding technical solutions, company interest, 
shorter development times, knowledge creation, personal 
interest, increasing reputation, lower cost for R&D and 
establishing network. Again, the inclusion of own IPR in 
OSS is rated below low relevance. In addition to the listed 
incentives, some respondents underline the relevance of 
interoperability to be achieved both by standardisation 
and OSS. Furthermore, the contribution to OSS is perceived 
as a strategy to prevent proprietary software solutions, 
which might create a vendor lock-in and consequently 
closes markets instead of opening them. 
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If we compare the assessment of the incentives to 
join standardisation activities vs OSS development, 
we observe the following patterns. First, the relevance 
of almost all incentives are rated higher for OSS with 
two exceptions. The inclusion of own IPR is slightly more 
relevant for the participation in standardisation than 
for joining OSS. And standards are obviously a more 
effective approach to specify regulations, in particular in 
the European Union in the context of the New Approach. 
Secondly, the largest differences can be found for the 
incentive of lower cost for R&D and shorter development 
times, important drivers for joining OSS. In addition, the 
personal interest is assessed to be more relevant for 
the involvement in OSS. However, in addition to finding 
technical solutions the royalty free use of code, which is 
also connected to a positive return of investment in R&D, 
is obviously much more important for an involvement 
than the royalty free use of standards.
Finally, two thirds of the respondents expect an increase of 
importance of OSS compared to less than half related to 
standardisation. In the assessment of the current relevance, 
we observe a significant difference between large and small 
organisations related to the importance of standardisation. 
Whereas the two thirds of the former assess it as very 
important, this is the case for less than one third of the latter. 
This assessment is consistent with the lower participation 
of smaller organisations in standardisation bodies. Related 
to OSS, we observe not such a significant difference. 
Obviously, standardisation plays for small compared to large 
organisations a less relevant, whereas we cannot observe 
such a difference related to OSS. Related to the future, the 
expectations related to standardisation are overall balanced 
between an increased and constant relevance and quite 
similar between large and small organisations, whereas the 
majority of all organisations, in particular larger organisations, 
expects a further increase in the relevance of OSS.
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Surprisingly, all three options, i.e. standards as input 
into OSS, OSS as input into standardisation and 
parallel development in addition to the general 
interconnectedness of standard development and OSS 
activities are perceived by the respondents to happen on 
average “sometimes”. However, the distinction between 
large and small organisations reveals some more 
differentiated insights. Surprisingly, more than 50% of the 
organisations with less than 250 employees report that 
their standardisation and OSS development activities 
are always or often connected, whereas this is only the 
case for less than a third of the larger organisations. In 
particular, for more than half of the smaller organisations 
OSS is used as input for standardisation, whereas this is 
4.2.4. Interaction between OSS and standardisation
45The Relationship Between Open Source Software and Standard Setting
only claimed by 15% of the larger organisations. Finally, 
more than a third of the small organisations claim parallel 
developments in standardisation and OSS, whereas this is 
claimed only by 15% of the larger organisations. Overall, 
standards development and OSS activities are much more 
interconnected for smaller organisations, which much 
more often transfer OSS as input into standardisation, 
whereas this transfer and even the parallel development 
is not so common for larger organisations. Obviously, small 
organisations contribute much more to the integration of 
OSS and standardisation than large organisations.
Following the identification of the different types of 
interaction, the respondents have been asked for 
their assessment of the interaction between OSS and 
standardisation on their efficiency and results. Starting 
with looking at the impacts on standardisation (Figure 
4), we observe that the majority of the respondents 
expects a positive impact of this interconnection on 
standardisation. In particular, more than 70% of the 
respondents perceive a positive impact on the creation 
of specifications of technical solutions contributing 
to interoperability and only slightly less than 70% on 
the implementation of technical solutions. However, 
standardisation benefits less related to the ideation of 
new technical solutions, but also to their validation and 
eventually diffusion, because here only around 60% of 
the respondents expect positive impacts. Overall, less 
than 10% of the respondents expect negative impacts 
from the interaction on standardisation.
5 
5 
3 
3 
5 
4 
16 
10 
13 
16 
15 
12 
31 
38 
35 
33 
32 
7 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Identification of possible technical
solutions (ideation)
Creation of specification of technical
solutions (interoperability)
Implementation of technical solutions
Validation of technical solutions
Fostering the diffusion of technical
solutions
Other effects
Negative impact No impact Positive impact 
FIGURE 4: IMPACT OF INTERCONNECTION OF OSS AND STANDARDISATION ON EFFICIENCY AND RESULTS OF STANDARDISATION.
The differentiation between small and large organisations 
reveals that the former are more likely to expect positive 
impacts on the identification of possible technical solutions, 
i.e. the ideation, and the creation of specifications of 
technical solutions, i.e. interoperability, whereas the latter 
see the advantages in particular in the implementation of 
technical solutions.
If we turn to the impacts of the interaction on OSS in 
figure 5, we observe even higher shares of respondents 
perceiving positive impacts. Almost 80% expect positive 
impacts for the creation of specifications of technical 
solutions, in particular related to interoperability, and 
around 75% for the implementation of technical solutions. 
Whereas around 70% perceive positive impacts on OSS 
both for the identification of possible technical solutions 
and their diffusion, beneficial impulses for the validation of 
technical solutions are expected by less than 60% of the 
respondents. However, only around 5% perceive negative 
impacts. 
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The differentiation between small and large 
organisations reveals in contrast to the expected impacts 
on standardisation that the former are more likely to 
expect positive impacts on the validation and diffusion 
of technical solutions. Larger organisations see the 
advantages again in the implementation of technical 
solutions, but also in the identification of possible 
technical solutions in OSS.
Taking the latter insights of the interconnection on 
efficiency and results of OSS together with those 
on standardisation, it becomes obvious that smaller 
organisations perceive knowledge flows from OSS to 
standardisation as providing the latter with new ideas 
as inputs for technical solutions. Larger organisations 
see advantages for standardisation from OSS in the 
implementation of technical solutions. In contrast, 
smaller organisations experience positive impacts 
of standardisation on OSS on the validation and 
diffusion of technical solutions. Obviously, there exists 
a complementarity of effects, which is explained by the 
size of the organisations. However, it has to be mentioned 
that smaller organisations are also less involved in 
standardisation confirming previous studies.
Overall, the respondents do see that there is likely to be 
a positive impact for identifying, implementing, validating 
and fostering technical solutions through the development 
and use of OSS outside of an SDO, and that its limited use 
and development for particular purposes in an SDO might 
be helpful in certain situations. 
In particular, analysing the impacts on open source 
projects, which build on standards developments, should 
require a differentiation according to the following three 
situations. First, when standards exist before open 
source initiatives, they can help to guide open source 
initiatives to create their technical specifications, which 
might be a positive impact. Secondly, standards created 
at same time as the OSS negotiations around the new 
standards might slow down the open source community 
to create its technical specifications. In addition, there 
is a risk that technical specifications in OSS advance 
more quickly than standards specifications and as the 
standard catches up, it ‘forces’ re-engineering of OSS. 
Both impacts could be negative. Thirdly, standards are 
created after OSS. Then, the standards might impact 
the existing ecosystem in reducing the variety in OSS. 
On the one hand, this might be negative, if this reduces 
the dynamic and ‘creative’ nature of many OSS teams 
competing in the parallel exploration of the search space 
to develop a winning or elegant solution. On the other 
hand, it might be positive in stabilising the subject area 
(hence, foster investment) and ensuring a level playing 
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field (hence promoting competition by allowing smaller 
players to have a chance). This positive impact is more 
likely, where interoperability is important. Especially 
during the consolidation after an initial phase of rapid 
exploration of OSS solutions, the aspect of standards 
needs to be considered. 
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In general, participation in standardisation activities 
applying royalty free schemes is much more common 
compared to FRAND. In particular, less than 20% of the 
respondents never participate in standardisation activities 
which apply royalty free schemes, this share is more than 
double in case FRAND is implemented. Complementary, 
more than 50% do always or often participate when 
royalty free is implemented, but less than 40% when 
FRAND is realised. In particular, small organisations are 
almost never involved in activities under a FRAND scheme, 
whereas the size of organisations does not correlate with 
the popularity of royalty free.
Looking at the most common OSS licensing regimes 
among the respondents in figure 6 the Apache License 
2.0, the MIT License and the GNU General Public License 
(GPL 2.0) are the top three followed by GNU General Public 
License (GNU) 3 and the BSD License 2.0.
In addition, we can observe discrepancies between larger 
and smaller organisations. The latter have much stronger 
preferences for both the GNU General Public License 3.0 
and the GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) 3.0, 
whereas the former are inclined to the MIT License and 
the various versions of the BSD Licenses.
4.2.5. IPR Regimes in Standardisation and OSS
Finally, the respondents were asked for the existence of 
conflicts between the various copyright licences and the 
licensing models in standardisation, in particular FRAND. 
Here, it becomes obvious that both the GNU General Public 
Licenses GPL 2.0 and 3.0 on the one hand and the GNU 
Lesser General Public License LGPL 2.1 and 3.0 create 
conflicts for around two thirds of the respondents. For the 
BSD Licenses only one third report conflicts. Overall, small 
organisations report less conflicts.
The detailed descriptions of the experienced conflicts 
between the chosen OSS and the licensing models in 
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standardisation summarised under “Other licences” in the 
figures reveal the following positions. Some argue that 
OSS licensing and FRAND are in general incompatible 
and that only fully open licensing is acceptable, because 
FRAND excludes out small businesses and increases 
burdens on open source builders. Others explain the 
conflict as of commercial as opposed to legal nature, as 
reciprocal OSS licences like the GPL-3 require a royalty-
free patent licence, while FRAND does not imply royalty 
free licensing. This may prevent the patent owner from 
monetizing their patent portfolio. Since the patent owner is 
free to choose a different business model, the issue is for 
some respondents not a question of legal compatibility.
In case of conflicts, there are – at least in theory – various 
options to solve them. Overall, the respondents have 
not very often experienced effective solutions. Most 
appropriate is the strict separation between OSS and 
FRAND licensing followed by negotiations to find solutions. 
If no solutions are found, sometimes organisations 
withdraw from standardisation. Another option is the use of 
copyright-only licences explicitly excluding patent licence 
rights, which are negotiated separately. Still more than 
rarely used are more flexible IPR models in SDOs, which 
allow case by case IPR schemes, and even the withdrawal 
from OSS, which is less likely than the withdrawal from 
standardisation. 
In a final question, we asked for an assessment of 
the effectiveness of various general approaches of 
collaboration between standardisation and OSS. First, 
it is asked in particular by smaller organisations for 
a higher flexibility of SDOs’ patent policy. Secondly, 
new processes to integrate OSS in standardisation are 
suggested. Thirdly, not only more flexible patent policies 
are asked for, but it is even suggested by many small 
organisations that SDOs change their patent policies 
towards royalty free.
4.3. Summary
Despite of the limited response to the stakeholder survey, 
the analysis of the responses reveals sound and internally 
consistent results. In addition, the results are also in line 
with the insights from methodologically similar analyses. 
The differentiation of the sample into large and small or 
medium-sized organisations, which is almost identical to 
a separation into patent owning and not patent owning 
companies, reveals interesting insights, which also guide 
the derivation of policy recommendations.

5  ANALYSIS
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The literature review, case studies and survey report 
together deliver a comprehensive picture of the interaction 
between SDOs and OSS communities in general and 
OSS and FRAND licensing related to standardisation 
in particular that goes beyond the insights covered in 
existing publications. The results will be synthesised to 
analyse aspects of governance, relevant stakeholders, 
areas of innovation and collaboration versus competition 
between the wider OSS community and standard setting 
organisations. These insights will be used to derive policy 
recommendations presented in the final chapter.
We structure the analysis according to the general 
governance of SDOs and OSS communities, the involved 
stakeholders and the addressed topics and conclude with an 
intermediate presentation of their respective strengths and 
weaknesses. In a final section, we analyse their interaction 
starting with the preconditions, before we introduce the 
interaction in general followed by the three possible 
scenarios of possible interaction. Since the impact of the 
interaction is perceived to be positive, we conclude with the 
analysis of the compatibility respective complementarity of 
IPR regimes in SDOs and OSS, the core topic of the study.
5 | Analysis
5.1. Governance
It became clear early in the study that legal 
compatibility of the IPR frameworks applied 
through open source licences and SDO terms 
of reference is necessary, but not sufficient to 
establish successful collaborations. Once legal 
frameworks have been established that make it possible 
to collaborate on standards and open source development, 
a common understanding of organisational governance 
and stakeholder participation needs to be developed that 
causes a positive motivation of all parties to committedly 
contribute to a collaborative process.
R&D funding and IPR frameworks are key traditional 
angles of innovation and IPR policy (Edler et al. 2016). 
Existing publications focus on legal aspects and the 
impact of IPR frameworks on industrial innovation and 
growth. This includes potential growth and R&D allocation 
effects caused by the admission of patented technologies 
into newly developed standards. Meanwhile, a growing 
number of different technologies is necessary to build 
modern products, but this is also one reason for a rising 
complexity to secure licences to all necessary IPR. A wide 
range of components of different types like network 
communication, storage, computing or peripherals are 
being combined into more and more integrated ICT 
products. This gives rise to potential anti-commons 
situations that could inhibit or prevent the efficient 
adoption of innovative IPR protected technologies in the 
market (Heller 1998). How participants acquire licences 
to the IPR necessary to introduce their products into 
the market is of key importance to the efficiency of the 
innovation process. Licences may be gained through 
bilateral negotiations, FRAND commitments, automatic 
licensing offers that can be unilaterally accepted and 
other means. Insufficiently discussed in literature is the 
importance of when in the innovation process participants 
are able to secure licences. The stakeholder input to the 
case studies shows that the ex-ante acquisition of 
licences to open source products without the need 
for later negotiation significantly reduces the 
inherent risk and potential of hold-up situations 
caused by the stronger bargaining position of rights 
holders in later market-based negotiations, an aspect 
not yet covered in literature. Parallel to the requirement 
of technical interoperability, the question of which IPR 
frameworks are applied and how participants manage to 
combine them in marketed products becomes crucial for 
the competitiveness of the ICT single market.
The importance of the perception of governance is 
underlined by the continuing disagreement about the 
possibility to combine FRAND and OSS licensing terms. 
While multiple authors point out that from a legal 
perspective only a small number of open source licences 
contain terms contradictory to FRAND licensing of SEP, 
others underline the cultural opposition of OSS contributors 
to reserving rights to collaboratively developed products 
(Bekkers and Updegrove 2013), or the prohibitive effect of 
such terms on contributor motivation (Phipps 2019). This 
indicates a difference in the perception of the nature of 
governance that became evident in the case studies. 
In an SDO environment, governance is expressed 
in the terms of reference, including the IPR and 
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pre-competitive cooperation frameworks applied by 
the organisation and accepted by the participants. 
At the heart of SDO governance is a multilateral legal 
agreement. For each participant, the SDO governance 
framework is an exogenous variable. How participants 
collaborate on the platform provided by the SDO follows 
from it. In OSS communities, it is more common that the 
model of collaboration emerges from the intentions of the 
participants. OSS governance is endogenous to the 
community. The collaboration model maps to different 
reciprocal or permissive approaches of product licensing. In 
recent years, licences are chosen from a small set of popular 
licences that each represent one of the common models of 
collaboration. The popular OSS licences provide a toolbox 
of flexible licence choices where different approaches may 
be combined even for the products of a single community. 
5.1.1. Governance of SDOs1
1 The governance of SDOs was not addressed in the terms of references of the study. However, it turns out that governance of both SDOs and OSS 
communities plays an important role for their interaction. Therefore, we summarise in this subsection the major findings from the executive summary 
of the report by Baron et al. (2019) as a benchmark for the comparison with the governance of the OSS communities.
5.1.1.1. The standardisation ecosystem
The governance of SDOs evolves within a comprehensive 
standardisation ecosystem. Consequently, it is constrained 
by several dimensions. First, SDO governance is 
embedded in a legal framework. Legal constraints 
arise from international trade law, competition/antitrust 
law, intellectual property law and public procurement 
law (Baron et al. 2019). In particular, the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade released by the World Trade 
Organization specifies transparency and openness, 
non-discrimination, impartiality, balance of interests 
and consensus-based decision-making as governance 
principles at least formal SDOs should follow, in order to 
avoid the creation of barriers to trade. Many consortia 
operate without considering this agreement. 
At the EU level Regulation 1025/2012 sets the legal 
framework for SDO governance in general and the 
Guidelines of the European Commission to horizontal co-
operation agreements in particular for competition issues 
related to standardisation. Secondly, the governance of 
formal SDOs is also limited by the relationships 
with other SDOs, in particular the vertical links in the 
top-down hierarchical structure between the established 
international, European and national SDOs. In addition, 
there are cooperative horizontal liaisons between these 
formal SDOs and informal SDOs and consortia, including 
OSS organisations. Finally, the competition between 
SDOs has a restrictive impact on their governance, 
e.g. in the context of forum shopping (Lerner and Tirole 
2006). Baron et al. (2019) found some evidence of “voting 
with one’s feet” by dissatisfied stakeholders to other SDOs 
in emerging areas, whereas with increasing maturity of 
technologies stakeholders are sticking to their SDOs due 
to switching costs, path dependency and even IPR linked 
to already existing standards. 
The three types of constraints for SDOs governance 
vary depending of the type of SDO (Baron et al. 2019). 
The formal and established SDOs at the international, 
regional or national level are primarily constrained by the 
respective legal frameworks and the vertical relationships. 
In contrast, informal SDOs or consortia are in general in a 
fierce competition with other SDOs for members in general, 
contributors and implementers in particular. Furthermore, 
some are looking for accreditation or approval of their 
standards by formal or already more established SDOs, 
which might generate indirect legal constraints and 
restrictions by the SDOs they collaborate with. Well 
established informal SDOs with a strong technological 
profile are in general therefore both under less competitive 
pressure and less constrained by regulatory frameworks 
and vertical relationships to other SDOs.
In the context of public policy, SDOs are embedded into a 
self-regulatory approach characterised by a limited 
involvement of public authorities in the day-to-day 
functioning of SDOs and in the substance of their work. These 
autonomous and industry-driven processes are also endorsed 
by their stakeholders. Nevertheless, public authorities are in 
the position to monitor and enforce the above-mentioned 
legal constraints, in particular trade and competition policy 
instruments, on SDO governance and procedures to ensure 
that the results of their activities are contributing to public 
policy objectives. This procedural approach allows some 
diversity, which is in line with experimental approaches to 
regulation, like regulatory sandboxes (NESTA 2019).
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Due to the different contexts of SDOs, Baron et al. 
(2019) observe some heterogeneity in the governance 
of SDOs. Internal institutions influence the way each 
organisation makes decisions within the three dimensions 
of constraints. They differentiate between leadership- 
and membership-driven models. The more formal SDOs 
tend to be following the later consensus-oriented model, 
because they have also to consider public interests. The 
informal industry driven SDOs put the technology in the 
focus of their work. Further objectives of the SDOs, which 
are mostly non-profit and non-governmental incorporated 
organisations, are depending on the governance, including 
the organisational form, the division of roles among 
governance bodies, the voting rules within these bodies, 
processes for selecting SDO leadership, and the role and 
responsibilities of SDO staff. 
Members are organisations, including other SDOs, but 
mostly companies. Some SDOs have a large individual 
membership. Members can be grouped by commercial 
functions, level of participation or geographical origin. 
With respect to SDO leadership, in general, members of 
governing boards are recruited from their membership. 
The size and responsibility of permanent staff vary 
considerably between SDOs. The existence of a significant 
permanent staff with leadership functions is an element 
of a more leadership-driven governance. Staff typically 
participates in standardisation meetings but has no voting 
rights. In some SDOs, the staff also drafts policy documents, 
whereas in other SDOs with a strong membership 
representation on the board policymaking is in the board’s 
responsibility. If individuals participating in SDO policy 
development are expected to represent a member or 
stakeholder, then governance is more membership driven. 
If individuals should act in the interests of the SDO itself 
or of society at large, then the autonomy of the SDOs 
towards its membership is strengthened and makes it 
more leadership driven.
SDOs follow different procedures to develop their 
rules and policies as compared to standards. Differences 
are found in voting rules (more majority voting instead of 
consensus), different decision-making bodies (the general 
assembly and the board instead of committees and 
working groups), eligible participants (formal members 
instead of any interested party), transparency (generally 
less than for standards development), and the duties of 
the participants (more emphasis on duties towards the 
SDO rather than towards the member). Most SDOs feature 
one or more of these differences. 
In most SDOs, policy matters must move through many 
bodies, e.g. committees and boards. However, decision-
making is quite heterogeneous between SDOs and even 
sometimes within an SDO depending on the topic. In 
general, where the central decision-maker for policy 
matters is the general assembly of members, policymaking 
is membership-driven. Where the central decision-maker 
is a board, policymaking can be more leadership-driven as 
long as the rules for board appointment and status give the 
board more autonomy vis-à-vis the membership. Where 
the central decision-maker is a specific policymaking body 
designed to balance stakeholder interests, here as well 
policymaking will tend to be less influenced by powerful 
members and more leadership-driven. Finally, where the 
ultimate decision-maker on policy is a non-elected director 
or board, policymaking is predictably leadership driven.
It should be noted that voting rules for policymaking are 
not always reflective of SDO practice. On paper, most 
SDOs have majority voting for policymaking, with voting 
thresholds ranging from simple to two-thirds majority. 
Individual votes are mostly kept secret. Some SDOs have 
specific voting rules designed to make it difficult to overrule 
significant stakeholders or stakeholder categories. However, 
in reality, votes are rare, and policymaking is mostly based 
on consensus. Policymaking might in theory lead to disputes 
between members. Most SDOs offer procedures to issue 
formal or informal interpretations of policies and allow for 
appeals of policy-related decisions. However, SDOs report 
few disputes, and generally show a strong aversion to 
intervening in disputes amongst members. The different 
features of SDO governance architecture combine to lead 
to a stronger role for SDO leadership or a greater emphasis 
on member or stakeholder consensus. 
5.1.1.2. Governance principles
The governance principles in particular for formal SDOs 
arising out of the legal constraints were formulated focusing 
on standardisation activities. In contrast, policymaking at 
SDOs is generally less open than standards development, 
since participation tends to be restricted to SDOs 
members and membership is not free at most SDOs. As 
for transparency, different models co-exist with respect to 
standards development. Some SDOs are very transparent 
in the process of standards development but will then 
make the final standard available only against a fee. 
Other SDOs that rely on membership fees offer sometimes 
less transparency to the outside world in the course of 
development but make the final standard available for 
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free. When it comes to policymaking, SDOs tend to be far 
less transparent. A similar difference exists in volunteer-
driven OSS communities, where the development process 
has been observed to be much more accessible and 
transparent than the community management process 
(Böhm 2019).
Balance of interests is a concern in policy making 
just as in standards development. Some formal SDOs 
seek to achieve a balance of interests, e.g. according to 
geographical and economic dimensions or public interests, 
in the bodies that decide on policies. Other more informal 
SDOs use ad hoc categorisations, defined per project. In 
practice, many SDOs experience difficulties in attracting 
sufficient representatives outside of the producer and 
implementer constituencies. In addition to balance in 
representation, a few SDOs also seek to balance voting, 
by having majority-per-category requirements.
Openness and balance are objectives that can be hard 
to attain at the same time. Some SDOs privilege 
openness, others balance, and others emphasize 
openness in standard development and balance 
in policy-making matters. An alternative path is to rely 
on the fiduciary duties of SDO leaders towards the SDO or 
the general interest of SDO members in order to dampen 
any adverse effects from openness or balance.
In the understanding of SDOs and their stakeholders, 
the consent of participants, as expressed through SDO 
decision-making, provides a substantial measure of 
‘internal’ legitimacy to SDO activities and decisions. 
The external legal constraints applicable to SDO 
procedures channel consent so as to avoid clashes with 
the policies underlying these laws. Still, from a public 
policy perspective, consent might not be sufficient, 
given the broad impact of SDOs activities and decisions 
beyond the SDOs and its stakeholders. Market discipline 
is more elaborate than previously thought and can also 
confer some legitimacy. While SDOs are not themselves 
democratic institutions, in certain cases (in the EU in 
particular) they do receive delegated tasks from 
democratic bodies, also contributing to their legitimacy. 
Finally, SDOs concentrate expertise, even though they 
sometimes deal with policy matters that lie outside 
of the typically technical expertise of the participants. 
Through the combination of all these sources, SDO 
activities and decisions can therefore aspire to sufficient 
legitimacy from a public policy perspective, warranting 
the self-regulatory approach described above.
5.1.1.3. Governance and IPR policies
In general, SDOs establish IPR policies, which are 
embodied in a range of documents, depending on the 
SDO. Stakeholders do care about these policies, and that 
they are material in their decisions relating to participation 
in SDO activities and decisions (Wiegmann et al. 2019). 
At the same time, product-centric and patent-centric firms 
diverge in their assessment of and expectation towards 
IPR policies, making this policy area both highly salient and 
highly challenging.
SDO IPR policies primarily regulate the 
management of copyright on the produced 
standards and rules on patent disclosure of 
potentially Standard-Essential Patents (SEPs), 
on patent licensing of such SEPs (often on the basis of 
commitments to Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory 
(FRAND) licensing) and on the transfer of such licensing 
commitments upon transfer of SEPs to another party. 
IPR policies are established and changed in interaction 
between the SDO and public authorities. Few SDOs in 
Europe are fully independent in this regard. They are 
subject to procedural approaches by public authorities, 
especially anti-trust and competition issues, in return for 
establishing a “safe harbour”. In the European safe harbour 
approach, public authorities describe the general content 
of an IPR policy that would usually be deemed to comply 
with legal requirements applicable to SDOs. Observing 
this procedure establishes a “baseline policy” generally 
understood to be compliant with legal constraints. 
These baseline policies define basic requirements of IPR 
disclosure and licensing, without prescribing the exact 
implementation in detail. Many SDOs adopt baseline 
policies without adding a substantial additional framework 
to guide their participants in areas where patents are rare. 
FRAND licensing requirement are rooted in the criteria 
imposed by the baseline policies. Any additional SDO terms 
of reference beyond the baseline policy reflects the SDOs 
own choices of technical scope and internal governance 
(Baron et al 2019). 
Explicit, written governance norms and IPR frameworks 
regulate the behavioural expectations towards participants 
in SDOs. For conflict resolution, most interviewees referred 
to these SDO frameworks as well-established guidelines 
that for the most part prevent conflicts by making the 
expected behaviour explicit and providing a platform for 
implementing those expectations. Participants orient 
themselves based on these SDO frameworks that usually 
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existed before they joined. They do not consider other 
conflict resolution methods necessary. Conflicts that 
cannot be solved by enforcing the widely accepted SDO 
IPR framework almost never occur in practice.
5.1.2. Governance of OSS communities
Where systematically different leadership-driven and 
consensus-driven models can be observed for SDOs, 
the governance in OSS communities is more 
obviously shaped by voluntary participation of all 
contributors. Individuals and organisations contribute to 
a community’s development process only if it is in their 
self-interest. While some communities have decision 
making and conflict resolution procedures and functions 
in place, they cannot force a contributor to implement a 
community decision. A participant always has the choice 
not to contribute to the implementation of the decision or 
to leave the community altogether. Because of that, open 
source communities generally aim for consensus 
similarly to SDOs when making decisions and are 
considerate towards minority opinions. The role of 
steering committees and boards is primarily to moderate 
the process of finding consensus and to facilitate 
contributions. This makes it difficult to systematically 
compare the governance of SDO and OSS communities. 
For analytical purposes, we will still discuss the same 
governance aspects for OSS that have been detailed in 
the previous section for SDOs.
The ultimate decision maker in an OSS community 
is the whole of all contributors, with each vote 
possibly weighted by the contributor’s merit in 
the meritocratic organisation. While in the past, 
concepts like a “benevolent dictator” veiled the fact that 
without voluntary participation there are no contributors 
and no community, in recent years governance norms of 
communities have increasingly normalised and common 
expectations established. Representative boards, either 
elected by the contributors or appointed based on financial 
contributions of organisations to the community, are tasked 
with day-to-day management, but can rarely take decisions 
even against an influential minority of contributors. There is 
also a common understanding that community management 
and technical leadership are separate concerns. Many 
community organisations separate between a governing 
board and a technical steering committee.
The voting rules reflect this ambivalent nature of leadership 
under voluntary participation. Votes are typically 
assigned in a one-contributor-per-vote scheme 
or based on a tiered model where organisations 
that pay a higher membership fee gain additional 
votes and committee seats based on that status. 
However, the composition of the representative committees 
only rarely translates to concrete influence over technical 
decisions. Technical leadership emerges from 
concrete product contributions which often only 
partially overlaps with administrative project 
leadership.
This means that the election process is based on 
a mix of meritocracy and organisational status 
within the project. The election process is also much 
less impactful. Since administration in OSS communities 
plays a subdued role as an enabler of product 
contributions, serving on a governing board or a technical 
steering committee translates more to responsibility than 
to privilege. If OSS projects elect representative functions, 
voting is performed either based on one-contributor-per-
vote schemes or on tiered membership status.
The individual duties of the participants are focused on 
the overall goal of the community to enable and attract 
contributions. They require for all participating organisations 
to collaborate with other contributors in the interest of 
the project, regardless of competitive interest. Once 
communities grow to a size where formal organisation is 
necessary, details of these behavioural expectations 
are often laid out in a “code of conduct” adopted by 
the project that aims at creating an inviting, non-
discriminating, productive community conducive 
to attracting contributors and contributions. 
Beyond explicit policies like a code of conduct, solidified 
implicit community norms reinforce professionality, 
acting in good faith and integration with parent umbrella 
organisations and the wider open source community.
The organisational form of OSS communities varies 
from small, auto-organised groups to formalized 
structure with appointed governing and technical 
representatives. Voluntary participation dictates 
that these project representatives do not enjoy 
executive power over project contributors and 
have only limited influence on the concrete technical 
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work. Some projects, however, employ technical and/
or administrative staff. In such setups, the community 
organisations act similar to companies in carrying out 
the mission of the project. Only a small number of OSS 
communities are set up as independent legal entities. 
Most of the larger collaborations established in recent 
years are established under an umbrella organisation, 
such as the Eclipse Foundation, the Apache Foundation 
or the Linux Foundation that are legal entities, which 
provide administrative support, technical infrastructure 
and other functions like marketing and fundraising 
coordination.
The role of staff cannot easily be generalised, since 
the project setups vary significantly. In industry-driven 
communities staff typically focuses on community 
management and project representation. Key technical 
contributors, like release managers, are employed as 
staff in some projects. Some of the figureheads like Linux 
Torvalds, the creator of the Linux kernel, are employed 
as staff to enable them to work on their projects full-
time. Overall, staff headcount of OSS projects 
is typically small compared to the number of 
engaged contributors and focuses on enabling and 
supportive roles. OSS community staff is usually not 
in a position to dictate governance, legal or technical 
decisions.
The case studies support this assessment and illustrate 
how OSS governance coalesces towards more common 
expectations based on pragmatic management of 
voluntary participation and meritocracy. The survey 
identifies that especially SMEs benefit from the 
reduced barriers to entry and cost of participation 
and are motivated by this to contribute.
Literature and journal publications are sparse on this 
aspect. The wider open source community has evolved 
beyond the earlier understanding of individual volunteer-
driven communities reflected in Benkler (2002), Lerner 
and Tirole (2002) or O’Mahony and Ferraro (2007) 
towards a model of collaboration shaped by industry-
driven continuous research and development cooperation. 
This development is not in contradiction to these earlier 
scientific observations, it marks a change in community 
composition that represents the adoption of OSS products 
and processes across the industry 
Similarly, the OSS ecosystem has evolved into 
the global upstream/downstream network that 
integrates the work of the various individual 
communities into a technology stack suitable 
for end-users and as software platforms for 
commercial products. The term wider OSS community 
describes this global network of individual projects, 
developers, research institutions, business and any other 
entities that participate in the creation of open source 
software. No central decision-making body exists to 
steer the work of the wider OSS community in the 
global upstream/downstream network. Similarly, to different 
SDOs competing for the creation of relevant standards, the 
work of the wider OSS community is coordinated by way of 
competition between alternative solutions for downstream 
integration and adoption. Collaboration between the 
communities within the upstream/downstream network 
may emerge organically, with the support of companies 
acting as distributors of integrated products, like Red Hat, 
SUSE or Canonical, or facilitated by umbrella organisations. 
The case studies illustrate how and where collaboration 
decisions are made and what umbrella organisations act as 
supporters of the process.
Where SDO governance develops within the 
constraints of the legal framework, relationships 
within the integrated network of SDOs and 
competition between them, governance of OSS 
refers to “the means of achieving the direction, 
control, and coordination of wholly or partially 
autonomous individuals and organisations on 
behalf of an OSS development project to which 
they jointly contribute” (Markus 2007, p. 152).
The leadership of SDOs is more formally 
established and in a position to manage and implement 
the goals of the organisation and of policy makers. 
Leadership in an OSS community is more fluent 
and acts in a facilitating role since the community relies 
on voluntary participation.
Decision making similarly differs both in scope and in 
process. The recognised status of some SDO enables 
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them to make and implement decisions that an 
important minority may not agree with. Except for 
possible competition between SDO and “forum shopping” 
behaviour of participants (Lerner and Tirole 2006), 
actors do not have the opportunity to “fork” the 
community. Similarly, should stakeholders be dissatisfied 
with the performance of a given SDO, they can ‘vote 
with their feet’ and take their standards development 
activities to another SDO, or even launch a new SDO. In 
OSS communities, however, relevance depends 
on the ability of the community to represent the 
consensus of a critical mass of contributors in 
terms of both technical direction and governance 
norms. Top-down enforcement of leadership decisions 
is not a promising proposition and cannot be observed in 
practice. The case studies highlighted that participants 
experience this as a strength of OSS communities, 
because it prevents the organisation from developing 
own interests that possibly diverge from the contributor 
interests. However, formalized decision making 
in SDOs provides stability and acceptance, for 
example in the interaction with policy makers or 
anti-trust authorities.
Voting rules and election processes differ strongly 
both between SDOs as well as between different 
OSS communities. For the interaction between standards 
and OSS development, they may be less relevant as they are 
mostly internal affairs of the organisation. One noticeable 
difference is in the acceptance of representatives that 
have not attained merit from contributing to the standards 
or OSS development process. In such cases, being an 
elected or appointed representative may not translate to 
having an influential voice in the collaboration. This issue 
is related to the individual roles and duties of participants 
that primarily represent the standards or OSS development 
organisation as opposed to the ongoing development 
process. While there is a role for career of standardisation 
staff members in SDOs, there is no such career (yet) within 
an OSS community. Open source umbrella organisations 
are more similar to SDOs in this respect than to individual 
OSS communities.
This comparison of key aspects of governance between 
SDO and OSS communities shows that as of now, 
significant differences exist regarding all five 
criteria, i.e. ultimate decision maker, voting rules, 
election process, individual duties, organisational 
form and the role of staff, that need to be understood 
and bridged to achieve efficient collaboration. A key 
aspect is that both most SDOs as well as OSS 
communities cannot be directed to collaborate 
and also cannot direct their participants to do so. 
This currently acts as a barrier to collaboration between 
SDO and OSS communities, since most attempts engage 
a top-down approach to it. It is, however, also an enforcing 
corrective to make sure that collaboration only emerges 
where its benefit is apparently clear and convincing. Policy 
makers can use this insight to influence the motivational 
environment to create, encourage and support convincing 
opportunities for collaboration.
5.2.1. Stakeholders in SDOs
SDOs in Europe rely on voluntary cooperation 
between businesses, users, public authorities 
and other interested parties. These include market 
surveillance authorities, accreditation and certification 
bodies, universities research institutes and laboratories, 
legal experts (e.g. on IPR), academics, innovation agencies, 
insurers, trade/labour unions, NGOs and other groups 
representing specific sectorial, professional or societal 
interests (e.g. consumer interests, worker interests, 
environmental interests and SME interests). In addition, 
governmental institutions, regulators and public procurers 
(Blind 2008) have a specific interest in standardisation and 
standards, because they rely on them in executing their 
tasks. At the European level, the standard setting 
process is based on consensus, i.e. characterised by 
the absence of sustained opposition to substantial issues 
by any important part of the concerned interest and by a 
process that involves seeking to take into account the views 
of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting 
arguments (see also ETSI 2019), and the other interested 
stakeholders. Overall, there are slightly less than 10% 
of the companies with more than 5 employees actively 
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involved in formal standardisation (Rammer et al. 2016). In 
addition, it has to be noted that despite representing 99% 
of all companies, SMEs appear to have individually very 
limited resources to invest in standardisation and therefore 
obviously experience difficulties in participating (Rammer 
et al. 2016), while their business can be highly impacted 
by standardisation work (e.g. Blind and Mangelsdorf 2013, 
Wakke et al. 2016). Furthermore, a strong overlap between 
companies active in formal standardisation and patenting 
can be observed (e.g. Blind and Mangelsdorf 2013). From 
a practical perspective, cooperation is needed between 
a broad range of stakeholders, including the EC, ESOs, 
industry, and the representatives of societal and other 
stakeholders. 
In the stakeholder survey, around one half of the 
responding and mostly larger organisations 
report to be active in at least one of the different 
types of standardisation organisations. On average, 
an organisation is engaged in almost three different 
types of standardisation organisation. Most popular 
are international consortia. This dominance is further 
supported by the standardisation organisations mentioned 
under “Others”. Here, we find further international 
consortia, like OASIS, OGC and W3C. However, taking all 
types of consortia plus the category “Others” sums up to 
slightly more than 42%, whereas the naming of the formal 
standardisation bodies accumulates to more than 57%. 
This ratio is certainly specific to the focus on information 
and communication technology in general and software in 
particular, because across all sectors German companies 
are five times more active in formal standardisation 
bodies compared to consortia (Rammer et al. 2016). Due 
to this specific focus, most organisations are active at ETSI 
followed by the international standardisation bodies ISO 
and ITU in addition to the involvement at the national 
standardisation bodies, which is a requirement for the 
participation at the European or international level.
In contrast to the rather high heterogeneity of stakeholders 
in standardisation, the stakeholders in OSS are 
concentrated on companies and independent 
software developers. Recent studies have shown that 
companies are significantly using OSS, e.g. according to 
Nagle (2019b) more than 40% and even more than 65% 
according to Black Duck Software (2016).
Whereas only around half of the respondents to the 
stakeholder survey are active in standardisation, 
almost 90% of the responding organisations are 
currently involved in open source development 
activities, which is significantly more than the share 
of the respondents of the survey conducted by Baron 
et al. (2019). Again, there is a strong bias of larger 
organisations being involved in particular in formal 
standardisation bodies. The involvement takes different 
forms. In general, the organisations among all 
respondents to the stakeholder survey are 
using OSS with a median value of 100 OSS projects. 
In particular, OSS is used by over 90% as input into the 
application level, slightly more than three quarter as 
input into the intermediate level, i.e. middleware, and 
around two thirds as input into base layer, i.e. into the 
operating system or the platform level. Here, the median 
number of OSS projects is 10. Around 80% of the 
responding organisations are occasionally contributors 
to five and regularly to ten OSS projects. It needs to be 
noted, however, that participation in OSS collaboration 
requires a smaller commitment of invested time and 
money.
The case studies exhibited a strong overlap 
between the participants in standards and open 
source development. Especially larger businesses 
engage on both. SMEs less often engage directly in 
standards development, as shown by the survey. 
The participant overlap may also be a result of the 
overwhelming representation of telecommunications 
operators and data network operators, original equipment 
manufacturers, equipment suppliers of different tiers, 
as well as ICT software vendors and service providers in 
the case study and survey data. These subsectors are 
characterised by strong market concentration for large 
enterprises combined with a network of service providers 
and suppliers. Based on the high level of interest in 
collaborating on the study, we assume the respondents to 
the survey to represent a representative cross-section of 
the stakeholders in the interaction of standards and OSS 
development.
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SDOs as well as OSS umbrella organisations facilitate 
the participation of industry, individual contributors and 
academia in technical innovation. By providing widely 
accepted IPR policies or project charters, they help to 
normalise governance norms.
Other stakeholders that do not participate in the 
standardisation process, but may be affected by the 
produced results, as for example environment protection or 
civil rights groups, are not reported by the study participants 
to be involved in the cases and have not been responding 
to the stakeholder survey. Some SDOs provide multi-
stakeholder platforms. Communities and SDOs are usually 
open for comments from outsiders already on drafts of 
standards. Beyond that, there seems to be no forum where 
outside stakeholders may formulate their interests. It is not 
clear from the cases whether or not participants see this as 
a situation that should be improved.
The cases covered mostly represent industrial 
standards development and open source 
collaborations. Both also accommodate the participation 
of volunteer contributors and academic institutions where 
it is applicable, which supports knowledge transfer.
Whereas we find in the literature no information about the 
overlap between the involvement of stakeholders both 
in standardisation and OSS, the survey reveals that 
almost half of the respondents are involved both in 
standardisation and OSS. Based on the insights of the 
case studies the stakeholders involved in the different cases 
are rather similar between standards development and OSS 
implementation focused projects. The key relationships are 
between telecommunications operators and data network 
operators as the commercial consumers of software and 
equipment, original equipment manufacturers, equipment 
suppliers of different tiers, software vendors and service 
providers. Other important stakeholders forming also the 
largest group of respondents to the survey are commercial 
and individual software developers that influence the 
adoption of technologies and academia and research 
organisations as a source of innovations. 
The absence of variance in the set of stakeholders 
between cases underlines that standards and OSS 
development serve the needs of the same community. 
Other stakeholders, like environmental groups, civil 
society or government representatives have not been 
mentioned by the study participants. Obviously, they are 
not sufficiently interested in the topic.
The reasons for participating in standards development 
stated by the participants of the case studies match those 
identified in the literature (e.g. Blind and Mangelsdorf 
2016). Standards development provides stability 
to the technical innovation process by enforcing 
a disciplined approach and the creation of 
complete specifications. The schedules and planning 
horizon of SDOs and OSS communities are similar and 
support each other, while businesses are often forced 
to plan from one release to the next. For some cases, 
standards are useful in their own right or as prerequisites 
for adoption, as in the cases of programming languages 
or mobile communication protocols. Standards support 
interoperability and are used as references for regulatory 
compliance. They also help overcome fragmentation in the 
market caused by diverging, incompatible or only partially 
standards-compliant implementations. Standards force 
vendors with strong market positions to open up for 
competition. The processes at SDOs facilitate consensus 
building embedded in a governance and IPR framework 
that allows for compromises between competitors.
The reasons stated by stakeholders contributing to the case 
studies for participating in open source development only 
partially overlap with the reasons for participating in SDOs. 
Overall, participants in SDOs and OSS development 
share many values and convictions. Participants aim 
at creating new technologies to overcome a dominant 
market presence of a single or a small group of vendors 
in a specific market segment. Collaborating on a joint 
implementation competing with incumbent businesses can 
help to re-establish competition, reduce prices, increase 
the variety of solutions offered in the market and rekindle 
innovation. In other cases, joint OSS implementation 
helped increase interoperability between existing or new 
solutions. Some study participants consider participating 
in OSS development a more suitable approach to develop 
industry standards if an implementation-first approach 
can be realised. 
If we compare the assessment of the respondents 
to the stakeholder survey on the incentives to join 
standardisation activities versus OSS development, 
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we observe the following patterns. First, the relevance of 
almost all incentives are quite similar, but rated higher for 
OSS with two exceptions. The inclusion of own IPR is slightly 
more relevant for the participation in standardisation than 
for joining OSS. Secondly, standards are obviously a more 
effective approach to specify regulations, in particular in the 
European Union in the context of the New Approach. The 
largest differences can be found for the incentive of lower 
cost for R&D and shorter development times, important 
drivers for joining OSS communities. In addition, the personal 
interest is assessed to be more relevant for the involvement 
in OSS. However, in addition to finding technical solutions, 
the royalty free use of code, which is also connected to a 
positive return of investment in R&D, is obviously much 
more important for an involvement than the royalty free 
use of standards.
A further explanation for the higher assessment of 
the incentives to get involved in OSS compared to 
standardisation is the general higher importance of 
being involved in OSS development compared to 
standardisation development. This bias towards OSS 
is reinforced by the assessment that two thirds of the 
respondents expect an increase of importance 
of OSS compared to less than half related to 
standardisation. In the assessment of the current 
relevance, we observe a significant difference between 
large and small organisations related to the importance 
of standardisation. Whereas the two thirds of the former 
assess it as very important, this is the case for less than 
one third of the latter. This assessment is consistent 
with the lower participation of smaller organisations in 
standardisation bodies. A major reason for the difference 
is the cost of participation (in time and travel) in standards 
work compared to OSS. SMEs have a harder time 
justifying participation. Also, a software engineer can write 
and contribute code without additional knowledge and 
training over what they need for their day job. Standards 
participation requires time to develop the necessary skills. 
Most SMEs do not have the in-house expertise, and it is not 
easy to hire experienced standards employees. Related 
to OSS, we observe not such a significant difference. 
Obviously, participation in standardisation plays 
a less relevant role for small compared to large 
organisations, whereas we cannot observe such 
a difference related to OSS. Related to the future, 
the expectations related to standardisation are overall 
balanced between an increased and constant relevance 
and quite similar between large and small organisations, 
whereas the majority of all organisations, in particular 
larger organisations, expects a further increase in the 
relevance of OSS.
In summary, the analysis of the stakeholders involved 
in standardisation and OSS reveals some interesting 
complementarities. Whereas we find in formal SDOs a high 
heterogeneity of stakeholders with an overrepresentation 
of larger and patenting companies (Rammer et al. 2016), 
the OSS communities relatively involve smaller companies 
without patents and independent software developers. 
This is a complementarity, which offers synergies to be 
exploited via a closer collaboration.
During the initial interviews in preparation for the case study 
report, an assumption was mentioned by an interviewee 
that the recognised and elaborate organisation structure 
of SDOs enabled them to coordinate large-scale, industry-
sector crossing standards development processes that 
required heavy up-front research and development 
investments, whereas OSS communities naturally focus 
on smaller-scale developments of individual programs 
with a low number of participants. If that assumption 
would hold, SDOs could provide a coordinating role to help 
smaller OSS projects to develop more complex products.
The observation from the case studies is, however, that 
large-scale collaborations exist in both standards 
and OSS development. From both perspectives, 
collaborations exist that span hundreds or thousands 
of participants and produce complex, market-ready 
products. While it is apparently true that larger, more 
complex collaborations require additional formalized 
organisational structures and processes, these functions 
are provided successfully by OSS umbrella organisations. 
There is no apparent need for a stronger formalization of 
OSS development processes. A convergence can be 
observed in the functions provided by SDOs and 
OSS umbrella organisations to their respective 
communities. Both act as platforms for collaboration 
and consensus building as well as industry and personal 
networks. While the purpose of individual OSS communities 
5.3. Subject matter and scale of collaboration
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is usually well-defined and implementation-oriented, it 
is possible that SDOs and OSS umbrella organisations 
converge further. This gives policy makers the option to 
engage with OSS umbrella organisations in the future 
similarly to how they engage with SDO today, which 
provides new policy options.
The case studies indicate that for the role of standards 
development the utility provided by the specification is 
more important than reducing technical complexity. The 
utility of a specification can either be inherent if major 
elements of the standardised technology are primarily 
embodied in the specification. This is for example the 
case for programming languages, where the language 
itself is specified as a standard and implementing 
products are measured against their adherence to the 
standard. If the utility of specifications is not inherent, it 
depends amongst other criteria on the pace of innovation 
within the specific market segment. In general, it can be 
assumed that the faster an implementation changes, 
the lower the utility of a detailed specification will be. 
The utility of specifications and efficiency of the process 
to create them is influenced by major trends in the ICT 
sector, including improved methods of collaboration and 
a trend towards openness and transparency (Böhm and 
Eisape 2019).
The specifications of standards change in their role if 
parts of the industry or specific market segments differ in 
the perception of their utility. Traditional arguments 
for standardisation, like enabling competition, 
facilitating interoperability and mitigating cost 
of change, are still being confirmed by the case 
study participants. However, other covered case 
studies consider a joint implementation as the standard. 
The code is the standard in this case, as with the 
Linux kernel. These communities take a neutral stance 
towards specification, considering it less relevant for 
their own work, but potentially beneficial for others. The 
Linux kernel developers for example are interested in 
participating in revising the POSIX family of standards, 
where Linux has become a reference implementation as 
well as a driver of new technical developments. In at least 
one case (Automotive Grade Linux), a negative stance 
towards specification was adopted by the community, 
stating that “specification leads to fragmentation”. Here 
the community actively questions the usefulness of 
multiple interoperable implementations for standards 
development. This overall trend causes an important 
change in the role standards play. At a time when the ICT 
sector primarily produced physical products that included 
a small share of the value-added in the form of software, 
the vast majority of standards implementations where 
difficult and costly to change. Hardware, however, is 
increasingly commoditised and the share of the value-
added provided by software grew dramatically, as in the 
example of smartphones. This means that for a smaller 
share of technologies specifications are conducive to 
technical development. For the others, open source 
collaboration provides an alternative, implementation-
first development approach. The accelerating industry-
wide adoption of OSS technologies may be supported 
by this changing role of standards, resulting in the 
characterisation of more recent large-scale OSS 
communities as primarily industrial research and 
development cooperation.
Where SDOs used to be the platform for industry 
consensus building on most ICT technologies, they now 
retain this role mostly for technologies that benefit from 
a specification-first development model. This blurs the 
previously accepted concept of separating technologies 
into innovative, state of the art solutions on the one hand 
and widely adopted commodity products on the other hand. 
OSS immediately gains the status of a commodity 
since is it available to everybody in a non-rivalrous 
and non-excludable fashion. It is, therefore, also 
non-differentiating. However, since major, market leading 
industry actors collaborate in its development, the product 
is also the result of early-investment intensive research 
and development and represents the current state of the 
art. Open source products can be innovative state of the 
art and commodity at the same time, as well as a public 
good. This indicates that their development benefits the 
general public.
With respect to these considerations it is important to 
keep in mind that standards and OSS almost exclusively 
interact for software and hardware development or for 
interfaces between either of them. The findings of this 
study are formulated specifically against the impact of 
software on the ICT sector. Other, related phaenomena 
like open data, open science or open hardware exhibit 
partially different economic characteristics. OSS inspired 
collaboration methods, however, have found application in 
other sectors as well.
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Before we highlight the strengths and weaknesses of SDOs and OSS communities, we present a comparison of the 
similarities, but also slight differences. 
5.4. Strengths and weaknesses of SDOs and OSS communities
SDOs OSS communities
Voluntary input of producers, users and interested 
groups
Voluntary input of producers and users of software
Initiation by interested stakeholders Initiation by interested individual or organisation
Continuation based on interest and financial 
contribution
Continuation based on interest and quality, but also 
financial donations
Time consuming (more simultaneous) consensus 
process
Time consuming (sequential) consensus process
No personalised inputs Identifiable personal inputs (signalling for labour 
market) 
Copyrights of standards belong to SDOs, IPRs (e.g. 
patents) are restricted by FRAND rule
IPRs are transferred according to OSS licensing 
schemes
Different output stages (drafts, final standard) No final output
Regularly updating after some years Continuous updating
Only specifications of components and interfaces as 
input for final products
Significant input in software programmes
Followed by high investments in physical capital Followed by most low investment in physical capital 
(esp. computer hardware)
TABLE 1: COMPARISON BETWEEN SDOS AND OSS COMMUNITIES (SOURCE: BASED ON BLIND 2004a).
Böhm and Eisape (2019) find in their SWOT analysis of 
SDOs and OSS communities based on reviewing literature 
and expert interviews that both complement each other 
and compete for relevance at the same time, but for 
different aspects of the functions they provide. Starting 
from a utilitarian approach to standardisation, they develop 
a phase model of standardisation that is able to describe 
both standards and OSS development processes. Based 
on the assumption that both SDO and OSS communities 
operate in the same space of technical innovation, they 
analyse strengths and weaknesses of each group and 
compare them systematically. Aspects where both sides 
show strengths are assumed to be areas of potential 
competition. Aspects where one side shows strengths and 
the other a weakness invite collaboration. Aspects where 
both sides show weaknesses indicate a potential need for 
others, including policy makers, to provide some guidance.
The strengths of SDO are identified as mature 
formal standardisation processes, a powerful 
reputation in a large stakeholder network, widely 
accepted terms of reference and IPR frameworks, 
signalling of market opportunities and value-
added SDO services. Weaknesses are organisational 
inertia, a dependency on powerful stakeholders, 
an ecosystem where responsibilities are allocated 
based on historical developments, under-defined 
IPR frameworks and reliance on outdated revenue 
streams by some SDOs.
The strengths of OSS communities are rapid 
prototyping, a global development model based on 
early and regular releases, voluntary participation 
in community activities, and the established 
overall development process of the wider open 
source. Weaknesses are a lack of established 
supply chain management processes, uncertainty 
and arbitrariness in licence compatibility and 
achieving licence compliance, and a meritocracy 
that focuses primarily on product contributions at 
the neglect of other potential stakeholders.
The strengths of SDOs compared to OSS communities 
found by Böhm and Eisape (2019) support the 
conclusions from the case studies. Participants benefit 
from tested, proven processes of standards 
development and a long-term roadmap providing 
stability to industry, research and policy maker 
participants. OSS communities are comparatively 
strong at developing technical innovations at 
a fast pace, steering investments effectively 
through eliminating failing approaches early in 
the process and practicing evolutionary product 
development with early and regular releases, 
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which is also in line with the case study findings. Böhm 
and Eisape (2019) establish the argument that cost 
of change is a determinant for the efficacy of 
the specification-first, implementation-first or 
parallel standardisation approaches. SDOs and OSS 
communities are in competition where they offer a choice 
of alternative collaborations and consensus building 
processes. They complement each other in the results 
they produce (specifications versus implementations). 
Both are still challenged in handling large-scale ground-
breaking research that requires significant upfront 
investments, like the development of pharmaceuticals 
or mobile communication protocols. Both SDOs and OSS 
communities are challenged by standards-essential 
patents (SEP), especially against the general trend 
towards more openness and transparency. So far, they 
are challenged to establish a common understanding 
what the requirements for open standards are, or the 
exact meaning of FRAND, or the right balance between 
enforcing standards with mandates and making them 
freely available, and many other fundamental questions 
about the future of standardisation.
5.5. Interaction between SDOs and OSS communities
5.5.1. Preconditions for interaction
5.5.2. Interaction in general
The case study report illustrates how most SDOs and OSS 
communities historically started as coalitions of interested 
stakeholders. The formal recognition achieved by some SDOs 
as either national standards bodies or recognised entities 
at the European or international level is in some specific 
cases assumed to be a motivator for OSS communities 
to collaborate with these formal SDOs. OSS communities, 
however, value partners only based on the contributions they 
make in a meritocratic model. Open source communities are 
interested in collaborating with SDOs that do relevant work 
in the field they are working in. What unifies SDOs in the 
eye of the OSS world is that they produce specifications for 
relevant standards. What unifies OSS communities is that 
they focus on implementation. Formal recognition was not 
a relevant differentiator of SDOs in the eyes of interviewees 
from an open source community background, even though 
it is important for the relationship between SDOs, industry 
and possibly policy makers.
The results from the literature review, the case studies 
and the survey all suggest that market actors 
pragmatically choose combinations of OSS with 
proprietary hardware and software. Today, such 
combinations are the norm and seen as the working model 
of most industrial OSS consortia, like the Linux Foundation 
or the Eclipse Foundation. There is no indication that 
the market pulls towards a situation where 
only open source solutions are used. Technology 
areas with high cost of change as well as competitive, 
differentiating product features do not favour open source 
development models. Voluntary participation also means 
that neither SDO nor OSS contributors are likely to choose 
such areas for their OSS development work.
The viability of collaboration between SDOs and 
OSS communities is influenced by all three layers of 
interaction identified in the expert interviews, i.e. cultural 
fit, governance models and legal framework in 
that collaboration has to be possible and to be preferable 
over working separately. Since neither side can instruct 
the other, collaboration probably needs to be envisioned 
as an integrated cyclic process with feedback loops 
between specification and implementation, and shared 
responsibility for both aspects between all participants.
Based on the insights from the case studies, we can derive 
the following general conclusions about the interaction 
between SDOs and OSS communities.
Where SDOs and OSS communities’ processes 
are combined, the processes and governance 
in the working groups and communities often 
converge. This may lead to parallel OSS development 
processes that incubate new features combined with 
standardisation processes to establish consensus, as well 
as a choice for participants of two alternative platforms 
for collaboration and consensus-building.
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It appears that a well-working relationship develops 
if standards developers and OSS implementers 
largely overlap and many entities potentially 
contribute to the development process. Where there 
is no such overlap, or in situations where few suppliers 
maintain control over the market, it can be assumed that 
cooperation is less likely to develop, and the majority of 
market participants are merely (commercial) consumers of 
technology with no participation in standards development.
From the perspective of SDOs, study participants 
consider their interactions with OSS communities 
mutually beneficial and serving their joint 
interest in a specific technical area. The OSS contributors 
help to incubate the developed technology and to test 
the specification, which helps maintain high quality in 
standards. The partner OSS community often creates the 
first or only reference implementation, which might become 
the de-facto standard implementation later in the process. 
Interaction with the OSS community also inspires the 
modernisation of SDO processes, for example through the 
adoption of new collaboration methods and platforms and 
increased transparency of decision making. Since experts in 
the specific market segments are rare, there is a noticeable 
but partial overlap between the individuals involved in 
standards development and OSS implementation.
The OSS communities describe their interaction 
with SDOs as fruitful and productive. The 
collaboration and consensus building processes encourage 
the stability of specifications, that would otherwise 
change quickly and cause interoperability issues. OSS 
implementations sometimes overshoot the functionality 
specified in the standards based on the faster pace 
of development. This may cause a shift in the scope of 
the technical development. In such cases, SDOs may be 
slower to update working group mandates and charters 
compared to the rigorous self-selection processes in OSS 
development.
Some of the larger collaborative projects do not 
consider the creation of multiple, standards-compliant 
implementations as useful, since they prefer all potential 
contributions to be combined into a single product. 
While standards help achieve interoperability 
of proprietary products that do not share an 
implementation, OSS users tend to choose a joint 
implementation for that purpose. In such a scenario, 
the best interoperability can be achieved by reducing the 
number of implementations, ideally to one. Based in that, 
some cases explicitly exclude participating in standards 
development from their organisations remit.
Freedom to operate is a key precondition for 
contributors to participate in the development 
process. Confidence in access to the implemented 
functionality either through cross-licensing, explicit 
patent grants in OSS licences or contributor IPR policies 
are considered necessary for a fast-paced development 
process. This confidence reduces investment risks and is 
expected to be achieved at the beginning of collaboration. 
Multiple case study participants emphasized that they 
consider the ex-ante acquisition of the required IPR and 
the absence of negotiation as key advantages of the OSS 
development process.
Study participants state benefits and costs of a closer 
integration of standards and OSS development. The 
combination of SDO and OSS processes may, 
however, lead to trade-offs, especially to a slower 
pace of development and lower innovativeness. 
Another benefit is that in areas of high technical complexity, 
detailed specification in standards and working 
OSS implementation may support each other and 
lead to both higher quality standards and better 
code. A further at least possible cost is that the existence 
of IPR frameworks that include SEPs may impose a barrier to 
collaboration by reducing the number of potential participants, 
while royalty-free licensing norms on OSS communities may 
similarly impede contributions from SEP holders.
Even in an open OSS development collaboration, 
participants are uncomfortable with the possibility that 
other actors may use the OSS product, including their 
contributions, to create competing products. While 
permissive licences like the MIT licence do not provide any 
protection against such scenarios, reciprocal licensing 
terms have been mentioned repeatedly as a 
viable IPR regime that protects contributors from 
future competition based on their own investments. 
The risk of competitors creating commercial, proprietary 
derivative work is a relevant concern to those participants. 
An IPR regime based on reciprocal licences like the GPL is 
considered sufficient protection by those participants.
The last section of the stakeholder questionnaire 
was eventually focused on the interaction between 
standardisation and OSS. Both in the literature review and 
in the case studies different types of interactions have 
already been identified. All three options, i.e. standards 
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as input into OSS, OSS as input into standardisation 
and parallel development in addition to the general 
interconnectedness of standard development and OSS 
activities are perceived by the respondents to happen on 
average “sometimes”. The distinction between large and 
small organisations reveals some more differentiated 
insights. More than 50% of the organisations with less 
than 250 employees report that their standardisation and 
OSS development activities are always or often connected, 
whereas this is only the case for less than a third of the 
larger organisations. In particular, for more than half 
of the smaller organisations OSS is used as input for 
standardisation, whereas this is only claimed by 15% of 
the larger organisations. In contrast, there is no difference 
between large and small organisations in using standards 
as input into OSS development. Finally, more than a third 
of the small organisations claim parallel developments 
in standardisation and OSS, whereas this is claimed only 
by 15% of the larger organisations. Overall, standards 
development and OSS activities are much more 
interconnected for smaller organisations taking 
their size into account, which much more often 
transfer OSS as input into standardisation, whereas 
this transfer and even the parallel development is not so 
common for larger organisations taking their size into 
account. In relative terms, small organisations contribute 
much more to the integration of OSS and standardisation 
than large organisations.
At first, we structure the insights about the interaction 
between SDOs and OSS according to the three scenarios 
established already in the literature, i.e. the specification first 
scenario starting with standardisation, the implementation 
first scenario driven by the implementation of OSS and 
finally parallel standards and open source development.
5.5.3.1. Specification first scenario
In the literature, we find a few examples of standards originally 
released by consortia, in particular OASIS, or SDOs, like ISO 
and its process to develop public available specifications, 
which created the basis for further OSS projects. The most 
prominent is certainly the PDF specification. Common to 
most of these examples is that they are either released by 
SDOs following an explicit RF policy, like W3C or OASIS, or 
referring to an explicit public patent licence. Both proprietary 
and OSS licensed projects, e.g. under the GPL licence, have 
implemented these few standards.
According to Phipps (2019), in particular formal SDOs 
are characterised by an implementation-led rather 
than a requirement-led standardisation approach. 
There are also some standards released by SDOs applying 
the FRAND regime. However, there are very few declarations 
of SEPs related to these standards with the exception of the 
mobile and wireless technologies. Nevertheless, there is still 
the latent fear of conflicts with potential SEP holders, because 
of the general contradiction between the FRAND regime and 
some OSS licensing terms. In particular, the popular GPL is 
incompatible with FRAND, but there are several other 
OSS licences, like the MIT or BSD licences, that are likely 
compatible with FRAND according to Kappos and Harrington 
(2019). However, there is no general consensus about 
this conclusion, because others argue that they are just 
complementary, but not compatible (Phipps 2019). In 
addition, the notion of the incompatibility of the licensing 
regimes is endorsed by a significant percentage of open 
source programmers (Bekkers and Updegrove 2013). There 
are some differences in the interpretation of licences either 
as contracts or as sui generis legal instruments that make 
these assessments situational to the applied jurisdiction 
and difficult to compare. Due to the highlighted relevance of 
standards implementation for their quality and success, the 
concerns of the OSS communities related to the ambiguity 
in the licensing conditions gain further in relevance. Some 
SDOs have recognised that OSS implementation as an 
option to promote their standards.
The majority of the projects among the case studies do 
not consider a specification as the necessary starting point 
of an implementation. Those that create specifications 
state well-known benefits like interoperability or enabling 
independent third-party implementations to improve 
competition and the general availability of products in the 
market. This indicates an increasingly utilitarian point of 
view towards the role of specifications. Specifications are 
authored, if they provide a tangible benefit. Projects that 
do not benefit from written specifications often omit them. 
Procurement processes, safety or compliance 
requirements and other conditions, however, 
continue to reference specifications provided 
by standards. Fulfilling such external requirements is 
5.5.3. Three scenarios
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one possible utility provided by a specification that may 
compel projects to provide them first.
5.5.3.2. Implementation first scenario
In contrast to the rather few standards which have 
been the basis for implementations in OSS, many OSS 
implementations have significantly contributed 
to the establishment of standards, because OSS 
is available for immediate testing and prototyping of 
applications. One popular example from the literature is 
the Open Document Format (ODF), first provided as an 
OASIS and later even as an ISO standard. Among the case 
studies, a significant number follows the implementation 
first paradigm, i.e. the respective OSS communities act as 
the incubators of newly developed technologies. 
However, there are also concerns, since the lack of 
any specific IPR rules related to OSS still generates 
uncertainties. The application of the FRAND rules relevant 
for patents seems to be less appropriate. In some SDOs, 
there is even implicit resistance to embed software in 
standard specifications. However, there are also proactive 
attempts to improve the integration of OSS in patent 
oriented SDOs, like the open source project Open Source 
MANO (OSM) launched by ETSI in 2016 under the OSS 
licence Apache 2.0.
In summary, the current frameworks of formal 
SDOs and informal consortia obviously allow 
the integration of OSS into their standard 
development process and standards. Consortia, like 
W3C and OASIS, which have more a RF culture related 
to patents and consequently rather limited number or no 
SEPs at all, are forerunners in starting proactive initiatives 
to include OSS in their standards. ETSI, a formal SDO with 
an established FRAND policy and a high number of SEP 
declarations due to their focus on mobile and wireless 
technologies, started with OSM a pioneering project. Other 
SDOs, like CEN and CENELEC, launched recently further 
pilot projects to respond to the challenges generated by 
OSS communities in claiming to set de facto standards. 
5.5.3.3. Parallel development scenario
More recently, parallel developments both in SDOs 
and OSS communities are becoming more popular 
according to the findings both in the literature review and 
to the case studies. In particular, the open processes for 
standardisation with low barriers to entry adopted by W3C 
or IETF obviously contribute effectively to open source 
projects implementing specific standards. Furthermore, 
a few cases of close interaction between OSS and 
standardisation are mainly focused on consortia, which 
have strict RF and rather patent intolerant licensing policies, 
i.e. W3C or OASIS. Finally, larger software companies are 
meanwhile engaged both in SDOs and OSS, which drives 
the parallel development, but might also lead to dominant 
market positions.
The complementarity of SDOs and OSS is also highlighted 
by the aspect that in contrast to OSS, SDOs prevent forking 
of their specifications that might result in incompatible 
implementations. 
5.5.3.4. Comparison of the three scenarios
Whereas looking at case studies reveals a trend 
to the implementation first scenario, i.e. OSS 
implementations are the basis for follow-up standards, 
and the parallel development in SDOs and OSS, the 
respondents to the stakeholder survey assess the 
likelihood of choosing any of the three scenarios 
as quite equal. However, the perception of the 
smaller organisations endorses the relative weights of 
the different scenarios based on the literature review 
and the performed case studies. In particular, SDOs 
implementing a rather strict RF policy related to 
patents are much more involved in cases about 
the collaboration between standardisation and 
OSS communities both in the past and in the present. 
Obviously, the compatibility of the IPR regimes applied in 
these SDOs and OSS is an important precondition for a 
collaboration to initiate at all. The case studies and survey 
results support the conclusion that projects are able to 
establish such suitable IPR regimes without much difficulty, 
however none of those regimes incorporate royalty-
bearing patent licensing or ex-post negotiation. Regarding 
the technologies being suitable for collaboration between 
SDOs and OSS communities, opportunities are again being 
limited by OSS communities almost exclusively producing 
software or possibly other information goods.
Multiple case studies exhibit a change of approach 
between the scenarios over time. Especially initiatives 
that started before the wide-spread adoption of OSS 
technologies, like the C++ standards committee initially 
chose a specification-first approach. Later the committee 
adopted a parallel approach to iterative standards 
development. There is not enough data to generalise 
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this as a trend, however, these transitions reflect the 
development of better methods of collaboration and the 
general trend towards openness and transparency that 
influences the ICT sector as a whole.
Following the analysis of the interaction in general and 
the direction of knowledge flows, we assess its general 
impact based on the findings from the case studies and 
the stakeholder survey. Here, specific insights from the 
literature are not available.
The case study research revealed different understandings 
of the nature of possible collaboration between SDOs and 
the wider open source community. The most widely used 
thought model experienced within SDOs for “working with 
the open source community” is the expectation that SDOs 
develop specifications in standards and the OSS community 
subsequently implements them. This approach assumes 
that a specification is created first as part of a standards 
development process, and that creating a concrete 
conforming product is left to implementers competing in the 
market. As discussed before, this specification-first approach 
to standardisation is only applied in a minority of cases. It 
does exist, however, for technologies like programming 
languages where the value of the specification is inherent.
Based on the overall impact that the reviewed cases 
as well as those being discussed in the literature had 
on the market, two thirds can be considered highly 
innovative, large scale collaboration that have seen 
wide or sometimes global adoption, especially Java, Linux 
and PDF. Almost a third have had a significant impact on 
a specific market segment. For the most recent cases the 
impact has not been realised even though they are being 
considered as innovative by participants. About half of the 
cases achieved market wide relevance across multiple 
industry sectors as foundational technologies or by 
driving business-critical infrastructure, even though they 
originated from the ICT sector.
There is no clear-cut definition of the affected industry 
sectors and subsectors as the technologies covered by 
the case studies are multi-purpose. As a general cross-
sector trend, computer and telecommunication systems 
become foundational technologies for various products 
and business processes. 
The choice of an early, parallel or late approach to 
standardisation does not limit the possibility of success 
of a project, nor is a specific approach a requirement 
to a successful standard. However, the incubation 
of new technologies and features more commonly 
happens through joint implementations or reference 
implementations under open source licences. Most 
innovations covered by the cases are brought to SDOs once 
proven implementations exist and are generally available. 
Instead, some case study participants emphasized that 
they see standards development not as a means to create 
genuine innovations, but to establish industry consensus 
on available technologies to enable economies of scale. In 
general, the governance and collaboration models 
need to be considered suitable by the relevant 
stakeholders to motivate them to participate, 
because most widely adopted technologies are also the 
ones that attract a large number of participants in their 
development. 
In summary, the case studies developed a partial focus 
on the networking and telecommunications subsector. 
This is to be expected since the interaction between 
standards and OSS development naturally centres at 
software-hardware intersections. The cases show that 
numerous successful collaborations between standards 
and OSS development exist and that they have developed 
a mature, well-established governance as for example 
showcased by ECMA TC39 or ISO JTC1. Both OSS and SDO 
processes are suitable for the development of technical 
solutions at a small and a large scale. Those of the 
observed collaborations that established explicit patent 
licensing regimes opted for royalty-free, ex-ante licensing 
with symmetrical conditions between contributors 
and between inbound and outbound licences. SDOs 
are usually not the drivers of technical developments. 
More commonly, OSS communities incubate new 
technical solutions until they become candidates 
for standardisation and diffusion in the market. 
OSS umbrella organisations increasingly provide functions 
like platforms for collaboration and consensus-building 
traditionally assumed by SDOs.
The respondents to the stakeholder consultation also 
have been asked for their assessment of the interaction 
between OSS and standardisation on their efficiency and 
5.5.4. Impact of interaction
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results. The majority of the respondents perceive 
a positive impact of this interconnection on 
standardisation. In particular, around 70% of the 
respondents perceive a positive impact on the creation 
of specifications of technical solutions contributing to 
interoperability and on the implementation of technical 
solutions. Standardisation benefits less related to the 
ideation of new technical solutions, but also to their 
validation and eventually diffusion, because here only 
around 60% of the respondents expect positive impacts. 
Negative impacts from the interaction on standardisation 
are in general not expected. The differentiation between 
small and large organisations reveals that the former 
are more likely to expect positive impacts on 
the identification of possible technical solutions, i.e. the 
ideation, and the creation of specifications of technical 
solutions, i.e. interoperability, whereas the latter see 
the advantages in particular in the implementation of 
technical solutions.
If we turn to the impacts of the interaction on OSS, 
we observe even higher shares of respondents perceiving 
positive impacts. More than 75% expect positive 
impacts for the creation of specifications of technical 
solutions, in particular related to interoperability, and 
for the implementation of technical solutions. Whereas 
around 70% perceive positive impacts on OSS both for 
the identification of possible technical solutions and 
their diffusion, beneficial impulses for the validation of 
technical solutions are expected by less than 60% of the 
respondents. Again, negative impacts are not experienced. 
The differentiation between small and large organisations 
reveals in contrast to the expected impacts on 
standardisation that the former are more likely to expect 
positive impacts on the validation and diffusion of technical 
solutions. Larger organisations see the advantages again 
in the implementation of technical solutions, but also in 
the identification of possible technical solutions in OSS.
Comparing all the assessments about the interconnection 
on efficiency and results, it becomes obvious that smaller 
organisations perceive knowledge flows from OSS 
to SDOs as providing the latter with new ideas as 
inputs for technical solutions. Larger organisations 
see advantages for SDOs from OSS in the implementation 
of technical solutions. In contrast, smaller organisations 
experience positive impacts of standardisation on OSS 
on the validation and diffusion of technical solutions. 
Obviously, there exists a complementarity of effects, which 
is explained by the size of the organisations. 
The sparse existing research reviewed in the literature survey 
that deals concretely with the interaction of SEP licensing 
and open source software focuses primarily on the legal 
compatibility of open source licences with FRAND licensing of 
SEP. This is one important dimension of the interaction, since 
any directly contradicting terms in a specific combination 
of open source and FRAND licence would prohibit a 
combination of the two works in a product. However, it was 
clearly identified during the case studies and the responses 
to the survey, but also recently raised by Maracke (2019) 
and Phipps (2019), that answering the question of 
legal compatibility is not a sufficient condition for 
possible collaborations of SDOs and OSS. 
The case study report established that the question of 
legal incompatibility can only be evaluated against a 
specific contractual situation and the individual terms and 
conditions applied in the concrete open source and FRAND 
licences. Several experts contributing to the stakeholder 
survey also endorsed that since many open source licences 
of very different nature exist and FRAND conditions as 
well are not harmonised, no general conclusions can 
be derived. Reviews of legal compatibility only yield 
useful results for a concrete licensing relationship with 
a specific open source licence combined with specific 
FRAND terms. However, even if a case does not incur any 
incompatibilities, this only means that a collaboration is 
legally possible, not that participants from SDOs and OSS 
would be willing to engage in it and contribute towards 
a common output. Legal compatibility of licensing 
terms is a necessary precondition, but not 
sufficient to establish a successful collaboration 
between SDOs and the OSS communities.
IPR regimes serve partially different purposes in SDOs 
compared to OSS communities. OSS licences mirror 
and follow collaboration models and represent how 
participants envision the jointly created products to be used, 
resulting in the strong-copyleft, weak-copyleft and permissive 
classes of OSS licences. The governance within open source 
communities develops as a collaboration model first and is 
then reinforced through a choice of one or more licences.
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In contrast, IPR frameworks at SDOs regulate 
how participants engage and how conflicts are 
resolved. Special attention is given to how participants 
may later exit the pre-competitive cooperation at SDOs and 
compete again on products that implement the developed 
standard. This rationale is foreign to OSS communities, as 
they do not envision re-engaging in competition once a 
functional area is covered by an industry-standard OSS 
implementation. This contradiction may pre-empt the idea 
of an OSS community creating reference implementations 
to a standard next to other competing implementations. 
Such a thought model has not been found implemented in 
any of the cases. In the same context, OSS communities 
see no benefit in engaging in standards development 
simply for the purpose of facilitating alternative or 
competing implementations.
One original question of this study was whether or not 
the empirically limited cooperation between standards 
and open source development is caused by uncertainty 
about the legal compatibility between SDOs and OSS 
IPR regimes. The results from the case studies and the 
literature review do not support this proposition, while the 
stakeholder survey did not produce a conclusive answer to 
this question. Most OSS projects observed in this study 
use licences with reciprocal conditions or explicit 
patent grants and interact productively with the 
SDOs relevant for their market segment. Some SDOs 
responded to OSS related market changes by establishing 
flexible or royalty free IPR regimes, like W3C and OASIS and 
by adopting open source inspired collaboration methods. In 
the vast majority of the covered cases, FRAND-licensing of 
SEP is not considered important or there are no explicit IPR 
policies for it. Generalisations beyond the available data 
may not be possible considering the situational character 
of qualitative case study research. However, in the 
investigated cases, SEP do not play a significant 
role in these ecosystems for a variety of reasons. In 
some cases, patent holders share their portfolios through 
cross-licensing or commit to limited patent grants. In other 
cases, patents covering their technology have already 
expired or the implementers established a culture of 
royalty free licensing. In these projects, there is no need 
to reconcile SDOs and OSS IPR policies. Except for the 
telecommunications subsector, the industry does 
not perceive a conflict between SDOs and open 
source IPR policies. Legal issues between OSS licences 
and SDOs IPR policies have not been found in practice 
and are not a relevant concern for most cases. In general, 
stakeholders either do not consider SEP relevant for their 
specific innovations or implement a royalty-free patent 
licensing policy. Therefore, they also do not consider this a 
situation that needs change.
Most commonly, participants adjust to the collaboration 
methods and IPR policies employed by the communities 
they engage with, entering into a trade-off between 
contributing own IPR in return for getting access to 
the aggregate contributions by the other participants. 
For activities at the boundary of standards and OSS 
development, this typically involves adopting a royalty-
free patent licensing policy for all cases except ETSI-
NFV and OpenAirInterface, which actively anticipate 
the inclusion of FRAND-licensed SEP into developed 
standards. This expectation of royalty-free licensing 
is considered acceptable and not to be a barrier 
to collaboration or to the development of relevant 
standards. Multiple parties mentioned as a precondition 
for this model to work well that all participants invest 
goodwill into making the collaboration work and are open 
and transparent about their intentions.
The answers to the stakeholder survey confirm the insights 
from the literature review and the case studies. In general, 
participation in standardisation activities under 
royalty free schemes is more common compared 
to FRAND, which is only rarely or at most sometimes 
applied by the responding stakeholders. In detail, almost 
half of the respondents never participate in standardisation 
activities, which follow FRAND. Complementary, more 
than 50% do always or often participate when royalty 
free is implemented. In particular, small organisations are 
almost never involved in activities under a FRAND scheme, 
whereas the size of organisations does not correlate with 
the usage of royalty free.
In addition to highlighting that RF might be a subcategory 
of FRAND but does not necessarily mean no cost for 
the implementer, Non-FRAND, RAND and RAND-ZERO 
are mentioned explicitly as other relevant IPR regimes. 
Furthermore, non-assertion covenant agreements are an 
option. Obviously, the guaranteed access to technologies, 
reciprocity and transferability aspects are important for 
the involved stakeholders.
In contrast to the distinction between royalty free and FRAND 
applied in standardisation, several licensing models have 
been developed for OSS. Looking at the most common 
regimes, the Apache License 2.0, the MIT License 
and the GNU General Public License (GPL 2.0) are 
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– as among the case studies – are the top three 
for the respondents to the stakeholder survey followed by 
GNU General Public License (GNU) 3 and the BSD License 
2.0. This ranking corresponds closely with already publicly 
available data confirming both the validity of the selected 
cases and the representativeness of the sample. Less 
common are the GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) 
2.1, the Simplified BSD License, the GNU Lesser General 
Public License (LGPL) 3.0 and the Eclipse Public License. No 
other licence model plays a relevant role.
In addition to the significant differences between the 
general attractiveness of the various OSS licensing models, 
we can observe discrepancies between larger and smaller 
organisations. The latter have much stronger 
preferences for both the GNU General Public 
License 3.0 and the GNU Lesser General Public 
License (LGPL) 3.0, whereas the former are inclined 
to the MIT License and the various versions of the BSD 
Licenses. It can, however, be observed in the case studies 
that many licence choices are made in the early stage of 
an OSS project and then never changed. This supports the 
claim that licence choices in communities follow the 
envisioned collaboration model of the contributors, 
and that more recent projects more often opt for licences 
with explicit, as in the Apache-2 or GPL-3 licences, as 
opposed to implicit or absent patent licensing terms.
The projects analysed in the case studies apply copyright, 
patent and trademark protection to their products and 
organisations. Only two projects (White Rabbit and 
Linux) do not formulate an explicit IP policy, mostly for 
reasons based on their historical development. Copyright 
is applied to source code and specifications. The majority 
of the OSS projects decided for the Apache 2.0 licence, 
which is a permissive open source licence that includes 
a licence grant to contributor-owned patents. A smaller 
group apply the GPL 2.0, a strictly reciprocal licence that 
requires all modifications to be distributed under similar 
licensing terms. Java combines the GPL with the Java 
Specification Participation Agreement (JSPA), a contributor 
licence agreement that includes a grant of a patent 
licence. Only two projects apply a broadly permissive 
open source licence (MIT, BSD) with no explicit patent 
grant. The ecosystems of some cases invite independent 
implementations, so that multiple licences may be 
applied by different organisations representing the same 
case. Overall, the cases set up a patent licensing 
framework either through the use of open source 
licences that include a grant of contributor-owned 
patents or by requiring a declaration of SEP or a 
patent licensing commitment from participants. 
Although, the hosting organisations for multiple cases 
leave an option for FRAND based patent licensing, 
almost all cases opted for a royalty-free patent licensing 
policy. This is either because patents where claims cover 
standardised functionality are expired, as in the case of 
C++, or because the working group aims at making the 
standard freely available, where the royalty-free policy is 
implemented by way of a contributor licence agreement.
Regarding the existence of conflicts between the 
various copyright licences and the licensing models in 
standardisation, in particular FRAND, the stakeholder 
survey revealed the following pattern. Both the GNU 
General Public Licenses GPL 2.0 and 3.0 on the 
one hand and the GNU Lesser General Public 
License LGPL 2.1 and 3.0 on the other hand create 
conflicts for the majority of the stakeholders. For 
the BSD family of licences only one third report conflicts. 
Overall, small organisations report fewer conflicts. The 
case studies draw a different picture, however: There, 
even if incompatibilities between OSS licences 
and SDO IPR frameworks may theoretically exist, 
the participants always resolved these issues 
or worked around them driven by the common 
interest in the collaborative development of a 
standardised technology. Licensing incompatibilities 
have not been observed as a practically relevant problem. 
This inconsistency might be explained by the much broader 
range of stakeholders being reached by the survey and the 
option to indicate conflicts anonymously. 
In case of conflicts, the strict separation between 
OSS and FRAND licensing is still the preferred 
option followed by negotiations to find solutions 
supported by the experiences reported in the case 
studies. If no solutions are found, in particular small 
organisations withdraw from standardisation. Another 
option is the use of copyright-only licences explicitly 
excluding patent licence rights, which are negotiated 
separately. Still more than rarely used are more flexible IPR 
models in SDOs, which allow case by case IPR schemes, 
and even the withdrawal from OSS, which is less likely 
than the withdrawal from standardisation. Almost never 
are more flexible definitions of OSS, alternative dispute 
resolutions or eventually litigation at court suggested. 
Whereas there are no convincing constructive solutions 
for conflicts between OSS and licensing models in 
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standardisation, some approaches of general collaboration 
between standardisation and OSS are more promising 
in particular in the perspective of smaller organisations. 
First, the stakeholders ask for a higher flexibility 
of SDOs’ patent policy. Secondly, new processes to 
integrate OSS in standardisation are suggested. Thirdly, 
not only more flexible patent policies are asked for, but 
it is even suggested that SDOs change their patent 
policies towards royalty free. Below medium, but above 
low effectiveness we find new governance and conflict 
solution models, the use of copyright-only OSS licences 
explicitly excluding patent licence rights and finally a direct 
combination of SDOs and OSS communities. Finally, the 
proposals that OSS licences should include FRAND-based 
patent grants and of more flexible definitions of OSS are 
perceived as being not very effective. Interestingly, larger 
organisations perceive these options as much more 
effective than smaller organisations.
The evolution of IPR frameworks in the ICT sector is 
complicated by the ongoing hardware commoditisation 
that results in the predominant use of commercial-off-the-
shelf general-purpose computers that integrate practically 
all key ICT functions like computing, storage, networking 
or telecommunication and peripherals. Manufacturers are 
faced with a market situation where to make competitive 
products they need access to a large, encompassing 
set of IPR held by diverse actors. This means that when 
assessing governance norms and IPR frameworks in the 
ICT sector, standards and open source development need 
to be analysed in combination. Market actors are aware 
of this situation and have partially already adapted to it 
by generally preferring consensus-driven collaboration. 
Formal rules act as fall-backs for conflict resolution. 
SDO governance focuses more on legal and IPR 
frameworks and is implemented self-regulatory 
within policy constraints, building upon the baseline 
policies established in interaction with policy makers. OSS 
governance is anchored in collaboration models 
and builds as of yet unregulated upon authority 
within the autonomous group of contributors. 
OSS governance still coalesces, with volunteer-driven 
communities relying on more implicit governance 
norms and industry-led OSS communities creating more 
explicit rules in increasingly normalised project charters. 
Governance in SDOs and OSS communities still differ in 
key aspects of philosophy and implementations, which 
poses a barrier to collaboration.
SDO processes are more inclusive with regard to 
engaging a broadly defined set of stakeholders. 
They are also integrated with industry and policy making. 
OSS communities mostly involve enterprises, other 
organisations and individual software developers without 
a systematic multi-stakeholder engagement. There is 
a strong overlap of participants in standards and open 
source development especially for large enterprises. 
Overall, OSS processes are currently less accessible 
to policy makers and difficult to influence according to 
industrial and innovation policy goals. 
Both SDO and OSS communities are capable of 
conducting small to large scale collaborations (in 
terms of number of participants) and small to large 
scale research and development investments. OSS 
umbrella organisations increasingly provide collaboration 
and consensus-building platforms traditionally offered 
by SDOs. The wider adoption of implementation-first 
and parallel approaches to standardisation influences 
the utility of specifications relative to the value of joint 
implementations. This changes the role of standards 
themselves as standards and OSS development are 
becoming alternatives in achieving market diffusion for 
a technology. OSS poses a new challenge for managing 
innovation by being innovative state of the art technology 
offered with the attributes of a commodity, which have 
traditionally been considered opposites, and as a public 
good.
A comparative analysis of strengths and weaknesses of 
SDO and OSS illustrates where they are likely to compete 
or to complement each other. It emphasizes cost of 
change as a determinant for the choice of standardisation 
scenario. Areas where both groups exhibit weaknesses 
mark opportunities for active innovation policy to address 
these concerns.
Globalisation and online collaboration shape the landscape 
of OSS communities and SDO in that interactions build 
primarily based on relevance in the respective market 
segment and less on formal recognition. However, 
5.6. Conclusion
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formal recognition still serves a purpose as it signals 
relevance for example for safety standards and for 
reliable baseline policies accepted by policy makers. The 
converging functions of SDO and OSS umbrella 
organisations offer actors a choice of platforms 
that previously did not exist. In general, participants 
judge SDO-OSS interaction as fruitful in practice. With 
the established alternative standardisation scenarios, 
the model of building competing products compliant 
to a previously established standard is complemented 
by the model of single joint implementations. Both 
approaches are successful at delivering interoperability 
and competitive, innovative technical solutions. In both 
cases, access to the wide range of technologies required 
to build competitive products is key to the freedom to 
operate of implementers.
Three scenarios, specification-first, implemen-
tation-first and parallel standardisation can be 
observed in the case studies. The specification-first 
approach declines in relative relevance but is still impor-
tant in specification-driven technology areas. Some cases 
transitioned from a traditional specification-first to a par-
allel approach as the necessary collaboration methods be-
came available. Especially the parallel approach to stand-
ardisation represents some of the successful interactions 
between standards and OSS development and can result 
in higher quality standards, more innovativeness and bet-
ter implementations.
Most of the covered projects are judged as innovative or 
highly innovative by the study participants. As expected, 
the cases cover key ICT technologies, like computing, 
networking, cloud computing and telecommunications. 
Where SMEs perceive a knowledge flow from OSS 
communities to SDOs, large enterprises experience a flow 
in the opposite direction. This may indicate preferences for 
the choice of collaboration and consensus building platform 
correlated with business size. Compatibility between 
OSS and FRAND licensing terms is recognised 
as a requirement, but not communicated as a 
practically relevant issue and considered solvable. 
However, wherever contributors have a choice, they 
are more likely to implement IPR policies based on OSS 
licences and royalty-free patent licensing. Only a small 
number of OSS licences are relevant in practice, which 
reduces the problem space for analysing the compatibility 
of OSS and FRAND licences.
Innovation policy focuses on IPR frameworks and 
directing research and development funding to increase 
competitiveness and encourage building technological 
champions and industry areas of expertise. The results 
from this study provide new insights especially into the 
dynamic development of SDO and OSS governance over 
time that are still lacking in academic literature. SDOs 
look back to a successful history but are challenged by an 
accelerating dynamic in science and technology, to which 
they started to react. OSS processes represent a viable 
additional approach to the development of technical 
standards. The success of OSS communities is driven 
by their dynamic innovativeness. However, they lack in 
integration with policy making and other stakeholders and 
may benefit from careful regulation.
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6 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
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Based on the insights of the comprehensive analysis that 
build upon the results of the review of the literature, the 
insights from the case studies and the assessment of the 
stakeholder survey, we derive policy recommendations 
with the aim to improve the interaction between SDOs 
and OSS in order to exploit further the existing synergies 
and cross fertilization effects. Since different actors 
must be involved, we structure the recommendations by 
target groups. At first, we derive the recommendations 
addressing SDOs, because here we see the most 
opportunities to foster and improve collaboration with 
OSS communities. Second, OSS communities can also 
contribute to a better interaction with SDOs. Finally, 
the European Commission or national governments 
responsible for the framework conditions in general and 
for SDOs in particular are asked to take both SDOs and 
OSS and their interaction in various policy areas into 
account. We conclude with an outlook.
6 | Policy recommendations
6.1. Introduction
6.2. SDOs
6.2.1. Considering software and OSS in IPR policies
At first, we address SDOs, because they are both benefiting 
from OSS and disrupted by the increasing importance of 
OSS in general. In addition, specific OSS organisations 
aim at setting standards in the future, which would mean 
immediate additional competitors. In principle, these 
recommendations address all SDOs, acknowledging 
however that individual SDOs have already implemented 
some of them or are currently addressing them.
We recommend SDOs to consider addressing 
software and OSS explicitly within their IPR 
policies in order to adequately handle the peculiarities of 
software in general and OSS in particular.
The review of formal SDOs IPR policies reveals that many 
either not differentiate between specific IPRs, like copyright 
and patents, or just focus on patents. This challenge might 
be less relevant for SDOs deciding to still exclusively focus 
on hardware technologies and eventually patents. By 
elaborating the IPR policies towards software and OSS, the 
interface between the guidelines for licensing patent rights, 
e.g. FRAND, and the different OSS licences also must be 
addressed. Organisations like W3C and OASIS that follow 
a rather strict RF policy related to patents are examples for 
a successful integration of OSS into the work and output of 
SDOs by creating a legally conducive framework between 
patent and copyright licensing. It will be useful for SDOs to 
consider why it is desirable to innovators to participate in 
such an environment. However, other approaches not based 
on RF might not follow the principle of legal compatibility, 
but just of legal complementarity. So far, success cases are 
missing, which is an indication that a more focused effort 
should be invested into developing such complementary 
solutions between FRAND and OSS licences in general or 
specific OSS licences including non-RF patent grants. 
For future approaches we recommend giving special 
consideration to the point of time at which agreements 
about the use of IPR are secured by implementers. Within 
OSS communities the decisions are made ex ante. In SDOs 
they are partially taken ex-ante, as for example with FRAND 
commitments, and partially ex-post, as for example with 
the concrete implementation of the FRAND commitment 
between the SEP holder and an implementer. Among OSS 
communities, ex-ante licences call for RF licensing. In SDOs, 
licences can be negotiated ex-ante as well. W3C and OASIS 
have decided to go for RF. However, other SDOs might 
negotiate for a positive price for SEP, like VITA (Baron et al. 
2019). The policy of VITA obligates members to declare the 
maximum royalty rate they will charge for a disclosed SEP 
before the standard is approved. The licensing offers made 
to implementers of VITA standards must be on terms and 
conditions that are both FRAND and not more restrictive 
than the more specific terms and conditions initially 
announced. Among OSS communities, ex post RF is applied 
as well, whereas in SDOs FRAND including RF is the common 
approach. In such case, conflicts between the licences 
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might, but not necessarily must arise. We recommend SDOs 
to elaborate different and alternative approaches for the 
integration of OSS in their processes either following an ex-
ante way of negotiating about IPR regimes, which is likely 
to be based on RF, or an ex-post decision. The decision of 
stakeholders will then reveal which approach is going to be 
more attractive in the long run and whether the coexistence 
of complementary ways might be a sustainable solution.
Furthermore, we recommend considering in particular the 
needs of smaller organisations, including SMEs, in drafting 
the details of the IPR guidelines related to OSS, because 
they have stronger preferences for copyleft licences 
including RF patent grants, whereas the larger patent-
owning companies favour non-copyleft preferences 
without patent grants.
In general, we recommend the development of at least 
incentive compatible solutions, allowing each contributor 
to achieve the best outcome to themselves by acting 
according to their true preferences, which are a necessary 
condition for a sustainable and successful collaboration 
between SDOs and OSS communities. Therefore, the 
latter might be involved in drafting the OSS related IPR 
guidelines at formal SDOs in order to understand and 
consider the slightly different incentive structure, but also 
to exploit existing commonalities.
However, if elaborating the IPR policies in SDOs towards 
OSS fails, the fall-back option is a strict separation 
between patent and OSS related policies. This separation 
requires a decision for either ex-ante acquisition of IPR, 
enabling OSS development, or to leave scope for ex-post 
royalty negotiations, enabling FRAND regimes. Both the 
literature, the experts interviewed in the context of the 
case studies and finally the majority of the respondents 
to the stakeholder survey recommend this separation as 
a fall-back.
6.2.2. Coordination between SDOs
6.2.3. Adjusting financing models of SDOs
The elaboration of more comprehensive IPR policies 
including software and OSS requires a better 
coordination between SDOs and the consideration of the 
views of public authorities and other stakeholders. 
We observe a diversity of IPR regimes in SDOs not only 
related to copyright and software, but in particular in the 
area of patents (Baron et al. 2019). This heterogeneity, but 
also the limited progress in finding effective and efficient 
solutions in the case of patents has been the starting point 
for recommending a tandem approach involving both 
policy makers and SDOs jointly to find common solutions, 
e.g. proposed by Baron et al. (2019) related to specifying 
FRAND. Since the authors admit that their proposal has to 
be elaborated and specified further, we do not recommend 
such an approach, but the exchange of experiences and 
ideas among SDOs also considering the view of public 
authorities and other stakeholders to exploit the variety of 
possible options. The launched CEN-CENELEC project on 
Open Source Innovation could be the platform for such an 
exchange among the national SDOs within the European 
Union. However, a further exchange with ETSI relying on the 
experiences with the MANO project at the European level 
is recommended. Due to the close links between CEN and 
CENELEC and the international level, a close coordination 
with ISO and IEC as well as ITU is encouraged.
Some SDOs depend on selling access to standards. The 
inclusion of OSS in standards might have an impact 
on SDOs’ financing models. We recommend these 
SDOs to consider this trend and to reduce their 
dependencies on revenues from selling standards. 
This has been realised by some SDOs that apply open 
access solutions already or practice a closer collaboration 
with OSS communities.
An increasing integration of OSS in standards published 
by SDOs can be assumed to challenge those SDOs 
which are selling their standards for a fee, because the 
software source code is general freely available via the 
OSS licences. Therefore, we recommend considering the 
implications of integrating OSS into standards not only 
related to the compatibility or complementarity between 
patent and OSS licences, but also for the financing models 
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of SDOs. As already argued by Baron et al. (2019) the 
practice and effects of copyright licensing of standards 
and reference implementations and their impact on public 
access and re-use would merit a separate study.
6.2.4. Speed of standardisation processes at SDOs
6.2.5. Inclusion of SMEs at SDOs
6.3. OSS communities
Stakeholders and policy makers have complained about 
the limited speed of standardisation processes at SDOs. 
We recommend a closer collaboration with OSS 
communities, because it might support SDOs in 
efforts to speed up the processes and to increase 
the agility of standards development.
In June 2011, an overall revision of the European 
standardisation system was called for in Communication 
311 setting out a strategic vision for European standards 
until 2020 (EC 2011). As part of the new package, strategic 
objectives have been published. Speed and timeliness are 
of high priority, because European standards need to be 
quickly available, especially to assure the interoperability 
in the field of information and communication technology. 
However, neither software in general nor OSS have been 
mentioned in this document. Since then, the limited 
timeliness of processes in SDOs has been expressed in the 
literature, by experts interviewed during the case studies 
and the respondents to the stakeholder survey. The 
potential role of OSS to address this challenge needs to 
be considered. Since OSS is characterised by its agility, its 
further integration into the contents of standards released 
by SDOs is recommended as an option to improve the 
agility of standardisation processes and eventually the 
timeliness of standards’ content. Since this topic has not 
been in the core of the current study, we recommend 
the further investigation of this interaction after SDOs 
might have decided to open explicitly their processes and 
standards to OSS communities and contents.
Small organisations, in particular SMEs, face problems 
in actively contributing to standardisation processes 
at SDOs. We recommend SDOs to integrate in 
particular SMEs active in the software sector more 
effectively in their standardisation processes by 
closer collaboration with OSS communities.
Communication 311 (European Commission 2011) asks 
not only for speed and timeliness of standardisation 
processes, but also for inclusiveness. The European 
Standardisation System should become as inclusive 
as possible by involving a wide range of participants. 
In addition to the integration of stakeholders of various 
interest groups, like NGOs, the involvement of SMEs 
is called for. Since both the literature, the case studies 
and the stakeholder survey confirm the higher likelihood 
of SMEs being involved in OSS communities compared 
to their participation in SDOs, the closer collaboration 
between the both of them presents another opportunity 
to increase indirectly the contribution of SMEs to 
standardisation and eventually even their participation in 
SDOs, as already envisaged in the ETSI 3SI Programme 
on Societal Stakeholders, SMEs and Inclusiveness. The 
programme is designed to increase the visibility of the 
societal stakeholders’ and SMEs’ interests in ETSI.
Whereas we have derived several recommendations 
addressing SDOs, we have only a few suggestions 
targeting OSS communities. Since OSS communities 
are mostly autonomous and driven by the aggregate of 
their contributor’s interests, they will primarily respond 
to changing incentives based on market forces and 
regulatory influences more than to recommendations of 
outsiders. Attempts to influence OSS communities will 
have to focus on adjusting the supply-side environment of 
the European market and incentivising the communities to 
adjust, also considering that the legal entities representing 
the communities may not be based in the EU area.
78 The Relationship Between Open Source Software and Standard Setting
Despite existing attempts to define open source independently, 
we recommend keeping and strengthening the 
existing Open Source Definition. The definition is 
broadly supported by the OSS community as well as the 
overwhelming majority of industry actors and therefore the 
basis for possible collaboration between them and SDOs.
Since there has been a high level of acceptance among 
the OSS communities, any efforts to challenge the 
definition by stakeholders outside the OSS communities 
is not increasing their willingness to collaborate with 
SDOs. The Open Source Definition provides a baseline 
of minimum requirements that normalises expectations 
towards OSS licensing relationships. This common 
baseline is an advantage of the wider Open Source 
community that facilitates large-scale collaboration 
by practically eliminating transaction of cost of 
participation.
6.3.1. OSS definition
6.3.2. OSS foundations
6.3.3. OSS-FRAND compatible licences 
Larger OSS communities should consider in 
engaging in the development of future strategies 
according to WTO standardisation principles, 
which includes openness, consensus and transparency, 
because SDOs that develop standards must meet these 
governance requirements. In addition, standards that 
include software specifications may be referenced in 
legislation. Consequently, OSS communities have a choice 
to produce the specifications themselves or to collaborate 
with SDOs. We encourage OSS communities to collaborate 
with SDOs to benefit from their reach, brand, and network 
for that purpose.
The wider OSS community benefits from applying a 
principled definition to what makes a contribution and from 
treating all contributors as equals, no matter if they are 
individual volunteers, businesses, research organisations 
or governmental agencies. Historical prejudices sometimes 
shared in the “hacker community” that free software 
is the prerogative of civil society and hackers are not 
justified considering that today’s community composition 
includes a majority of corporate contributors. Global OSS 
collaboration offers a unique opportunity to build bridges 
between the interests of individual, civil society, enterprises 
and the state, provided they are willing to contribute to the 
free software commons. The wider community can work 
towards realising this potential by actively influencing 
the quality of the collaboration process as perceived by 
the different types of participants through community 
management and setting governance norms, while 
maintaining and reinforcing the principles of free software 
like meritocracy, transparency, non-discrimination, shared 
stewardship and open collaboration. By identifying and 
lobbying for software freedom as the unifying overarching 
goal, the OSS community can build the foundations for a 
successful integration with governments or regulators and 
SDOs. 
Only standards and technical specifications as defined 
by Regulation 1025/2012 are likely to be referenced in 
legislation, so OSS communities have a choice to produce 
the specifications themselves, like the Linux Foundation 
(Biddle 2019), or to collaborate with SDOs and benefit 
from their reach, brand, and network for that purpose. OSS 
communities should expect to be held to higher standards 
regarding social responsibility in the future and should 
consider this a sign of their success in contributing to the 
common good.
Attempts to combine elements of OSS licences with 
conditions for FRAND licensing of SEP are in general 
of limited success. We recommend both OSS 
communities and stakeholders active in SDOs to 
continue developing new models of collaboration 
and to test them in the market. Innovative approaches 
may either be successful or provide new impulses to 
improve existing SDO and OSS processes. Market actors 
will indicate the usefulness of these new approaches by 
way of their decisions to participate.
Although there have been attempts to combine elements 
of OSS licences with conditions for FRAND licensing of SEP, 
like the OpenAirInterface project, they have not shown a 
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significant adoption in the market outside research and 
development or academia. However, as already argued in 
the literature and based on our findings, legal compatibility 
is just a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the 
success of such solutions among OSS communities. 
The viability of collaboration between SDOs and OSS 
communities is influenced by the cultural fit, governance 
models and legal framework in that collaboration must be 
possible and to be preferable over working separately. 
6.4. European Commission and national governments
6.4.1. R&D&I policies
In general, the involvement of governments in markets 
can only be justified by market or system failures. Nagle 
(2018, 2019a) shows that OSS is creating positive 
externalities. Blind and Jungmittag (2008) reveal the 
positive macroeconomic effects of standards. This provides 
a general justification for public authorities to support both 
standards and OSS development and therefore also to 
improve the interface between SDOs and OSS. In addition, 
Swann (2010) derives several incidences of market and 
system failures related to stakeholder participation in 
standardisation, but also to the integration of research 
and innovation in standardisation. 
Standardisation is utilised as a channel of knowledge 
and technology transfer for publicly funded research, 
development and innovation projects. We recommend 
policy makers in the Member States and the 
European Commission in particular to promote 
OSS in addition to standardisation as a further 
channel of knowledge and technology transfer. 
In this context, the interface between OSS and 
standardisation must be defined and elaborated 
further as a parallel and complementary transfer 
channel to exploit possible synergies and minimize 
redundancies and conflicts.
Governments and the European Commission have 
realised the benefits of a better integration of research, 
development and innovation policies on the one hand 
and standardisation on the other hand by using the latter 
as an additional channel of knowledge and technology 
transfer. This novelty in the current European framework 
programme Horizon 2020 can be seen in the context of 
the shift from proprietary research and innovation towards 
fostering open access in science or open innovation 
(Moedas 2015, European Commission 2016).
Since more and more research projects involve aspects 
of software development, both the transfer of results 
into OSS communities and the interface between them 
and standardisation activities at SDOs need to be 
considered. Therefore, we first recommend considering 
the accumulated body of OSS as an important part of the 
technology stock available to innovators in the EU. Policies 
should be updated to reflect that public R&D investments 
shall contribute to this technology stock by encouraging 
the integration of R&D results into OSS as the default 
and directing public R&D funding into private proprietary 
products only as an exception. Commercialisation 
of R&D results should focus on building marketable 
products and services on top of this common, non-
differentiating technology stock. Commercial products 
that gradually improve on existing OSS without adding 
new functionality higher in the stack compete with a 
potentially all-encompassing collaboration of other 
stakeholders and are unlikely to succeed commercially. 
Selection criteria for EU framework programs for research 
and innovation should be reviewed and updated against 
this recommendation.
The option of using OSS as a technology transfer channel 
should be further implemented in R&D&I policies to foster 
the integration and minimise redundancies between 
academia, industry and public policy making. In addition, 
the relation to intellectual property rights, in particular 
patents generated in the context of publicly funded 
research, also needs to be clarified. First examples exist of 
universities that have expanded their transfer strategies 
to explicitly include OSS and standardisation as further 
channels in addition to patents, entrepreneurship and 
collaborative research projects.
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The current regulatory frameworks both related to copyright 
and patents neither reflect the relevance of standards nor 
software as such and OSS in particular. Policy should 
consider OSS and standards in future revisions of 
European copyright and patent legislation.
The interface between SDOs and OSS related to their 
different licensing regimes cannot be influenced directly 
by European or national Intellectual Property law. 
However, possible negative implications can be avoided 
or mitigated by undertaking pro-active consultation with 
both SDO and OSS stakeholders. There continues to be 
a need for EU policy makers to understand better the 
various tenets of open source software from established 
business models or licensing frameworks. For example, 
conflicts in relation to standards, of the recently 
approved Directive on copyright in the Digital Single 
Market on OSS communities should be considered in 
future revisions. Another example, the European Patent 
Convention does not include a reference to standards and 
standardisation either, although standard documents are 
used increasingly as a source of prior art.
6.4.2. IPR policy
6.4.3. Public procurement policies
6.4.4. SME policies
Public procurement as an important demand-side 
innovation policy is already recurring on standards, but in 
official policy documents rarely on OSS despite the already 
existing option to reference OSS in public procurement. We 
recommend the explicit inclusion of OSS in public 
procurement policies, e.g. in updating the public 
procurement directives or the public procurement 
strategy. Equally, we recommend investigating 
the interrelation between standards and OSS in 
public procurement.
In improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public 
procurement, governments have looked at standards as a 
way of reducing the cost-of-ownership of certain products 
and the risk of lock-ins covered by proprietary or de facto 
standards. In Europe in particular, this has led to specific 
measures in the area of public procurement (see also 
Baron et al. 2019). Therefore, public procurement must 
comply with Directive 2014/24/EC, which differentiates 
between formal standards and other technical 
specifications developed by private organisations. For 
the latter, a description of functional requirements and 
use of technology-neutral specifications is additionally 
encouraged. Art 23(1) of the Directive requires that “[t]
echnical specifications shall afford equal access for 
tenderers and not have the effect of creating unjustified 
obstacles to the opening up of public procurement to 
competition”. Therefore, standards should not be used in 
a discriminatory fashion that is unjustified by the subject 
matter of the contract. The key element in EU public 
procurement law is a requirement that public authorities 
procure software or other technology systems by reference 
to standards (as opposed to proprietary technologies). In 
addition to cost savings in purchasing these standard-
based products, standards might reduce costs of document 
format incompatibility and conversion. 
Whereas standards are mentioned both in the procurement 
directive and in the more recent communication on making 
better use of standards in public procurement for building 
open ICT systems (European Commission 2013a), neither 
software in general nor OSS in particular are mentioned. 
However, Nagle (2019a) proves the positive impact 
on demand for OSS by a change in France’s technology 
procurement policy that required government agencies 
to favour OSS over proprietary software in an attempt 
to reduce cost. This increase in contributions to OSS by 
French developers led to benefits for France that increased 
its national productivity and competitiveness by increasing 
the number of firms using OSS, the number of IT start-ups, 
and the amount of IT labour, and decreasing the number 
of software related patents. 
The involvement of SMEs in SDOs is still limited. Policy 
makers, in particular in member states, should 
further promote SMEs’ involvement both in SDOs 
and OSS communities within EU and national SME 
policies.
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We have already addressed the better inclusion of 
SMEs in standardisation via a stronger collaboration 
with OSS communities in the recommendation targeting 
SDOs. Despite initiatives like StandICT.eu to support the 
participation in international standardisation, the still 
limited support of SMEs related to their involvement 
in SDOs (OECD 2019) should not only be expanded in 
general, but also include their support related to their 
involvement in OSS communities, although the barriers to 
entry are much lower. Nagle (2018) reveals the positive 
productivity effects for companies contributing to OSS, 
which are biased strongly to larger companies. 
6.4.5. General competition policy
6.4.6. Open source software as public infrastructure
SDOs and OSS engage in a healthy competition from the 
process perspective. We recommend the European 
Commission to create a level playing field 
between SDOs and OSS communities to foster 
innovation. This requires creating exchanges between the 
evolutionary selection process in OSS communities and 
the formalization within SDOs, but also may add additional 
obligations, like working with multi-stakeholder platforms 
or adherence to minimal standards for governance norms.
For OSS and standardisation to be considered as 
instruments to support public policy, regulators should 
create a level playing field via an expansion of Regulation 
No 1025/2012 on European standardisation towards 
OSS. This requires creating exchanges between the 
evolutionary selection process in OSS communities and 
the formalization within SDOs, but also may add additional 
obligations, like working with multi-stakeholder platforms, 
or adherence to minimal standards for governance norms, 
e.g. following WTO principles, that support the long-
term viability of the OSS development model. If OSS 
foundations become dominant platforms, they have the 
responsibility to ensure that their rules do not impede free, 
undistorted, and vigorous competition according to the 
recommendations proposed by Crémer et al. (2019). 
Policy makers have provided substantive guidance on 
the legal boundaries and requirements applicable to the 
substance of IPR policy choices of SDOs with the safe 
harbour approach defined in the guidelines to horizontal 
co-operation agreements. No such guidance exists 
with regard to OSS communities. We recommend 
developing specific requirements for horizontal 
co-operation that apply to both SDOs and OSS 
communities and their collaboration.
In the specific area of IPR policy, policy makers have 
provided substantive guidance on the legal boundaries 
and requirements applicable to the substance of IPR 
policy choices with the safe harbour approach defined 
in the guidelines to horizontal co-operation agreements 
(European Commission 2011). Under this approach, the 
policy maker defines and states legal requirements and 
identifies general practices of SDOs, which are responsible 
both for devising specific policies in line with the identified 
general practices and their compliance. For this purpose, the 
role of OSS umbrella organisations should be considered 
closer to that of SDOs than the role of individual OSS 
communities, which is also apparent in their membership 
structure as well as in the variety of projects hosted by 
these foundations.
SDOs are already well-integrated into the European 
research and policy frameworks, while for OSS communities 
such integration is still at the beginning. We recommend 
integrating OSS communities into the European 
research and policy frameworks where justified 
by their generation of positive externalities in the 
European Union.
The public support of OSS foundations could be raised 
to a level comparable to the support provided to SDOs, 
especially if they commit to a charitable cause and comply 
both to the relevant WTO regulations and the European 
guidelines to horizontal co-operation agreements.
Today, OSS runs a large part of the technical infrastructure 
of an information and knowledge driven society. OSS should 
be considered as an infrastructure of the information 
age of similar importance to highways and bridges. It is 
worth investigating the benefit of public medium-to-long 
term investments into OSS infrastructure that supports 
European Union policy goals. We recommend further 
evaluating policy options for the European Union 
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to contribute directly to OSS. This may require 
changing the regulatory framework or establishing 
European OSS development organisations either next to 
or integrated with existing European SDOs.
The acceptance of the public interest in the contributions 
OSS makes to the common good could justify the 
establishment of a European OSS development umbrella 
organisation either next to or integrated with existing 
European SDOs. Careful consideration needs to be 
applied to avoid disrupting the upstream/downstream 
model peer production process that is based on self-
identification. This can be avoided by selectively 
awarding competitive, time-limited grants similar to 
current research funding by the EU. Governmental and 
regulatory representatives should expect to be received 
as welcome contributors, but also to have to earn their 
merit in the communities like any other contributor. 
When developing policy measures aimed at fostering 
OSS development, sector specific experiences may 
not be generally applicable. In particular, the highly 
concentrated, regulated and politically influenced mobile 
communication sector may not be a useful yardstick for 
the development of general public OSS policy. Experiences 
from a plurality of highly innovative technology areas 
like cloud-native computing, automotive platforms or 
programming languages that involve standards setting 
and implementation should be taken into account. 
Practices need to be developed that reflect the trend 
towards openness and transparency in general and the 
WTO requirements in particular. Exclusive third-party 
rights to formal standards that are mandated or where 
conforming with the standard might despite FRAND 
commitments be a barrier to market entry will find 
less acceptance and may be considered by the public 
as inappropriate rent-seeking or invitation to morally 
hazardous behaviour. Next to welfare losses from the 
lack of adoption of formal standards, public policy that 
facilitates SEP may undermine the competitiveness of 
local industry sectors by inviting outsiders to compete by 
participating in global collaboration on developing OSS 
solutions. The availability of formal standards where 
compliance is mandatory or practically required as open 
standards would eliminate this possibility.
We have derived several specific recommendations in 
particular addressing SDOs and OSS communities in the 
short run as well as some suggestions for the European 
Commission or national governments in adapting 
the current regulatory framework to the increasing 
relevance of OSS and the related OSS communities. The 
traditional IPR frameworks have served society well in 
the industrial age and continue to do so in most industry 
sectors. In the ICT sector, new rules have developed 
since the emergence of the internet that change the 
efficacy of these traditional IPR frameworks. Both the 
development of the concept of SEP in combination with 
formal standards as well as open collaboration and code 
licensing methods applied in the wider OSS community 
represent adaptations to this changed ICT environment. 
The trend towards more collaborative and cooperative 
approaches in society that is represented by both SDOs 
and OSS communities is a welcome opportunity to 
develop more efficient methods to manage innovation. 
The impact of the changes in the ICT environment is 
all-encompassing. It affects policy areas like research 
and development, public procurement, SME support or 
competition policy. Adapting to these sea changes will 
require coordinated actions by the European Commission 
and the national governments to support specific 
long-term policy goals like achieving the Digital Single 
Market. Both standards and open source development 
are welcome tools to help mitigate the challenges of 
globalisation and digitalisation. By developing a deep 
understanding of the underlying processes, setting 
aside differences and collaborating towards economic 
development and sustainability goals, Europe has a 
chance to lay the ground for modern institutions that 
shape and facilitate technical innovation.
6.5. Outlook
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Glossary
code of conduct A code of conduct describes the behavioural norms and rules that community contributors are 
expected to adhere to. Once adopted, a code of conduct is part of the explicit governance norms of a community.
commodity A commodity is a good with normalised attributes, giving instances of its fungibility. Commodities 
commonly are produced under price competition. Free and open source software (FOSS) that implements common, 
non-differentiating features of a computer system is considered a commodity.
community A FOSS community produces information goods, predominantly computer programs, in a collaborative 
process based on voluntary participation.
Eclipse Foundation The Eclipse Foundation is a not-for-profit industry association (US 501(c)(6)) that provides a global 
community of individuals and organisations with a mature, scalable, and commercially focused environment for 
collaboration and innovation.
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory Licensing under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms is a 
voluntary commitment some SDO request from a patent owner that participates in standards development.
free and open source software The term free and open source software refers to software that is distributed under 
a licence which complies with the Open Source Definition. The Open Source Initiative is the steward that approves 
licences for being compliant with this definition.
governance In the context of FOSS, governance describes the totality of implicit and explicit behavioural norms, codes 
and processes that regulate the relation- ship between contributors and the community as a whole.
implementation In the context of standardisation, the term implementation refers to a product that is compliant with 
the specification of a standard.
information goods Information goods are expensive to create, but only incur negligible cost of reproduction. Assuming 
marginal cost pricing, the price of an information good converges to zero under perfect competition.
intellectual property rights Intellectual property rights (IPR) include copyright, designs, patents, trademarks and 
other rights that are associated with intellectual property (IP) and are utilised to grant permission to use the work 
through licensing and other relationships.
intellectual property Intellectual property (IP) is a term that describes intangible creations of the human intellect 
that can be controlled by an owning entity, like artistic works, inventions and designs. IP is made a tradeable good 
through the application of intellectual property rights (IPR).
Linux Foundation The Linux Foundation is a not-for-profit industry association (US 501(c)(6)) dedicated to building 
sustainable ecosystems around open source projects to accelerate technology development and commercial 
adoption.
meritocracy In the context of FOSS, the term meritocracy is used to describe a system where contributors gain 
reputation in a community solely based on the value of the contributions they make.
Open Source Definition The Open Source Definition formulates the terms soft- ware must comply with to be considered 
FOSS. It is maintained by the Open Source Initiative. By way of the Open Source Definition, especially it’s unanimous 
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acceptance, the term “open source” gained a precise meaning across the wider FOSS community, and is therefore a 
term of art and part of open source culture.
open source The term “open source” is used in this paper as a synonym to FOSS or free software. It originally describes 
a campaign to promote free software to business.
physical goods Physical goods require at least a combination of labour and materials to build. Assuming marginal cost 
pricing, the price of a physical good is affected by the factors required for its production, and therefore larger than 
zero.
software stack Computer systems consist of multiple layers of subsystems that together provide a platform that 
applications run on. Lower parts of the stack are usually less differentiating and typically FOSS. Some stacks are so 
common that they have names, like the LAMP (Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP) stack.
source code Source code is the fundamental component of a computer program that is created by a programmer and 
is referred to as the “before” versions of a compiled computer program.
specification Specification means a document that prescribes technical requirements to be fulfilled by a product, 
process, service or system. .
standard A standard is a document established by consensus and approved by a recognised body, that provides, for 
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement 
of the optimum degree of order in a given context (EN 45020:2006).
standard-essential patent A standard-essential patent contains claims that must be used to implement a standard.
standardisation Standardisation describes an activity of establishing, with regard to actual or potential problems, 
provision for common and repeated use, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given 
context (EN 45020:2006).
standards development organisation A standards development organisation is an entity whose primary activities 
are developing, coordinating, promulgating, revising, amending, reissuing, interpreting or otherwise maintaining 
standards that address the interests of a wide base of users.
upstream/downstream model The analogy of the upstream/downstream model uses the mental image of a large 
river that collects the water from many smaller and smaller tributaries (the communities) and delivers it to the 
ocean (the users). Key tenets of the upstream/downstream model are the non- negotiability of the free software 
licensing terms and community governance norms.
wider open source community The phrase wider open source community is commonly used to describe the totality 
of individuals, smaller and larger communities, umbrella organisations and entities collaborating on developing the 
commons of FOSS in the global upstream/downstream model.
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Acronyms
3GPP – 3rd Generation Partnership Project
AGL – Automotive Grade Linux
AGPL – Affero General Public License
ANSI – American National Standards Institute
ARPA – Advanced Research Projects Agency
BSD – Berkeley Software Distribution
CEN – European Committee for Standardisation
CENELEC – European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation
CLA – Contributor License Agreement
CNCF – Cloud Native Computing Foundation
CPU – Central Processing Unit
DG Enterprise – Directorate-General Enterprise
DIN – Deutsches Institut für Normung
DSM – Digital Single Market
EC – European Commission
ECMA – European Computer Manufacturers Association
ECSIP - European Competitiveness and Sustainable Industrial Policy Consortium
ETSI – European Telecommunications Standards Institute
EU – European Union
EURAS – European Academy for Standardisation
FLOSS – Free/Libre Open-Source Software
FOSS – Free Open-Source Software
FRAND – Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory
FRAND Z - FRAND with zero royalties
FSFE – Free Software Foundation Europe
GCC – GNU Compiler Collection
GPL – General Public License
GSM – Global System for Mobile Communications
GTLL – Global Technologies Limited
ICT – Information and Communications Technology
IDC – International Data Corporation
IEC – International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
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IEEE-SA – IEEE Standards Association
IETF – Internet Engineering Task Force
IIC – Institute of Electronics and Communication, Inter-Integrated Circuit, Industrial Internet Consortium
IoT – Internet of Things
IP – Intellectual Property
IPR – Intellectual Property Rights
ISC – Internet Software Consortium
ISO – International Organization for Standardization
IT – Information Technology
ITU – International Telecommunications Union
ITU-R – ITU Radiocommunication Sector
ITU-T – ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector
JIS – Joint Initiative on Standardization
JRC – Joint Research Centre
JTC1 – ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee for Information Technology
LFN – Linux Foundation Networking
LGPL – Lesser General Public License
LO – Large Organisations
LOT – License on Transfer
MANO – Management and Orchestration
MIT – Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MQTT – Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
MSP – Multi-Stakeholder Platform
NFV – Network Function Virtualization
NGO – Non- Governmental Organisation
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology
OAI – Open Archives Initiative
OASIS - Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
OCED – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OCF – Open Connectivity Foundation
OCI – Open Container Institute
ODF – Open Document Format
OFE – OpenForum Europe
OGC – Open Geospatial Consortium
OIN – Open Invention Network
ONAP – Open Networking Automation Platform
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OOCRAN – Open Orchestration Cloud Radio Access Network
OpenJDK – Open Java Development Kit
OPNFV – Open Platform for NFV
OSI – Open Source Initiative
OSL – Open Software License
OSM – Open Source MANO
OSS – Open Source Software
OWF – Open Web Foundation
PDF – Portable Document Format
PNG – Portable Network Graphics
PPI – Public Procurement of Innovative solutions
R&D – Research and Development
R&D&I – Research and Development and Innovation
R&I – Research and Innovation
RAND – Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory
RAND-ZERO – RAND with zero royalties
RDFa – Resource Description Framework in Attributes
RF – Royalty Free
RFC – Request for Comments
RISES - Research on Innovation, Start-up Europe and Standardisation
RTDI – Research, Technology, Development and Innovation
SDO – Standard Development Organisation
SEP – Standard-Essential Patent
SME- Small to Medium Enterprise
SMO – Small- and Medium-Sized Organizations
SOIT - Spoločnosť pre otvorené informačné technológie (Open Information Technology Society)
SVG – Scalable Vector Graphics
SWOT – Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TC – Technical Committee
TCK – Test Compatibility Kit
TIFF – Tagged Image File Format
ToR – Terms of Reference
TRIPS – Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
W3C – World Wide Web Consortium 
WG – Working Group
WTO – World Trade Organization
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The literature review used two types of sources. On the 
one hand, we searched for all academic literature on 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and standardisation in 
information and communication technologies following 
the definition by Comino and Manenti (2015), with a 
specific focus on patents and copyright issues, open source 
software in particular. On the other hand, we screened the 
publication of the standardisation organisations and other 
associations for recent publications related to open source 
software.
Before we screened the academic literature, we 
investigated the existing studies on the relation between 
IPRs in general and patents in particular on the one 
hand and standardisation on the other hand. In contrast 
to the numerous studies on SEPs in general and FRAND 
in particular, the analysis of important previous studies, 
such as the EC studies conducted by Blind et al. (2002), 
Blind et al. (2011), the ECSIP (European Competitiveness 
and Sustainable Industrial Policy Consortium) consortium 
(2014), the report presented by the US National Academy 
of Sciences edited by Maskus and Merrill (2013), the 
Independent Review of the European Standardisation 
System performed by Ernst & Young (2015), and even the 
recent studies about licensing terms of Standard Essential 
Patents by Pentheroudakis and Baron (2017) and CRA 
(2016), but also the governance of SDOs (Baron et al. 2019) 
reveal that the issue of OSS is in general not addressed 
at all or only marginally. Exceptions are the report of the 
conference organised by the European Commission on 
the option to implement standards following the FRAND 
regime in OSS (European Commission 2012) and the 
EU-funded report by Open Forum Europe (2017b) that is 
analysing the collaboration models between SDOs and 
cloud open source software development initiatives.
Consequently, we have consulted the databases Web of 
Science (provided by Thomson Reuters), Scopus (provided 
by Elsevier) and Google Scholar. The very narrow search 
including “open source”, “standardisation”, “patent*” 
and “FRAND” did not reveal any in a scientific journal 
published paper in Scopus and only Lopez-Berzosa 
and Gawer (2014) in the Web of Science. Therefore, 
we deleted “FRAND” from our search, but generated 
still less than ten publications by the two search tools. 
Deleting “patent*” from the search revealed more than 
500 publications in Scopus and almost 400 publications 
in Web of Science. However, the screening of titles and 
abstracts reduced the number of relevant papers to 
just a few above 20 in Web of Science and in Scopus 
with a large overlap. Finally, the most relevant sources 
according to the search results of Google Scholar have 
been screened to complement the most relevant papers 
identified by the Web of Science and Scopes searches. 
However, the quality of the search results based on 
Google Scholar was rather limited, because most of the 
papers ranked as very relevant did not address the topic 
of our literature review. Consequently, we relied on the 
around 30 papers from the Web of Science and Scopus 
search. This low number is not surprising, since Contreras 
(2017) comes in his recent literature review about IPR 
and standardisation to the conclusion that “Given the 
increasing importance of open source software to the 
global technology infrastructure, further research in this 
area is needed.” supported by screening the reference 
lists in Baron et al. (2019) and Maracke (2019).
Annex 1 | Literature Review
1.1. Methodology of the literature review
1.2. Results of the literature review
Legal studies, like Li (2018) or Maracke (2019), organise 
their overviews according to the permissiveness of the 
licensing regimes combined with the questions, whether 
the licences contain patent grants. However, in order 
to structure our review of academic papers, we divide 
the studies into three categories following Lundell and 
Gamalielsson (2017), but also Clark (2016), without 
immediately considering the tension between OSS 
licences and the FRAND regime related to patents. First, 
we consider cases, which start as standardisation projects 
within formal or informal standardisation bodies but are 
eventually implemented as OSS projects. The second 
option is the initial implementation of software via OSS 
projects followed by a standardisation process. The third 
and final option is the parallel development of standards 
and their implementation as OSS.
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On the generic level of the telecommunication industry, 
Wright and Druta (2014) analyse the increasing 
implementation of standards by open source projects 
despite the telecommunication technology infrastructure 
mainly licensed according to the FRAND model. They 
assume that the patent-based FRAND model is not going 
to change radically but complemented by open source 
components. In order to benefit from these interactions, 
companies that have not yet been engaged with open 
source communities need to develop appropriate strategies 
and policies to delineate the functionalities between 
proprietary and open source and the different IPR regimes 
to avoid contamination and conflicts between each other. 
However, they ask also both the formal standardisation 
bodies and informal consortia and alliances to adjust their 
governance, IPR rules and even their staff. 
Whereas Clark (2016) presents Universal Business 
Language UBL v1 originally released by OASIS and 
meanwhile developed further to ISO/IEC 19845:2015 
released in 2016 as an example of a standard, which 
created the basis for further OSSs project in many local 
and regional projects, he does not address the role of the 
possible tension between patents and open source. In 
contrast, one very prominent example of the first scenario 
analysed related to IPR in depth by Gamalielsson and 
Lundell (2013) is the release of the PDF specification as 
ISO standard ISO 32000, which is then implemented in 
various OSS. In the context of our study, it is important to 
note that Adobe issued a Public Patent License granting 
every individual and organisation “the royalty-free right, 
under all Essential Claims that Adobe owns, to make, 
have made, use, sell, import and distribute Compliant 
Implementations”. This licensing regime allows OSS 
implementations under the GPL. However, some OSS 
contributors expressed some concern for potential risks for 
patent infringements related to the PDF format including 
the risk that redistributors obtain patent licences making 
the program eventually proprietary. However, not only 
patent protected content, but also copyrighted fonts 
creates worries among the OSS developers. Finally, the 
initial licences were changed in both open source projects 
to stronger copyleft licences due to business reasons and 
to resolve licence incompatibility issues with other OSS 
projects. 
Following these case studies, Lundell et al. (2015) expand 
their analysis both to the licences required for standards 
issued by formal and informal standardisation bodies. In 
addition to three ISO standards (PNG, JPEG 2000, and TIFF/
EP) implemented in open source software, they analyse 
the SVG (Scalable Vector Graphics) standard released by 
W3C and the PNG (Portable Network Graphics) standard 
(ISO/IEC 15948:2004) initially published in by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) as RFC 2083 and soon after as 
a W3C standard. The information they received from W3C 
and ISO let them conclude that these organisations are not 
aware of any royalty-bearing patents that are essential 
for the implementation of the Portable Network Graphics 
specification. Several widely deployed (proprietary and 
open source licensed) software projects have implemented 
solutions for SVG and PNG under the GPL licences. For the 
investigated standards, Lundell et al. (2015) come to the 
conclusion that the owners of patents impacting on the 
standards have no interest in providing licences for those 
patents which would allow the implementation in software 
to be provided under the GPLv3 licence. Consequently, they 
conclude that any organisation interested in implementing 
these standards under any open source software licence 
would face significant risks. However, for many companies 
it is important to be able to implement the standard in OSS 
provided under common open source licences, including 
licences from the GPL-family (Lundell et al., 2011). In 
addition, Mitchell and Mason (2010) note that there may 
be a fundamental mismatch between the requirements of 
some open source software licences (notably those of the 
GPL family), and parallel patent licences, unless the terms 
of those licences are extremely liberal.
In summary, Lundell et al. (2015) conclude that there is 
no problem of implementing standards as OSS so long as 
the implementer of a standard using software licensed 
under a GPL family licence can distribute that software in 
such a way that the recipient has no fewer rights that the 
implementer has. In other words, if the implementer has 
the benefit of a specific patent licence, any recipient of the 
implementer’s code will also need to have the benefit of 
a patent licence on the same terms, either directly from 
the licensor, or as a sub-licence from the implementer. 
However, they identify a problem if the implementer of 
a standard containing third party GPL code has to cause 
any recipient of that code to receive a licence (including 
a patent licence), which would enable the recipient to 
exercise all rights permitted under the GPL, including the 
right to modify the code, so that it no longer implements 
the standard, but nonetheless still has the benefit of a 
1.2.1. Scenario 1: Standards implemented as OSS (“standard first”)
109The Relationship Between Open Source Software and Standard Setting
relevant patent licence. Such a broadly drafted patent 
licence would render the economic value of the patent 
close to zero, so it would be unlikely to be acceptable for 
the patent owner. Consequently, they come also to the 
conclusion that FRAND licences are incompatible with 
open source licensing owing to the inability of the licensee 
to sub-license to downstream recipients (Dardailler et al. 
2012, Phipps 2019) confirming the European Commission 
(EC 2013a) that such licensing conditions for standards 
“create barriers for open source projects to implement the 
technical specification”. 
In order to solve this tension, Lundell et al. (2015) propose 
a compromise between these two options guided by the 
scope of the patent licence in GPLv3, which does not expect 
a distributor of GPL software to provide a blanket patent 
licence to recipients covering all possible modifications of 
the code transferred. They expect support of stakeholders 
from both proprietary and open source software, and, 
in particular, from organisations like the Free Software 
Foundation supporting the GPL family of licences, that 
an approach like this would be compatible with both the 
spirit and the legal terms of the relevant licence. On the 
one hand, they assume that many companies are not 
only involved in standardisation processes, but also in 
the contribution to open source code. Consequently, they 
argue that these mainly larger companies should be also 
familiar with licensing their patents royalty free to those 
being interested in implementing the standards. This 
royalty free based licensing should be compatible with 
open source licences, like GPLv3, LGPLv3, Mozilla 2.0 and 
Apache 2.0 containing patent licensing clauses. These 
clauses limit the licence granted to the scope of the claims 
implemented by the version of the software as distributed 
by the patent licensor. For example, a recipient receiving 
a word-processing software from the licensor cannot 
assume that the patent licence is covering significant 
changes of the original word processing software allowing 
very different applications. They admit that whereas any 
open source licence grants the recipient under its copyright 
provisions the freedom to make the above-mentioned 
changes, the patent sections of the same licence may not 
allow it. However according to Lundell at al. (2015), it is still 
an acceptable open source practice to limit the scope of 
an included patent licence granted to the implementations 
of the standard. The recipient is still free to change the 
functionality of software under the open source licence 
in a way that its functionality does no longer meet the 
requirements of the standard. However, she or he is not 
benefiting any more from the original patent licence.
In contrast to the specific case-based approach by Lundell 
et al. (2015) and their related work, Kesan (2011) applies 
a systemic theoretical legal review, irritatingly called 
“empirical analysis”, of the interplay between open source 
software licensing and FRAND licensing. In his examination 
of all OSS licences available in 2011 and approved by the 
Open Source Initiative (OSI), he comes to the conclusion 
that there is no inherent conflict between OSS and FRAND 
(see also Kappos and Harrington 2019). In particular, only 
the GPL and the Lesser GPL licence among the eight most 
popular OSS licences conflict with FRAND. Furthermore, 
he concludes that “only a small fraction of the remaining 
59 OSI-approved licences have any conflict with FRAND”. 
Consequently, he makes the concluding statement that 
“the vast majority of OSS licences are fully compatible 
with FRAND, with regard to both monetary and non-
monetary terms.”
Comparing Kesan (2011) with the studies by Lundell 
et al. (2015) reveals that there are indeed conflicts 
between FRAND based standards and their GPL based 
implementations. Since GPL-licensed open source 
software is one of the most common type of open source 
software according to Lundell et al. (2011), EC (2012b) 
and Li (2017), the notion that the majority of obviously 
less used OSI licences by Kesan (2011) does not solve 
the tension. 
Mitchell and Mason (2011) also come to the conclusion 
that GPL 2, GPL3 and related licences are likely to be 
incompatible with FRAND licences in contrast to e.g. 
to the European Union Public License as argued by Li 
(2017). However, they go even one step further and 
contradict Li (2017) that even royalty free FRAND 
licences are not compatible with the GPL family, 
because although each licensee will be able to obtain 
his own individual licence from the patent owner for 
free, this is not automatically the case for downstream 
users of the GPL. The problem is the fundamentally 
different architecture of the “cascade” licensing of 
OSS under GPL and the parallel licensing of computer-
implemented inventions under the FRAND licensing 
scheme (see also EC 2012b). In particular, if the granter 
of the GPL licence cannot provide the same automatic 
downstream cascade of patent rights as he can in 
respect of copyright, he cannot grant a GPL copyright 
licence. Mitchell and Mason (2011) leave it as an open 
question whether these contradictions could be solved 
if the patent holder were prepared to agree to the 
downstream transmission of the licence.
110 The Relationship Between Open Source Software and Standard Setting
Finally, the above-mentioned issues concerning 
implementation of standards in software has recently 
received attention amongst several SDOs, but it should 
be noted that implementation issues have not received 
always appropriate attention (Egyedi 2007). Egyedi 
(2007) argues that developing standards neglects often 
standard implementation, but SDOs need to consider 
implementation issues, since standards development and 
implementation are closely intertwined related to their 
impact. She recommends SDOs to shift their emphasis 
from standard development to a more systematic inclusion 
of implementation concerns both at the technical level of 
standard committees and the policy level of SDOs. 
In summary, there are examples of the implementation 
of standards via OSS discussed in the literature. However, 
these standards are mainly developed in SDOs following 
a RF licensing scheme, like OASIS and W3C. According 
to Phipps (2019), these SDOs are characterised by 
an implementation-led rather than a requirement-led 
standardisation approach. There are also some standards 
released by SDOs applying the FRAND regime. However, 
there are no declarations of SEPs related to these 
standards. Nevertheless, there is still the latent fear 
of conflicts with potential SEP holders, because of the 
general contradiction between the FRAND regime and 
OSS licences. In particular, the popular GPL is incompatible 
with FRAND, but there are several other OSS licences, like 
the MIT or BSD licences, being compatible with FRAND 
according to Kappos and Harrington (2019). However, 
there is no general consensus about this conclusion (see 
also EC 2012b), because others argue that they are just 
complementary, but not compatible (Phipps 2019). In 
addition, the notion of the incompatibility of the licensing 
regimes is endorsed by a significant percentage of open 
source programmers (Bekkers and Updegrove 2013). Due 
to the highlighted relevance of standards implementation 
for their quality and success, the concerns of the OSS 
communities related to the ambiguity in the licensing 
conditions gain further in relevance.
The second scenario according to Lundell and Gamalielson 
(2017) is characterised by the initial implementation 
of software, which eventually leads into technical 
specifications of standards also called implementation-
led standardisation by Phipps (2019). Under this scenario, 
a software implementation precedes the development 
and endorsement of the technical specifications of a 
standard released either by a formal and or informal 
SDO. Already more than ten years ago, Schöchle (2003) 
has perceived open source software as a form of 
standardisation outside both of formal SDOs and informal 
consortia. Despite being a form of distributed development 
process, he perceives it also as a form of standardisation, 
because it leads to standards, which, like open source, 
serve as platforms upon which new market can built on. 
Furthermore, he mentions IETF as an early example of a 
standardisation consortia, which has relied on open source 
software. According to Schöchle (2003), the advantage of 
standardisation is the open documentation of the results 
in standards avoiding the fragmentation in distributed 
development projects, such as in open source software. 
In addition, Behlendorf (2009) claims that many OSS 
implementations of ICT standards have significantly 
contributed to the establishment of standards, because 
OSS is available for immediate testing and prototyping of 
applications. Furthermore, extensions open source code 
are easier to adopt, but its utility is easier to be compared 
to a specification of a standard. 
One specific example is the development of software, 
which eventually evolved into the development of the 
OpenDocumentFormat ODF later established as ODF 
standard and nowadays recognised and provided as an 
OASIS standard. This standard was even transferred to 
ISO and published as ISO/IEC 26300:2006. However, 
due to the competition within ISO (Blind 2011) with 
ISO/IEC 29500:2008, ISO/IEC 26300:2006 was not 
maintained within ISO. The very initial work on the 
implementation was the proprietary software StarOffice, 
which was later released as open source software by 
OpenOffice.org. StarOffice lead eventually to the OASIS 
OpenDocumentFormat ODF, which enabled FOSS 
suites of royalty-free office document, spreadsheet and 
presentation software. The FLOSS release of OpenOffice.
org further evolved into Apache OpenOffice and LibreOffice 
(Gamalielsson and Lundell 2014). 
According to Li (2017), it is in general more complex for 
SDOs to utilise open source working practice to develop 
standards. She differentiates between two sub-scenarios. 
On the one hand SDOs can use source code directly in 
specifications. On the other hand, specifications refer to 
1.2.2. Scenario 2 OSS code as input into a standard (“software implementation first”)
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the same functions they derive from open source projects. 
The direct use of running code requires at first the check 
of the copyright issue over this specification, because 
SDOs own the copyright of specifications, while in the 
open source project developers remain the right holder. 
The major problem is that it is uncertain whether SDOs 
still can claim the copyright if code is included as part of 
the specifications. This problem is confirmed by Lundell 
and Gamalielsson (2017), who conclude their paper not 
only with the open question of which open source licence 
should be used, but more important which organisation has 
or should have the copyright for the developed software 
in which the technical specification of the standard is 
implemented.
In case of some SDOs (e.g. ITU and ETSI), guidelines have 
been released, which may apply to direct code utilisation, 
if contributors to open source code agree to them. These 
may solve the ownership issue, since these guidelines give 
the option to contributors to either transfer the ownership 
or grant a software licence. Nevertheless, the problem then 
lies on distribution. The right granted by such guidelines 
to copy, modify and distribute are only limited to specific 
situations listed in those guidelines. Such restrictions 
obviously contradict the free distribution guaranteed by 
OSS licences.
Despite of general rules related to the inclusion of copyright 
protected content, the lack of any IPR rules specifically 
related to open source software, e.g. by IEEE2, may 
generate some uncertainty. In addition, SDOs accredited 
by the American National Standard Institute (ANSI) may 
lack a particular clause for code ownership and distribution 
in specifications, since the ANSI appears to discourage 
software from being embedded in standard specifications 
(Bekkers and Updegrove 2013). If such specific clauses are 
missing, the general copyright rules for specifications of 
standards apply, which restrict significantly the distribution 
of code embedded in the specification. This is in contrast 
to the sharing and collaborating practice and licences 
implemented by the OSS communities. However, IEEE 
recently perceives the benefits of incorporating OSS in their 
standards without addressing the (copy)right problem.3 
In the second sub-scenario presented by Li (2017), the code 
included in the specifications of the standards becomes 
essential, like patent-protected knowledge in the case of 
essential patents. Here, addressing the copyright issue 
becomes even more crucial. According to her analysis of 
ETSI, ITU and IEEE none of them have a particular clause 
regarding essential copyright. The ETSI IPR policy even 
emphasizes that software embedded in specifications 
shall not be used as mandatory for compliance (ETSI 
2017). As argued before, SDOs accredited by ANSI have 
been discouraged in general from including software in 
standards, let alone letting them be essential.
Since there are no specific guidelines related to software 
code, one may refer to the clause for patents. In case of 
ETSI, the essential claims subject to FRAND licence terms 
use the general term “intellectual property rights”, which 
is broad enough to encompass not only patent rights, 
but also copyright. Therefore, like in the case of SEPs, 
implementers of standards containing code could try to get 
a FRAND copyright licence in order to be able to copy and 
implement the standard (code). In parallel, such software 
code will be licensed under the various OSS licences. 
However, Li (2017) leaves it open whether FRAND licence 
terms or OSS licences will prevail also referring to Bekkers 
and Updegrove (2013), who recommend treating licensing 
of patents and copyrights differently, because both types 
of IPRs quite distinct. 
In addition to including software code in the technical 
specifications of standards, the functions from OSS 
code can also be adopted in a standard. Here, Li (2017) 
distinguishes between the licences applicable to the OSS 
code. If the OSS licence does not contain any patent 
clauses, like the MIT or BSD, the patent issue could only 
be left to the policies of the relevant SDO, which might 
eventually subject to the FRAND commitment (according 
to Li 2017). However, if an OSS licence includes a patent 
clause, e.g. the Apache v.2, the patent right is granted 
on a RF base. The open question is whether SDOs can 
require the patent owners who contribute patents to the 
standard to licence it under FRAND licence even if there is 
already an OSS licence with RF patent licensing. However, 
Li (2017) cannot find any entitlements for SDOs to do so 
in their current IPR regimes.
Since most SDOs have no specific rules regarding the 
licensing of OSS code integrated in the specifications of 
standards, Li (2017) concludes that the OSS licensing 
terms are the “only clear applicable rule”. Consequently, 
2 https://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sect6-7.html#7 retrieved March 27th 2018.
3 https://beyondstandards.ieee.org/general-news/open-source-ieee-involved/ retrieved March 27th 2018.
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granting RF licences should be applied to use the code 
in standard embedded technologies. However, such rules 
might be a strong disincentive for at least some patent 
owning innovators, because the option to collect royalties 
on SEPs might be one of the main incentives for many 
innovators to contribute standardisation (e.g. Lerner and 
Tirole 2015). However, in the survey by Blind et al. (2011) 
patent owning companies technologies rate the relevance 
of the freedom to operate achieved by a standard as 
much higher.
In addition to the conflict regarding the licensing terms for 
OSS and patents, there is a systemic difference in licensing 
software according to the OSS licensing terms and patents 
according to FRAND. OSS licences follow a cascade 
effect, which restrict the implementers of OSS in other 
areas not applicable to FRAND (Li 2017). Although using 
patents for free, OSS licences contain in general a “patent 
retaliation” clause, which discourages recipients from 
litigating against the work that incorporates the patented 
contribution by terminating the patent right. The idea is 
to prevent implementers from filing lawful litigation, if 
the find their patents included in the same work have 
been infringed. However, the current IPR regimes of SDOs 
guarantee patent owners this opportunity.
Despite the general tension of the licensing conditions 
for OSS on the one hand and patents on the other hand, 
there are first efforts of SDOs to promote the utilisation of 
OSS in their work. Li (2017) and Maracke (2019) present 
and analyse the open source project Open Source MANO 
(OSM) launched by ETSI in 2016 under the OSS licence 
Apache v.2, which is aligned with ETSI Network Function 
Virtualization (NFV) Information Models (ETSI 2017 https://
osm.etsi.org/). Meanwhile, almost 100 organisations 
produced one million lines of code. Li (2017) analyses 
the potentially applicable IPR rules by relying on ETSI’s 
IPR policy and the relevant Apache v.2 licence clause 
complemented by the Terms of Reference of OSM4 and 
the Contributor License Agreement (CLA), which has the 
same copyright and patent licence rules as the Apache v.2. 
Apache v.2 is among the most popular Open Source 
Licences (OSLs) identified by the OSI, accounting for 
over 15% of the open source projects in the records.5 
It is not a copyleft licence, but it includes the so-called 
“patent retaliation” clause, i.e. the receivers of the granted 
RF licence on patents are not allowed to initiate patent 
litigation against any entity alleging that the work in 
general or a contribution in particular justifies a patent 
infringement, otherwise the RF granting licence will be 
terminated.6
In summary, the application of the ETSI IPR policy in 
particular related to SEPs and the Apache v.2 licences are 
essential. So far, these two regimes do not contradict each 
other, because no organisation has declared SEPs on OSM. 
However, this might change in the future and conflicts 
between ETSI’s IPR policy and Apache v.2 will be likely.
According to the ToR the deliverables from OSM are not 
ETSI technical specifications and that code will not be 
directly included in specifications. However, Li (2017) find 
some hints in the projects that might not be able to exempt 
all the possibilities for overlapping easily. One of the 
functions of OSM stated in the ToR is to “provide practical 
and essential feedback to the finalization of the ETSI 
MANO stage two and three specifications.” Such feedback 
helps formulate the ETSI MANO Standards and the future 
5G standards. Moreover, Li (2017) predicts that standards 
that are based on existing OSM implementations are 
possible, because many multi-party de facto standards 
(implementations) existed before selective process and 
multi-protocol activities carried out by SDOs, such as the 
IETF or W3C. In particular, the technical sharing between 
the RDFa standard and the Drupal project showed high 
possibility for overlapping functions between standards 
and an open source project. Although a direct inclusion of 
code has been avoided by the ToR, there is still a high 
possibility that some functions derived from OSM code 
can be adopted into ETSI NFV standards. Since OSM is a 
hosting open source project in ETSI, possible patents based 
on such code are likely from ETSI members who have 
signed the CLA. If patents turn out to be essential, FRAND 
must be applied. Patent licences must be made available 
royalty free to any recipient that agrees to Apache v.2 in 
OSM. This necessity will raise concerns among SEP holders. 
In addition, Li (2017) expects more concerns related to the 
“patent retaliation”, because currently no mechanism are 
established to monitor the continuing contributions to the 
project. This creates some uncertainty, for example for 
SME’s who might rely on patented innovative technologies 
4 https://portal.etsi.org/Portals/0/TBpages/OSM/Docs/ETSI_OSG_OSM_ToR_2016-02-09.pdf.
5 https://www.blackducksoftware.com/top-open-source-licenses.
6 https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.
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to compete against big market actors, which may explain 
the decrease of around 100 participants in OSM in 2018 
to 70 participants from 50 ETSI members in June 2019.7
In summary, the current frameworks of formal SDOs and 
informal consortia obviously allow the integration of OSS 
into their standard development process and standards. 
SDOs, like W3C and OASIS, which have meanwhile more 
a RF culture related to patents and consequently rather 
limited number or no SEPs at all, are forerunners in starting 
proactive initiatives to include OSS in their standards. ETSI, 
a formal SDO with an established FRAND policy with a 
strong focus on the patent intensive mobile and wireless 
connectivity technology and therefore a high number of 
SEP declarations started with OSM a pioneering project. 
Despite taking the tensions between the traditional 
licensing regimes of patents on the one hand and OSS 
on the other hand in the framework of the project into 
account, the decreasing number of companies contributing 
to OSM might be an indication for the still existing legal 
uncertainty. The situation becomes even more complex, 
because the open source project Open Orchestration 
Cloud Radio Access Network (OOCRAN) contributes 
also to the ETSI MANO standards. However, OOCRAN is 
managed under the AGPL and not Apache v.2 (Floriach-
Pigem et al. 2017). Obviously, not only the bilateral 
relationship between patent licensing and OSS licensing is 
challenging the integration of OSS in standards, but also 
the multilateral interfaces in case of different OSS projects 
following not the same OSS licensing regime.
Despite these challenges, the strict exclusion of OSS code 
in standards’ specifications is certainly no sustainable 
strategy, because the available OSS code is already large 
and further growing. Furthermore, some OSS communities 
already claim to set de facto standards, which is challenging 
both formal SDOs and informal consortia (Updegrove 
2015). Finally, both the increasing competition between 
SDOs and consortia and the additional competitors from 
the OSS communities as additional standard setters are 
likely to increase the pressure to cooperate with the latter. 
Industry standards may also be developed by competition 
between OSS communities, forgoing formal specification 
altogether.
7 https://portal.etsi.org/TBSiteMap/OSM/ListofOSMMembers.aspx.
Whereas in the previous two scenarios a more or less 
clear distinction between the starting point of the process 
and the transfer in the other area has been drawn, 
Scenario 3 represents the reciprocal action between the 
development of technical specifications of a standard 
together in parallel with the development of one (or 
several) implementations(s) of technical specifications of 
a standard in OSS software.
Lundell and Gamalielsson (2017) further developing 
Gamalielsson et al. (2015) analyse the bi-directional 
influences between the OSS project Drupal provided under 
the GPL licence version 2 being a copyleft type and the 
development of the RDFa (Resource Description Framework 
in Attributes) standard for the interchange of data on the 
web at W3C. Support for RDFa 1.0 was achieved in the 
OSS project Drupal by its first implemented in the core of 
Drupal 7 (RDFa is implemented in a separate module in 
Drupal). Gamalielsson et al. (2015) conduct a case study 
based on quantitative analyses of issue tracker data for 
different issue trackers for W3C RDFa and the Drupal 
implementation of RDFa. Their analysis provides details 
on how and to what extent organisational influences occur 
in W3C RDFa and the Drupal implementation of RDFa, by 
specifically providing a characterisation of issues and results 
concerning contribution to issue raising and commenting, 
organisational involvement over time, and individual and 
organisational collaboration on issues. In particular, they 
found that contributors from five different organisations 
were active in both W3C RDFa standardisation and Drupal 
RDFa implementation. In particular, two organisations 
are substantially influencing the two communities. This 
close cooperation is driven by the fact that the work 
practices adopted in the Drupal project are similar to those 
implemented in W3C RDFa standardisation. They conclude, 
that meanwhile many companies are used to engage with 
strategically important OSS projects, among which several 
implement standards. Since many standards are currently 
being implemented in OSS projects, the possible lock-in 
effects caused by standards are inhibited. In particular, 
1.2.3. Scenario 3: OSS and standardisation in parallel (“standard and implementation 
of standard in parallel”)
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transparent implementations provided as OSS projects 
are able to foster clarity concerning how to interpret a 
technical specification of a standard, which promotes 
high quality technical specifications of standards. In 
turn, technical specifications of standards which are 
(and can be) implemented in transparent OSS projects 
promote interoperability and longevity of whole systems. 
Gamalielsson et al. (2015) conclude that widely deployed 
standards can benefit from contributions provided by a 
range of different individuals, organisations, and types of 
organisations not only directly to a standardisation project 
or indirectly via an open source project implementing the 
standard. In particular, the RF culture established by W3C 
obviously contributes effectively to open source projects 
implementing specific standards.
A second example under Scenario 3 presented by Lundell 
and Gamalielsson (2017) is focused on IETF, which uses 
an open process for participation. Consequently, it implies 
that anyone can join the IETF merely by showing up at a 
meeting or participating on the relevant list server. In detail, 
the IETF standards RFC 821 (Simple Mail transfer protocol) 
and RFC 822 for the format of ARPA Internet messages are 
two Internet standards published in 1982, which describe 
the syntax of an email message (Allmann 2011). These 
two standards have evolved over several versions in 
parallel with the development of the sendmail software. 
As a consequence, the ambiguities in the standards were 
exposed quickly, like well-meaning features that were 
unnecessarily difficult to implement. However, it is also 
mentioned that meanwhile such quick updates in standards 
are not so easy anymore. In addition, the implementation 
of the IETF standard in sendmail often led to an extension 
of the standards, because some implementers enhance 
the protocol to add new functionalities. When the 
implementation of a standard goes beyond the technical 
specification defined by the standard, Lundell and 
Gamalielsson (2017) are afraid of the unintended effect 
that there are limited incentives to correct errors in the initial 
specifications. Sendmail has been criticized for being too 
liberal in what it accepts, e.g. accepted addresses that did 
not include the domain name, this liberality puts very little 
pressure on authors of mail submitters to fix the problem. 
In addition, illustrative diagrams and examples in standards 
aid to their understandability but create inconsistencies 
to the text. Consequently, it is proposed that examples in 
standards should be deleted.
Another approach for developing standards is to use 
reference implementations, which implies that a single 
implementation that is defined to be correct, all other 
implementations are correct if and only if they work against 
the reference implementation. However, using reference 
implementations for the development of technical 
specifications of standards are not unproblematic, since 
no implementation is completely bug-free. Consequently, 
finding and fixing a bug in the reference implementation 
essentially changes the standard. Then, the above-
mentioned relevance of standards’ implementation is 
challenged by a possible lack of interoperability (Egyedi 
2007). Overall, the classic waterfall model in software 
engineering does not work well for building standards. The 
problem is that the specification of standards mandates 
things that are only marginally useful but are difficult or 
impossible to implement and the cost of going back and 
modifying then specification goes up exponentially with 
time.
As a third example, Clark (2016) mentions that the 
OASIS MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) 
technical committee standardised an industry protocol 
for lightweight sensor and device coordination, which 
has been complemented and informed by Eclipse’s open 
source code projects. In this case, the two teams also feed 
each other improvements.
In addition to these specific cases of parallel developments, 
some further general aspects of the third scenario have to 
be addressed. Rosen (2010) highlights a complementarity 
between SDOs and OSS. In contrast to OSS, SDOs 
prevent forking of their specifications that might result in 
incompatible implementations (also argued by Atlass et 
al. 2017), e.g. W3C does not want a forking of HTML5, 
but wants the implementation of OSS. One proposed 
compromise was to allow software derivative works, but 
no specification derivative works. However, it was argued 
that such a licence was incompatible with GPL. Another 
approach by IETF was requiring specification writers to 
distinguish between code and text. The IETF copyright 
licence allows derivative works for code, but not for text. 
In practice, large software companies working together 
in developing standards, SDOs, like W3C and IETF, have 
little incentives to ask for royalties or to impose burdens 
on implementations. Moreover, open source projects have 
refused to implement proprietary standards at all. Also, 
contributors to OSS sign contributor licence agreements 
(CLAs) to provide written confirmation of their copyright and 
patent promises. For example, the Open Web Foundation 
(OWF) writes agreements for industry standards, incl. 
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identification of patent claims licensed for free, to mitigate 
the risks of litigation. Therefore, almost no litigation cases 
can be observed. However, the Oracle vs. Google case is 
an exception. It relates to the Java standard, where open 
and proprietary implementations exist. Oracle asserted its 
patents against Google’s implementation of the Android 
open source operating system. In addition, Apache Software 
Foundation complained about Java Community Process 
requirement that implementers pass a compatibility kit 
test before receiving Java patent licences from Oracle 
when those test compatibility kit (TCK) licences expressly 
prohibit certain kinds of implementation and derivative 
works, because it is incompatible with OSS.
This is in line with the perception by Lundell et al. (2015), 
who see significant risks in implementing standards in 
software under any software licence, when the legal 
conditions for use of specific standards cannot be clarified 
and all necessary patent licensed cannot be obtained. This 
point is supported by the importance of the absence of 
negotiation and the acquisition of licences to all necessary 
IPR at the beginning of OSS collaboration that was 
identified as part of the study results.
In addition to the rights problem, contributions to an 
open source project as well as to standards development 
might be driven by specific interests (see Blind and 
Mangelsdorf 2016), which may cause tensions among 
different stakeholders. In case of close interactions 
between OSS and standardisation, the influence of large 
companies contributing to both processes might become 
dominant and even anti-competitive. Therefore, one 
effective strategy for countering such potential threats 
for influencing specific standards in a specific direction of 
single contributors is a transparent and open process for 
participation in standardisation. Bekkers and Updegrove 
(2013) mention W3C as such an example for low barriers 
for entry and participation shaped by a culture of free 
licence rights not accepting fees for patents referenced in 
their standards. This example shows the interrelationship 
between IPR regimes and openness, which might be a 
strategy to prevent anti-competitive behaviour by making 
use of the interaction between OSS and standardisation.
Summarizing the insights related to the third scenario of 
parallel developments in OSS and standardisation confirm 
on the one hand the observations related to the first and 
second scenario. In the early days of the Internet, IETF as a 
consortium driven by individual members, like OSS projects, 
has been involved in the development of an email format 
in parallel to OSS projects. However, the few cases of close 
interaction between OSS and standardisation are mainly 
focused on consortia, which have strict RF and rather 
patent intolerant licensing policies, i.e. W3C or OASIS. 
They have been already been identified as being in a good 
position to integrate input from OSS projects in contrast to 
formal SDOs applying the FRAND scheme. The recursive 
integration of inputs from standardisation respective OSS 
may lead to a virtuous circle of standards of higher quality 
and broader distribution. In contrast, the challenges for the 
FRAND based SDOs and consortia already elaborated for 
the unidirectional relations also will create difficulties for 
the parallel developments. In the long run, higher quality 
standards due to inputs from OSS and their broader 
diffusion via OSS will put further pressure on formal SDOs 
and informal consortia following the FRAND regime.
Complementing the case studies and legal analyses 
following the three scenarios, Updegrove (2017a) 
postulates in 2017 the advent of “open hybridization” 
defined as the “well-considered marriage of open 
source software and open standards” despite playing 
down the role of code for standardisation two years 
before (Updegrove 2015). However, not only Updegrove 
(2017a), but also Clark (2016) expect the convergence of 
open source and standards methodologies. OpenForum 
Europe (2017a) also proposes collaboration of SDOs 
with open source foundations instead of hosting OSS 
projects themselves. In summary, it is likely that a 
fourth scenario of a hybrid of standardisation and OSS 
will emerge in the near future in addition to the three 
scenarios introduced by Lundell and Gamalielsson 
(2017). If SDOs miss the opportunity to collaborate with 
OSS communities, OpenForum Europe (2017a) expects 
OSS foundations to become serious competitors for the 
former. However, Updegrove (2017b) perceives that the 
OSS communities underestimate the need for standards 
and the opportunities of standardisation. Therefore, 
there are good reasons to prioritize the hybrid solution 
still without knowing its necessary specifications in detail 
and its likelihood of success.
1.2.4. Future developments
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Bekkers and Updegrove (2013) in the survey about the IPR 
policies of 12 SDOs reveal that the majority did until 2012 
not consider copyright or software. In the common ISO, IEC 
and ITU jointly adopted and in 2015 revised Guidelines 
for the Implementation of the Common Patent Policy (ITU/
ISO/IEC 2015), software is yet not mentioned at all. Still 
in 2017, software copyright issues are not high on the 
agenda of SDOs (Li 2017, 2018). 
Since IPR-related rulings can also be made outside the 
Common Policy and Guidelines, the ITU has issued in 
2011 Software Copyright Guidelines (ITU 2012) including 
licensing approaches ranging from waiving the copyright 
to Royalty Free (RF) licence and to licence with reasonable 
monetary compensation. It is linked to a software copyrights 
database, like for standard-essential patents, but with very 
disclosed few declarations, i.e. less than five in 2018. ISO 
and IEC do not even have such a database. This observation 
is also confirmed by the fact that ISO does not mention open 
source in their 2020 strategy at all, whereas IEC announced 
it in its current masterplan, that it will consider OSS as one 
fundamental change that will impact its core operations 
in the future. In contrast, ISO provides public access to the 
references listed in every ISO standards, recently defined by 
Blind et al. (2019) as standard-essential publications.
CEN and CENELEC mention the objective to identify the 
opportunities of OSS for standardisation in order to exploit 
their complementarities in their work programme 2018 
(CEN CENELEC 2017). The project, launched under the 
chairmanship of the German standardisation institute 
DIN, which acknowledges the relevance of open source 
software in its updated strategy released in 2016 (DIN 
2017), did not yet produce any results.
ANSI published already in 2008 a guideline on software 
in standards without addressing open source. However, 
ANSI organised with stakeholders of industry and the 
OSS communities an event in 2016 to explore OSS and 
its impact on standardisation but did not publish yet any 
conclusions or even consequences on its website. 
ETSI has – also since 2011 – an explicit paragraph in its IPR 
policy version of April 2017 addressing software in general, 
without mentioning explicitly OSS. If software is included 
in any element of a standard, there is no obligation to 
use that software to conform to the standard (or technical 
specification). Furthermore, the owner has to agree to a 
worldwide, royalty-free, sub-licensable copyright licence 
to prepare derivative works of the contributed software. 
The copyright licence granted shall also extend to any 
implementer of that standard for the purpose of using 
the software in any compliant implementation, unless 
the contributing member grants an irrevocable copyright 
licence on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms 
and conditions for the purpose of using the software in any 
compliant implementation. In a special report released in 
2012 (ETSI 2012), ETSI published some recommendations 
about the usage of elements of OSS in the development 
of ETSI standards, but also about their adoption within OSS 
communities. One scenario describes the consideration of 
code from OSS-producing organisations in the development 
of technical specifications and standards. Here, the main 
challenges are perceived in the collaborative work with the 
OSS communities. The second scenario characterises the 
adoption of interfaces to become prescribed within ETSI 
standards. Here, the main challenge is to ensure that the 
OSS licence applying to the interfaces or languages is not 
preventing the licensing of essential patents according to 
FRAND terms, otherwise an incompatibility with ETSI IPR 
policy may arise. In the third scenario, OSS code is included 
in a Technical Specification. Again, the challenge is to ensure 
that the OSS licence applying to the input, i.e. interfaces 
or codes, and to any derivative work does not prevent the 
licensing of essential patents on FRAND terms because of 
the incompatibility with ETSI’s IPR policy. Consequently, ETSI 
members are encouraged to be careful in introducing external 
materials. Furthermore, ETSI standards should not adopt or 
reference OSS code with OSS licensing regimes that limit their 
implementation with the exception that owners of related 
standard-essential patents are adequately compensated. 
Consequently, ETSI standards should be not approved if the 
OSS licence applicable to the integrated OSS content restrict 
their implementation because owners of standard-essential 
patents are prevented to seek FRAND-based licences or any 
implementers of ETSI standards – adequately compensating 
the SEP owners – from developing or acquiring software or 
hardware necessary for producing or commercialising their 
products or services.  Whereas the ETSI report released in 
2012 included only generic recommendations with focusing 
on a specific technology or a set of standards, ETSI identified 
and provided an overview about standardisation activities 
and standards related to cloud computing including relevant 
OSS projects, but without addressing licensing issues (ETSI 
2013). However, a report released in 2016 (ETSI 2016) 
investigates the relationship and the interactions between 
1.3. Review of the SDOs publications
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standardisation and OSS in cloud computing addressing 
explicitly the challenges of the tensions between patent 
licensing and OSS licences. The report acknowledges that a 
clarification of the licences applied to OSS has to be included 
in a standard or in an implementation of a standard. On 
the one hand, it is highlighted, again as in the 2012 report 
(ETSI 2012), that it has to be ensured that OSS included 
in standards does not restrict their usage, but also does 
not conflict with ETSI’s IPR policy. On the other hand, it is 
admitted that there is no consensus that this IPR policy is 
compatible with the implementation of ETSI standards by 
OSS communities, i.e. the implementation of standards 
available under a FRAND licence in OSS is obviously difficult. 
In summary, the workshops about OSS and standardisation 
organised by ETSI in 2015 and 2016 did obviously not 
contribute to further progress in solving the tension between 
the FRAND and the OSS licensing model, which is indirectly 
confirmed by the missing references in the most recent ETSI 
work programme (ETSI 2017). However, ETSI is still working 
on finding solutions to solve this tension.
In contrast, OASIS and W3C include in their policies 
the requirement to make software available under the 
commonly used open source licences to facilitate and to 
protect the implementation of their standards. Specifically, 
the OASIS policy now includes a track, which is crafted to 
particularly facilitate the implementation of standards in 
software made available under all of the commonly used 
open source licences. The intention was a shift from the 
focus of disclosure rules related to essential content, i.e. 
patents or copyrights, towards a more ‘licence-centric’ 
approach in order to provide greater protection for users of 
OASIS standards (Bekkers and Updegrove 2013). 
In the development and deployment of the Internet, a 
culture of free licence rights for Internet infrastructure was 
developed and maintained. In parallel, OSS was increasingly 
commonly used to provide the software ‘stack’ supporting 
the servers that enables the functioning and success of the 
Internet. Consequently, W3C already in 2003 adopted the 
option of RF in their standardisation processes. 
IETF follows a slightly different strategy by requiring that 
any source code included in a standard must be made 
available under the BSD open source licence in addition 
to including copyrights in its disclosure requirements. This 
requirement applies both to essential and non-essential 
copyrights in software code, as no differentiation between 
the two is made. Surprisingly, the IEEE SA does not address 
software in its recently updated IPR policy or in its updated 
bylaws (also stressed by Li 2017).8 However, The IEEE 
Standards Association Corporate Advisory Group (CAG) 
initiated an ad hoc for OSS a couple of years ago. 
The limited focus on copyright in general, and software or 
open source software in particular, has certainly economic 
implications in various dimensions. First, the few SDOs or 
consortia explicitly addressing software are able to develop 
a stronger profile in standardising topics based on software 
alone or on the combination of software and hardware. Here, 
the actors with standardisation needs obviously decide 
according to the perceived competencies of the SDOs, 
including the governance related to software. Second, the 
FRAND regime relevant to the licensing of standard-essential 
patents established in traditional SDOs, i.e. members of ISO 
and therefore guided by the ISO/IEC/ITU IPR policy, is not 
necessarily attracting contributors to OSS, which are used to 
rather royalty free dominated licensing schemes. Therefore, 
a separation or division of work can be expected also in the 
future despite the significant efforts in particular by ETSI to 
find solutions for the coexistence of FRAND licensing and 
OSS licences responding to the expressed needs of some of 
their members organised within the  Fair Standards Alliance 
(2017). Secondly, the rather strict royalty free based policies 
of OASIS and W3C following the OSS licensing schemes 
facilitate the implementation of their standards. Third, the 
IPR policies of SDOs related to software are linked to their 
business models, in particular those that do not make their 
deliverables freely available. It seems more difficult to sell 
standards under a royalty free regime integrating OSS in 
standards. However, this tension has not yet been addressed 
in the publications of SDOs and consortia.
1.4. Summary
8 http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf.
The background as presented in the literature review leads, 
first, to very general conclusions as regards the growing 
importance of standard setting processes and their use 
of IPR, not only patents, but also copyrights on software. 
The general assessment is, secondly, that standardisation 
has a multidimensional role. It intermediates between 
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science and technology driven research and innovation 
and demand-sided innovation policies (OECD 2011) 
framed by various regulatory framework conditions. 
Patents and copyright-protected software including open 
source software are the major IPRs used as inputs for ICT-
standardisation and also relevant for the accessibility of 
the output of ICT standardisation. Therefore, IPR utilisation 
in standardisation processes adds a further dimension.
In general, standards are developed by a number of 
different actors within a voluntary consensus-oriented 
process. Considering the accompanied increasing variety 
of interests of actors involved in standard setting, standard 
setting governance determines the success of SDOs in the 
sense of integrating the different interests at stake also 
asked for the European Commission. Effective rule setting 
and governance of SDOs are crucial for the successful 
development and eventually the implementation of 
standards. The IPR policy approaches developed by SDOs 
will have to consider not only specific rules and procedures 
for FRAND licensing relevant for patents, but even more for 
the treatment of open source software.
119The Relationship Between Open Source Software and Standard Setting
The project “Interaction between Open Source Software 
and FRAND licensing in Standardisation” aims at gaining 
a deeper understanding of the motivators and inhibitors 
of a closer collaboration between standards development 
organisations (SDOs) and open source software (OSS) 
communities. It focuses on the interaction and compatibility 
of the different licensing schemes and their effect on the 
success of collaboration. Our study assumes that it is 
necessary, but not sufficient to identify under what legal 
framework such a collaboration is possible. Beyond the 
legal options, the stakeholders involved must be positively 
motivated to participate in this collaboration by providing 
adequate and incentivising framework conditions. To 
illustrate this motivation, the study investigates cultural 
and governance aspects of the involved organisations as 
well as the relevant IPR frameworks.
The Digital Single Market (DSM) “is a strategy by the 
European Commission (EC) to ensure access to online 
activities for individuals and businesses under conditions 
of fair competition, consumer and data protection, 
removing geo-blocking and copyright issues.” The pillars 
of the DSM strategy are improved access for consumers 
and businesses to digital goods and services, creating 
beneficial conditions and a level playing field for digital 
networks and innovative services, and to increase the 
standard of living across Europe by realising the growth 
potential of the digital economy. 
A key ingredient to achieving the growth goals intended in 
DSM is standardisation. Standardisation promises efficiency 
gains through economies of scale, fosters competition 
between producers of standard-conformant products and 
benefits consumers through increased compatibility and 
interoperability, but also improved trust and reduced risks. 
Besides economic gains, implementing well-functioning 
frameworks that assure consumer and data protection and 
fair competition require specific standards to guide market 
actors and the judiciary towards goals set by policy makers.
Standards development and OSS development are two 
parallel processes that influence the information and 
communication technology (ICT) sector to standardise 
on successful products or processes. Standards 
development is facilitated by established SDOs and 
well-integrated into the European policy framework via 
the New Legislative Framework (Decision No 768/2008/
EC). Its benefits are clearly understood. Open source is 
software that is commonly developed in a decentralised 
production process characterised by auto-organisation 
and collaborative development. While its benefits are 
also well-understood by now, there is still uncertainty 
about the interaction between SDOs and open source 
communities and about how to position open source 
development in the EU regulatory framework. In the 
2015 edition of the Rolling Plan, the “use of open source 
elements by better integrating open source communities 
into SDOs’ standard setting processes” was encouraged.9 
The recent communication on standard-essential patents 
concludes with the objective that “the Commission will 
work with stakeholders, open source communities and 
SDOs for successful interaction between open source and 
standardisation, by means of studies and analyses”.10
Since both standardisation (Blind and Jungmittag 2008) 
and OSS (Nagle 2019a) contribute significantly to 
economic growth and the positive welfare effects of the 
ICT sector, it is assumed that a closer cooperation between 
SDOs and OSS would benefit both and support achieving 
the growth goals of the DSM.
A central question in the debate about this relationship 
are the choices of intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes 
implemented by SDOs and open source communities, 
and how these choices influence both sides ability and 
motivation to cooperate. Since innovators may contribute 
patented technologies to the development of standards, 
some SDOs, like the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI), favour IPR regimes that allow for 
the combination of standards with patented technologies. 
Others, like W3C, prefer IPR frameworks based on royalty-
free licensing or apply a mix of IPR policies that matches 
the specific subject matter to be standardised. Multiple 
initiatives within SDOs are currently investigating suitable 
Annex 2 | Case studies on the interaction of OSS and FRAND  
licensing in standardisation
 9 European Commission (2016): Rolling Plan for ICT Standardisation 2016.
10 European Commission (2017): COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents, COM(2017) 712 final.
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IPR regimes for combining or experimenting with including 
open source facilitation into their portfolio of services.
Consequently, some of the resulting standards are covered 
by standards-essential patents (SEPs) that need to be 
licensed to implement the standards. The EC considers 
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing 
conditions essential for SEP-encumbered standards. The 
literature review has shown the tension, but also authors 
close to the wider open source community, like Phipps 
(2019) have expressed concerns that FRAND conditions 
are potentially incompatible with open source licensing 
models, or otherwise inhibit a possible cooperation. The 
case study report gathers experience from a wide range 
of successful and unsuccessful attempts of cooperation 
between SDO and open source communities, presents 
it in the form of multiple case studies, and develops 
an initial understanding of the factors that support 
and suppress such cooperation. The findings from this 
investigation have been used as input to the ongoing 
stakeholder survey and are further studies in the analysis 
section of the report.
The research project that this case study report is part of 
was kicked off in February 2018 and performed in three 
partly overlapping phases. The delivery of the first phase 
was a comprehensive literature survey submitted in April 
2018 that aimed at grounding the later field work on the 
academic state of the art. In parallel, a set of case studies 
was produced in the second phase that also started in 
February 2018. The results of the performed case studies 
are presented in this chapter. The third phase built upon 
the results from the first two and consists of a wider 
survey of relevant stakeholders. The transition between 
phases two and three was marked by an expert workshop 
held on 18 September in Brussels.
The case studies report was developed following these 
steps:
— First, insight into the specific area of interest was 
gathered through multiple open-ended, qualitative, 
in-depth interviews with representatives of key stake-
holders, especially organisations that participate in 
standards development, open source activities or both, 
SEP rights holders, European and international SDO, 
and major open source communities, standardisation 
consortia and umbrella organisations. The interviews 
followed an interview guide approved by the European 
Commission and the steering committee established 
2.1. Case study concept and methodology
■ CERN, IEEE AND THE WHITE RABBIT PROJECT
■ CLOUD FOUNDRY AND MULTI-PLATFORM CLOUD COMPUTING
■ OPENSTACK AND DATACENTER VIRTUALIZATION
■ KUBERNETES AND THE CLOUD NATIVE COMPUTING FOUNDATION
■ GENIVI, W3C AND AUTOMOTIVE IN-VEHICLE INFOTAINMENT
■ AUTOMOTIVE GRADE LINUX AND THE LINUX FOUNDATION
■ ECMA TC39 AND THE JAVASCRIPT PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE
■ ISO JTC1 AND THE C++ STANDARDS COMMITTEE
■ THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAVA PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE SPECIFICATION
■ DOCKER, CONTAINER RUNTIMES AND THE OPEN CONTAINER INITIATIVE
■ BLOCKCHAIN AND DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS
■ THE OPEN CONNECTIVITY FOUNDATION AND THE IOTIVITY PROJECT
■ ETSI NVF AND OPEN SOURCE MANO
■ OPNFV AS A COMPLEMENTARY NFV IMPLEMENTATION
■ SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKING AND OPENDAYLIGHT
■ ONAP AND THE CONVERGENCE OF PHYSICAL AND VIRTUAL NETWORK FUNCTIONS
■ THE LINUX FOUNDATION NETWORKING FUND
■ OPEN AIR INTERFACE AND OFF-THE-SHELF 4G AND 5G
■ THE LINUX OPERATING SYSTEM
■ The OPEN INVENTION NETWORK
TABLE 2. LIST OF CASE STUDIES.
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to accompany the study. They are tailored to gain a 
deep understanding of the experience of the parti- 
cipants regarding the interaction between FRAND li-
censing and open source from a cultural, governance 
and legal perspective. The individual interviews are not 
targeted towards a specific case study. However, the 
exchange with the participants revealed interesting 
cases. 
— The interviews resulted in a set of findings and an initial 
understanding of the subject. Based on these findings, 
data about the case studies has been gathered in a 
second step, through field work, directed research 
and direct interaction with the case study subject 
entities. The interviewees had been informed about 
the selected cases and encouraged to provide more 
specific input if they can.
— In the final step, the findings from the interviews and 
the case studies have been aggregated into informed 
insights about the motivators and inhibitors of SDO 
and OSS collaboration.
2.2. Stakeholder participation
The case studies developed as part of this project aimed 
at getting first-hand, in-depth experience from expert 
practitioners at the intersection between standardisation 
and open source. Since there is only a small body of 
literature to draw from regarding this specific subject, as 
confirmed by the literature survey, the case study research 
was performed based on a fieldwork approach. Evidence is 
gathered through direct interaction with participants in the 
concrete cases and evaluated against the insights derived 
from the qualitative expert interviews. The in-depth 
insights from the interviews provided the foundation for 
the more concrete field work investigation of the individual 
case studies.
The interviews have been held with practitioners from an 
industry, SDO and open source community background. 
They do not map directly to concrete case studies, since 
it is assumed that the interviewees draw on experience 
from both ecosystems and from participation in multiple 
open source communities and SDOs. Interview questions 
where standardised, but allowed for open-ended answers, 
enabling participants to express a variety of perspectives 
and the aggregation of cross-sections of interview results. 
The outline for the interviews consists of 29 individual 
questions with various sub-questions. It was developed 
within the study group and reviewed with the steering 
committee before the beginning of the interview process. 
Interviewees have been selected to represent key SDOs 
and open source stakeholders. However, the invitation 
process was organised openly and shared across multiple 
forums to reduce a possible selection bias. Once invited 
participants agreed to being interviewed, the interviews 
where for the most part organised as teleconferences. 
Provided the interviewees agreed, the audio of the 
discussion was recorded and will be archived with the 
study group for scientific reproducibility. The interviews are 
evaluated by aggregating the details for each individual 
question horizontally across all interviews. The results 
from this process are used to interpret the case study 
findings.
Candidates for case studies have been identified based 
on suggestions from stakeholders attending the kick-off 
and steering committee meetings, individual initiative by 
interested third parties, and by way of recommendation 
from the wider open source and SDO related network 
of the study group. From these candidates, cases where 
selected that represent concrete standards or open source 
software development activities (as opposed to program 
development or task forces that develop concepts), 
represent large enough numbers of participating entities, 
show relevant market adoption of their products and 
distinctive specification and implementation activities. 
While it was not a requirement that the cases originate 
in the ICT sector, it turns out that most of them are. The 
cases are described based on assessments of 40 different 
parameters structured the same for each case study.
Conclusions from the case studies are again drawn 
by horizontally aggregating the findings based on the 
standardised case study structure. They are used in the 
second phase of the study to develop and conduct a wider 
stakeholder survey and become part of the final study 
report.
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The case studies have been selected based on a set of 
concrete criteria: 
— Each case needs to exhibit a relevant connection 
between standards and open source development based 
on an existing collaboration or interaction. Exploratory 
activities, intentions to establish collaboration and other 
preparations for a future interaction have not been 
considered as they may turn out to not be viable and 
never lead to an actual collaboration.
— From the remaining cases, those have been preferred 
that excel in essential community metrics, especially 
the number of participating entities and the amount 
of contributions raised. These metrics can be applied 
separately to both standards and open source 
development activities.
— The developed standards or open source technologies 
must have found adoption in the market. Adoption was 
assessed through knowledge transfer to other entities 
than those involved in the collaboration as well as from 
successful attempts at commercialization of the results.
Not all cases fulfil all three of the criteria. Two exceptions 
have been made based on the importance of the specific 
instances in shaping the boundary between standards 
development and open source:
— The OpenAirInterface project was included in the report 
even though it has not yet seen significant adoption 
in the market outside research and development or 
academia. It was included because it fulfils the other 
two criteria and applies a unique licensing model that 
combines elements of the Apache-2 open source 
licence with conditions for FRAND licensing of SEP 
(Maracke 2019).
— The Open Invention Network was included in the report 
even though it does not produce concrete specifications 
or open source technologies. It was included because it 
creates a patent cross-licensing environment for open 
source collaboration and has successfully built an 
influential community that shapes the IPR frameworks 
of multiple collaborative projects included in the case 
studies.
The report covers more initiatives that originate within 
the wider open source community than from within 
SDOs. The authors actively sought out additional more 
standards development related activities for inclusion in 
the study by reaching out to the participants in the study, 
the standardisation community and the project advisory 
board. This outreach did not discover additional activities 
not yet covered by the report. The authors are confident 
that the selected cases cover a large share of the 
spectrum of initiatives at the boundary of standards and 
open source development. However, some risk remains 
that other activities relevant for the analysed interaction 
are not covered by this report.
2.3. Case selection criteria
2.4. Interview evaluation and case studies preparations
The interviews serve as a first qualitative step towards 
gaining a good understanding of the boundary between 
standards and open source development before beginning 
the research work for the individual case studies. 13 
roughly 90 minutes interviews have been performed to 
prepare the case study research. Interviewees have been 
invited openly based on their prior experience with the 
study subject and engaged in in-depth discussions based 
on a predefined set of relatively open questions. The 
interview design allowed for the interviewees to extend on 
aspects important to them, resulting in a broad spectrum 
of experience being made available for analysis. This 
enabled the authors to gather a realistic impression of the 
industry sentiment regarding standards and open source 
development in a qualitative approach. The following 
paragraphs in this section describe issues identified during 
the interviews that where then further researched in the 
case studies.
The sparse existing research reviewed in the literature 
survey that deals concretely with the interaction of SEP 
licensing and open source software focuses primarily 
on the legal compatibility of open source licences with 
2.4.1. The question of legal compatibility and reasons to participate in collaboration
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FRAND licensing of SEP. This is one important aspect 
of the picture, since any directly contradicting terms 
in a specific combination of open source and FRAND 
licence would prohibit a combination of the two works. 
However, it was clearly identified during the interviews 
that answering the question of legal compatibility is not 
sufficient to provide answers of genericity or to serve as 
a foundation for shaping a possible collaboration. First, a 
question of legal incompatibility can only be evaluated 
against a specific contractual situation combined with 
the individual terms and conditions applied in the 
concrete open source and FRAND licences. Since many 
open source licences of very different nature exist and 
FRAND conditions as well are not normalised, no general 
conclusions can be supported simply because there was 
a combination of the two. The statement that some 
combinations of specific open source licences with 
specific FRAND terms are incompatible and others are 
not is only useful when applied to a specific licensing 
relationship. Second, if a case can be cleared not to pose 
any incompatibilities, this only means that a collaboration 
is legally possible, not that participants from both sides 
would be willing to engage in it and contribute towards 
tangible results. Legal compatibility of licensing terms 
is a necessary precondition, but not enough to establish 
a successful collaboration between SDOs and the wider 
open source community. This guided the case study 
research to investigate the reasons why actors engage in 
standards and open source development, and how these 
are related to the applied IPR framework.
The interviews revealed that there are different 
understandings about what the nature of a possible 
collaboration between SDOs and the wider open source 
community should be. The most widely used thought 
model experienced within SDOs for “working with the 
open source community” is the expectation that SDOs 
develop specifications in standards and the open 
source community subsequently implements them. This 
approach assumes that an as of yet unimplemented 
innovation is invented first and specified as part of a 
standards development process, and that creating a 
concrete conforming product is left to implementers 
competing in the market. 
The vision behind this understanding is that an 
inventor conceives an innovation and formulates it in a 
specification, which may become a formal standard. The 
creative, inventive work is expected to be embodied in the 
specification, and the later implementation follows the 
blueprints of it. The open source development community 
exhibit a different process. It usually assumes that the 
inventive work of finding creative solutions to problems 
is performed as part of the software implementation 
process, and that specifications are authored after the 
creative problem is solved. It is highly unlikely from this 
perspective that specifications can be developed in ex-
ante working group processes and will then be picked up 
by the open source community to be implemented. For a 
potential collaboration to be successful, the interviewees 
indicated that a common understanding of the role and 
utility of specifications that then become formal standards 
needs to be developed.
2.4.2. Different expectations towards the possible benefits of collaboration
2.4.3. Open source software and open source community
The terms open source software and open source 
community have been used with different meanings during 
the interviews. The term open source software refers to 
software that is distributed under a licence which complies 
with the open source definition. The Open Source Initiative 
is the steward that approves licences for being compliant 
with this definition.11 To convey a more precise meaning 
to the terms in this study, open source community and 
wider open source community will be differentiated. We 
use the term wider open source community to describe 
the global network of individual projects, developers, 
research institutions, business and any other entities 
that participate in the creation of open source software. 
The wider open source community is connected in 
11 https://opensource.org/osd. Another widely used reference is the Free Software Definition by the Free Software Foundation (https://www.gnu.org/
philosophy/free-sw.en.html). For the purpose of this study, both definitions are roughly equivalent.
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an overarching upstream/downstream network that 
integrates individual open source packages into complete 
software stacks. Software stacks solve a higher-level 
problem, like a Linux distribution that provides a complete 
operating environment for example for end-users, a device 
platform like Yocto that can be used to build embedded 
systems, or an enterprise platform like OpenStack that 
runs datacentres. A specific open source community 
focuses on a more concrete set of software packages – the 
operating system kernel, the C library, or a compiler. Here 
it is comparatively easy to identify who contributes what 
to the product, on which the idea of meritocracy builds. 
Meritocracy in open source communities is understood 
as the concept that each contributor is valued in the 
community solely based on the contributions they make. 
Specific communities can be big or small, ranging from 
one to hundreds or sometimes thousands of developers. 
It is helpful to consider organisations that are aggregates 
of specific communities, like the Eclipse Foundation or 
the KDE Community, as umbrella organisations, because 
they serve a different purpose of providing representation 
and administration to the communities they support. 
Decisions are made at the level of the individual open 
source community and coordinated within the wider 
open source community, for example through voluntary 
collaboration and conferences. No central decision-making 
process exists to steer the whole wider open source 
community. The work of the wider open source community 
is coordinated by way of competition between alternative 
solutions for downstream integration and adoption. In the 
case studies, this insight has been used to identify where 
collaboration decisions are made and what organisations 
act more as umbrellas with an overarching facilitating role. 
We consider the entity that invests work time or funding 
into the development of OSS as the contributor. In case 
of corporate employees, while the individual developer 
works on the code, the employer is the contributor that 
makes the decision to participate and also in most 
cases gains copyright on the contributions made by the 
employee. The principle of voluntary participation in OSS 
communities means that the entity that ultimately makes 
the investment decision is also the one that decides on 
participation. Even if employees are given a certain leeway 
to decide what exactly to focus on, the decision to employ 
them and assign them to OSS development work is still 
the employers. Independent individual developers and 
corporations are contributors that voluntarily participate 
in OSS development, which is similar to how the same 
entities decide to participate in standards development.
Reducing the problem of collaboration between standards 
and open source development to implementing standards 
in open source software as opposed to engaging with 
the open source ecosystem to create implementations 
of new technologies frames the research question to one 
of product licensing. The requirement that a software 
is open source if it is distributed under a licence that 
follows the Open Source Definition does not prescribe 
how the software is being developed. Some open 
source products, like Android, are being industrially 
developed by a single vendor with very little to no 
outside contributions. However, most OSS are developed 
by a network of voluntary individual or organisational 
contributors. Open source communities successfully 
produce software if contributors (both individuals and 
organisations) are motivated out of their self-interest 
to voluntarily do so. A collaboration between SDOs and 
open source communities will be beneficial to all sides if 
it combines the innovativeness and agility of open source 
communities with the diligence and multi-stakeholder 
review of SDOs. Asking how this can be achieved is a 
matter of governance in the specific and the wider open 
source communities, not a question of the licensing 
conditions of open source software.
Explicit, written governance norms and IPR frameworks 
regulate the behavioural expectations towards participants 
in SDOs (see Baron et al. 2019 on the governance of 
SDOs). For conflict resolution, most interviewees referred 
to these SDO frameworks as well-established guidelines 
that for the most part prevent conflicts by making the 
expected behaviour explicit and providing a platform for 
implementing those expectations. Participants orient 
themselves based on these SDO frameworks that 
usually existed before they joined. They do not consider 
other conflict resolution methods necessary. Conflicts 
that cannot be solved by enforcing the widely accepted 
SDO IPR framework almost never occur in practice of the 
investigated case studies in contrast to the increasing 
number of litigations related to SEPs (Pohlmann and Blind 
2016).
2.4.4. The roles of governance and legal frameworks
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Similarly, open source licences are often expected to be 
what regulates how open source communities collaborate. 
This was put in question during the interviews, as it reverses 
the order of events. Communities initially came together 
to jointly produce a solution in the form of a concrete 
implementation that they had a common interest in. Then 
they established a model of collaboration that suited their 
purpose. And then finally they set out to formulate or adopt 
a licence that embodies their collaboration method and 
allowed others to work with the community in the intended 
way. Later, communities have for the most part adopted 
already existing licences. However, they do so based on 
what licence supports the collaboration model they chose. 
It is not common that a community is set up by choosing 
a licence and implementing a conflict resolution process 
based on the details of the licence. The detailed terms of 
the licence do not express how the community operates. 
The governance norms of open source communities have 
been described during the interviews as almost completely 
separate from open source licensing terms. From this 
perspective, the collaboration models as well as the IPR 
frameworks of SDOs and open source communities must 
match to establish a successful interaction. A community 
might even adopt a different, more suitable licence if the 
collaboration model changes. 
In addition, concerns have been raised during the 
interviews that open source licence agreements cannot be 
interpreted in an abstract fashion. Open source licences 
are essentially templates that contain suggested terms 
and conditions. The recipient and the authors engage in a 
concrete agreement based on conclusive acts of offer and 
acceptance. What the parties agreed to in this agreement 
depends on what the offering and the accepting party 
should have reasonably understood. What the original 
authors of the licence text intended to express or limit 
in the meaning of the contained clauses may diverge 
from what contributors and recipients understand today. 
In case of uncertainty, a legal agreement needs to be 
interpreted against the intent based on which the parties 
made it. This aspect is complicated in the context of 
SEP licensing depending on whether or not the offering 
party holds a patent with claims that are implemented 
in the code. The statement “permission is hereby 
granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy 
of this software and associated documentation files (the 
“Software”), to deal in the Software without restriction…” 
contained in the MIT licence may in such a scenario 
easily be understood to include even an explicit licence 
to the patent in question.12 During the interviews, it was 
identified that such uncertainty is considered not helpful, 
which was mentioned as one important reason that the 
open source community steers towards licences that 
include an explicit, not implicit, grant to the contributor’s 
own patents. This is, however, a question of clarity of 
or uncertainty about the licensing conditions, not a 
question of the compatibility between open source and 
FRAND licensing terms. The question of what licences 
are preferred today and how those interact with SEP 
licensing terms was researched in detail in this study. 
The question whether or not some specific licences may 
include an implicit patent grant was not considered 
relevant (see the legal discussions in Li (2018) and 
Maracke (2019)).
2.4.5. The impact of formal recognition of SDO on the collaboration with open source 
communities
12 The authors refrain from further investigating the nature of the patent grant embodied in the text of MIT family of licences, acknowledging that 
arguments have been brought forward making the case for no patent license, an implicit patent license or an explicit patent license. Even though 
multiple study participants considered it important to resolve this decades-old debate, the outcome should only have a very limited impact on the 
results of this study.
Most SDOs and open source communities historically 
started as coalitions of interested stakeholders to work 
together on either standardisation or collaborative 
software development. Some SDOs over time gained 
formal recognition as either national standards bodies 
or recognised entities at the EU or international level. 
Based on this a differentiation is made between formal 
and informal standardisation. In the eyes of many SDO 
participants, the prestige of an SDO is closely related to 
it being formally recognised. It is also commonly assumed 
that such recognition should be a motivator for open 
source communities to collaborate with these SDOs. Open 
source communities, however, value partners based on 
the contributions they make in a meritocratic model. Open 
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source communities are interested in collaborating with 
SDOs that do relevant work in the field they are working 
in, for example the W3C or IETF. What unifies SDOs in 
the eye of the open source world is that they produce 
specifications for relevant standards. What unifies open 
source communities is that they focus in implementation. 
Formal recognition was not a relevant differentiator of 
SDOs in the eyes of interviewees from an open source 
community background. However, formal recognition is 
recognised as important for the relationship between 
SDOs, industry and possibly policy makers. During the case 
study research, these aspects were further investigated.
Interviewees where asked why enterprises, regulators and 
others are interested in a collaboration between SDOs and 
open source. The answers indicated that there seem to be 
two different motivations at play, which should be treated 
separately during the analysis. One can be described as an 
external push, the other one as a market pull.
Market pull is caused by the attractiveness of the 
open source model to market participants that causes 
them to adopt OSS and processes out of their own 
self-interest. Automatic licensing and the absence of 
negotiation reduce transaction cost to a minimum. They 
enable complex contributor networks that in the face of 
negotiations over IPR would be prone to anti-commons 
situations. In an anti-commons situation (Heller 1998), 
the cost of negotiation over the right to a good reach a 
point where it is prohibitive to the intended transaction. 
The market pulls towards open source approaches 
because they provide a way to pool funding to produce 
non-differentiating software and focus research and 
development investments towards differentiating 
commercial features. Market actors pragmatically 
choose combinations of OSS with proprietary hardware 
and software. Today, such combinations are the norm 
and seen as the working model of most industrial open 
source consortia, like the Linux Foundation or the Eclipse 
Foundation. The market does not pull towards a situation 
where only open source solutions are used, because 
collaboration is not a viable strategy for the development 
of competitive, differentiating product features. Market 
pull is characterised foremost by voluntary participation 
of all participants.
External push is created, among others, by societal 
expectations towards openness and transparency, 
politicians that use open source as an argument in 
debates, or by regulators that perceive open source either 
as a threat to be stemmed or as an opportunity. Unlike 
market pull, such demands do not represent voluntary 
participation of contributors in Open source development.
2.4.6. Market pull and external push for OSS adoption
2.4.7. Software versus hardware
Commoditization is a long-standing trend in the ICT sector. 
It describes the replacement of expensive, custom or 
otherwise specific hardware solutions with off-the-shelf 
hardware components and functionality implemented 
in software. Through economies of scale, this process 
benefits consumers by drastically driving down prices, and 
in turn threatens the business models of companies that 
sell hardware products that now can be implemented in 
software. Economically, this trend also represents a shift 
from inventions being implemented as physical goods to 
the same inventions being implemented as information 
goods. This is often used as an argument that this means 
these information goods needs to be covered by the 
same IPR that previously covered hardware. This issue 
was raised as an open question during the interviews. 
Historically, different IPR frameworks developed for 
technical inventions and creative goods that are, among 
other things, based on the cost of creating additional units 
of these goods.
In the case studies, it was further investigated what IPR 
frameworks the participants consider suitable for source 
code and technical inventions, especially when engaging 
in collaborative development.
127The Relationship Between Open Source Software and Standard Setting
The case studies cover standardised structured set of criteria 
that will be evaluated in the following section. The criteria 
are of a qualitative nature and cannot be normalised for 
a quantitative evaluation. For example, the assessment of 
the match between the SDO and open source community 
IPR regimes cannot easily be summarised in numbers. What 
the cases and the evaluation describe is a comprehensive 
profile of the market, the stakeholders and the governance 
framework at the boundary between open source and 
standardisation. The results are indications of underlying 
principles and norms that shape this intersection. Some of 
these expectations have been further verified in the study’s 
stakeholder survey. The following subsections provide a cross-
sectional assessment of the answers to the same questions 
for the 18 different cases that produce specifications or 
implementations (exceptions are the Linux Foundation 
Networking Fund and the Open Invention Network).
The scope of the study reduces the technologies 
represented by this evaluation to functionality embedded 
in software and hardware. The results cannot directly 
be transferred or applied to standards development 
activities that do not involve a similar combination of 
physical and information goods or a global collaboration 
of implementers. For example, the discovery of 
prevalent implementation-first or parallel approaches to 
standardisation is important but may only be applicable 
to intangible products that are created during research 
and development and are not later manufactured in 
mass production (instead, they are copied at negligible 
costs per unit).
The results of the case studies are presented in an 
aggregated fashion. They can, however, not be used 
to derive averages or quantitative assessments. 
Among other factors, the self-selection bias of 
interview and case study research participants creates 
a noticeable clustering of cases that represent the 
telecommunications industry and industry-driven open 
source projects.
2.5.1. The need for standardisation
2.5.2. The approach to standardisation
2.5. Results and analysis of the case studies
The reviewed projects differ in their view on the role of 
the specification that a standards development process 
creates. The majority of the projects do not consider a 
specification as the starting point of an implementation. 
Instead, many develop specifications based on proven 
functionality in existing implementations, and some even 
require a working implementation for a feature to be 
added to the specification. Those that create specifications 
state well-known benefits like interoperability or enabling 
independent third-party implementations to improve 
competition and the general availability of products in the 
market. This indicates an increasingly utilitarian point of 
view towards the role of specifications. Specifications are 
authored if they provide a tangible benefit. Projects that 
do not benefit from written specifications often omit them. 
Procurement processes, safety or compliance 
requirements and other conditions, however, continue to 
reference specifications provided by standards. Fulfilling 
such external requirements is one possible utility 
provided by a specification that may compel projects to 
provide them.
The traditional view on the process of standards development 
is that specifications are created based on voluntary 
stakeholder participation, e.g. by industry, research or other 
societal organisation, are promulgated to communicate 
stakeholder consensus and are then embedded in standards-
compliant products by implementers. Case study participants 
explained how historically the incubation of newly standardised 
technologies was discussed as a common problem in SDOs. 
These standards were developed specification first before 
any implementations existed (see section 5.5.3). This 
paradigm is not prevalent anymore in the researched cases. 
16 of 18 cases apply an implementation-first or a parallel 
approach to standardisation. For the initiatives that apply 
implementation-first or parallel approaches, the respective 
open source communities act as the incubators of the 
specifications. Only two cases focus on creating specifications 
first, which means the traditional model described above is 
becoming less prevalent in the ICT sector.
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The stakeholders mentioned by the representatives 
of the different cases are rather similar between 
standards development and open source implementation 
focused projects. The key relationships are between 
telecommunications operators and data network 
operators as the commercial consumers of software and 
equipment, original equipment manufacturers, equipment 
suppliers of different tiers, software vendors and service 
providers. Other important stakeholders are commercial 
and individual software developers that influence the 
adoption of technologies and academia and research 
organisations as a source of innovations. The wider open 
source community sometimes takes on the role of a 
software vendor, replacing commercial software providers 
especially for foundational technologies like operating 
systems or cloud infrastructure software.
The absence of variance in the set of stakeholders 
between cases underlines that standards and open source 
development serve the needs of the same community 
with different processes and methods. Actors choose 
to participate in specific projects based on a presumed 
match between their business goals and the organisations 
aims and governance.
Other stakeholders, like environmental groups, civil society 
or government representatives have not been mentioned 
by the study participants. This can be interpreted in a 
way that the interests represented by them are relevant 
in general, but do not have a specific relevance for the 
subject of the study.
2.5.3. Relevant stakeholders
2.5.4. IPR and governance frameworks in standards and open source development
The projects apply copyright, patent and trademark 
protection to their products and organisations. Only 
two projects (White Rabbit and Linux) do not formulate 
an explicit IP policy, mostly for reasons based on their 
historical development. Copyright is applied to source 
code and specifications. The cases set up a patent 
licensing framework either through the use of open 
source licences that include a grant of contributor-owned 
patents or by requiring a declaration of SEP or a patent 
licensing commitment from participants. Although the 
hosting organisations for multiple cases leave an option 
for FRAND based patent licensing (examples are ISO/IEC 
JTC1, ECMA for TC-39, ETSI-MANO and OpenAirInterface), 
almost all cases opted for a royalty-free patent licensing 
policy. This is either because patents where claims cover 
standardised functionality are assumed to have expired, 
as in the case of C++, or because the working group aims 
at making the standard making the standard available 
at royalty free terms, as in the case of TC-39 where the 
royalty-free policy is implemented by way of a contributor 
licence agreement.
SDO hold copyright on balloted standards documents 
or specifications and make them available through their 
usual channels, either as free downloads as in TC-39, or 
for purchase as for IEEE and ISO. Working documents are 
increasingly kept on collaboration platforms like GitHub. 
Most organisations (all cases except ETSI-NFV and 
OpenAirInterface) do not set up provisions for including 
features covered by SEP in standards documents. The 
vast majority of interviewees and case study participants 
stated doubts that royalty-bearing SEP licensing and open 
source development can be successfully combined.
The majority of the open source projects covered in the 
cases (Cloud Foundry, OpenStack, Kubernetes, AGPL, 
Docker, OCF, OPNFV, OpenDaylight, ONAP, OpenAirInterface, 
Hyperledger) decided for the Apache-2 licence, which is 
a permissive open source licence that includes a licence 
grant to contributor-owned patents. A smaller group 
(White Rabbit, C++ with the implementation that is part of 
the GCC compiler family, Java and Linux) apply the GPL-2, 
a strictly reciprocal licence that requires all modifications 
to be distributed under similar licensing terms. Java 
combines the GPL with the Java Specification Participation 
Agreement (JSPA), a contributor licence agreement that 
includes a grant of a patent licence. Only two projects, 
ECMAscript and the Bitcoin based implementations of 
blockchain, apply a broadly permissive open source licence 
(MIT, BSD) with no explicit patent grant. The ecosystems 
of some cases invite independent implementations, 
so that multiple licences may be applied by different 
organisations representing the same case. For example, 
C++ implementations are released under the GPL-2 (GCC), 
the permissive NCSA licence (Clang) and proprietary 
licences (Microsoft Visual C++). OpenAirInterface also 
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applies the OAI Public License which is based on the 
Apache-2 licence but replaces the Apache-2 patent grant 
with provisions for FRAND licensing. The OAI Public License 
is not approved as an open source licence by the Open 
Source Initiative.
2.5.6. SDO landscape
2.5.5. Innovativeness and contributions to the state of the art in the affected industry 
subsectors
Based on the overall impact that the reviewed cases 
had on the market, two thirds can be considered highly 
innovative, large scale collaboration that have seen wide 
or sometimes global adoption, especially Java and Linux. 
Almost a third have had a significant impact on a specific 
market segment. Only two (Genivi and OpenAirInterface) 
need to be considered as less impactful, however, this 
is mostly because at the time of writing the case study 
report they did not achieve larger adoption in the market, 
even though both projects are considered as innovative by 
participants.
About half of the cases achieved market wide relevance 
across multiple industry sectors as foundational 
technologies or by driving business-critical infrastructure, 
even though they originated from the ICT sector. This 
includes cloud technologies like OpenStack that operate 
essential services in the financial and automotive sector, 
among others. Other affected sectors mentioned during 
the interviews are energy, health care, manufacturing, 
logistics and government services. There is no clear-cut 
definition of the affected industry sectors and subsectors 
as the technologies covered by the case studies are 
multi-purpose. As a general cross-sector trend, computer 
and telecommunication systems become foundational 
technologies for various products and business processes. 
This means that changes to IPR and regulatory frameworks 
potentially cause market wide effects, affecting all industry 
sectors where open source technology has become 
business critical.
The SDO involved in the case studies are ETSI (5 
cases), ISO (4), W3C (3), IEEE (2), IETF (2), ECMA (1) 
and OASIS (1). Six projects opted not to participate in 
standards development and focus on implementation 
driven strategies. The reasons for actors to participate 
in standards development in these cases vary widely. 
One cluster of drivers is the goal to enable adoption 
in the market through technology transfer, fostering 
competition and improving interoperability (4 cases). 
In the 3 cases that cover programming languages the 
specifications as such are the reference for developers 
and implementers. Another reason to standardise 
mentioned for multiple cases are to support the 
availability of open standards. In the blockchain 
ecosystem, development activities are not yet very 
structured, so that no coherent standards development 
regime has emerged. The Hyperledger project focuses 
on implementation. 
Only two cases (ETSI-NFV and OpenAirInterface) actively 
anticipate the inclusion of FRAND-licensed SEP into 
developed standards. All others either do not consider 
SEP relevant for their specific innovations or implement 
a royalty-free patent licensing policy. The participants in 
these projects that engaged with the interviews or the 
case study field work also do not consider this a situation 
that needs change. The most common participation 
strategy adopted by actors is to adjust to the collaboration 
methods and IPR policies employed by the communities 
they engage with. For activities at the boundary of 
standards and open source development this typically 
involves adopting a royalty-free patent licensing policy. 
For all cases except ETSI-NFV and OpenAirInterface, 
this expectation of royalty-free licensing is considered 
acceptable and not to be a barrier to collaboration or to 
the development of relevant standards. Multiple parties 
mentioned as a precondition for this model to work well 
that all participants invest goodwill into making the 
collaboration work and are open and transparent about 
their intentions.
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Except two cases that have yet to achieve significant 
adoption in the market (GENIVI and OpenAirInterface), all 
others have had decisive impact in their technology areas. 
7 cases build foundational technologies and 3 facilitated 
interoperability based on an early implementation. 4 cases 
(the programming languages and ETSI-NFV) achieved wide 
adoption in the market based on available specifications 
that existed first. This indicates that the choice of an 
early, parallel or late approach to standardisation does 
not limit the possibility of success of a project, nor is a 
specific approach a requirement to a successful standard. 
More importantly, the governance and collaboration 
models need to be considered suitable by the relevant 
stakeholders to motivate them to participate. The most 
widely adopted technologies are also the ones that attract 
a large number of participants in their development. 
The incubation of new technologies and features more 
commonly happens through joint implementations or 
reference implementations under open source licences. 
Most innovations covered by the cases are brought to 
standardisation once proven implementations exist and are 
generally available. The assumption that royalty-bearing 
SEP licensing is a necessity for innovators to participate 
in standards development is not supported by the cases 
in contrast to the findings by Baron et al. (2019) based 
on survey results. Instead, some case study participants 
emphasized that they see standards development not as 
a means to create genuine innovations but to establish 
industry consensus on available technologies to enable 
economies of scale. Innovation in their view is better 
coordinated through market competition.
2.5.7. Contribution to standards development
2.5.8. Value system of contributing to open source development
The cases representing collaborative open source efforts 
illustrate the usual combination of the pragmatic view 
that considers open source a proven, well-working method 
of producing high quality software and the principled view 
that emphasizes the imperative of free access to software 
technologies as a societal necessity.
The pragmatic reasons to contribute to open source 
development mentioned in the cases are to establish 
effective reuse and minimise duplication of effort between 
projects, to reduce risks, to pool research and development 
investments for non-differentiating technologies and to 
reduce the number of parallel implementations of the 
same functionality. Avoiding contributor fragmentation 
towards different communities competing over adoption is 
a central concern. An understanding of a rule of thumb has 
evolved in the industry that states that at least 80% of 
the software code shipped with modern devices should be 
collaboratively developed common platform functionality 
and the remaining 20% represent the differentiating 
features vendors compete over. Especially the industry-
driven collaborative open source projects represent an 
important focal point for collaboration that facilitates the 
allocation of the remaining research and development 
spending towards differentiating functionality.
The principled perspective that emphasizes ethical aspects 
of software freedom is represented by arguments that 
publicly funded research should be made freely available 
to the general public (like in the current promotion of Open 
Access to scientific publications) and that the chosen 
licensing model should ensure that they remain free, or 
by the goal to ensure the means of production of digital 
goods like compilers or device platform are freely available 
to innovators. Some participants state that they strongly 
prefer collaborative approaches for the development of 
business-critical software infrastructure and that they 
would rather use jointly implemented solutions than 
those dominated by single or a small group of entities 
that maintain control over the specific market segment. 
This mirrors reasons stated as motivators to participate in 
standards development.
Most participants in the study agree that the prevalent 
open source methods provide a well-established balance 
between the pragmatic and the principled concerns. Some 
caution that by interfering with the established open source 
norms through changes to the accepted interpretations 
of open source licences or patent licensing policies, the 
delicate governance balance may be disturbed, leading to 
declines in participation.
The majority of implementations represented by the cases 
serve as upstream and downstream projects at the same 
time. This means that these projects make extensive use 
of software modules developed by other parts of the 
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wider community, while they themselves become building 
blocks for further downstream projects. For example, the 
Linux operating systems provides the container features 
necessary for container runtimes like Docker, which then 
become key elements of the Cloud Foundry or Kubernetes 
platforms. Projects that solve specific problems without 
engaging with the wider open source community (like in 
the case of White Rabbit) are rare.
2.5.9. Knowledge transfer and commercialization
2.5.10. Decisions to participate in standards and open source development
Some of the cases represent platforms or software 
systems characterised by complex, long-term technical 
developments that require larger investments and strong 
commitment from participating companies. OpenStack, 
Cloud Foundry or the Linux operating system are examples 
for such developments that then become foundational 
technologies other products are built upon. There is 
strong interdependence and reuse between the different 
software projects described by the cases. This reduces 
the duplication of development effort and cost which 
represents an increase in the efficiency of the innovation 
process compared to patent races and other competing 
innovation processes. A key function of the wider open 
source community is the early filtering of relevant projects 
and communities and to enforce the “fail early” approach 
to less convincing attempts.
The reasons for participating in standards development 
stated by the study participants match those identified 
in the literature review. Standards development provides 
stability to the technical innovation process by enforcing 
a disciplined approach and the creation of complete 
specifications. The schedules and planning horizon of 
SDO and open source communities are similar and 
support each other, while businesses are often forced 
to plan from one release to the next. For some cases, 
standards are useful in their own right or as prerequisites 
for adoption, as in the cases of programming languages 
or mobile communication protocols. Standards support 
interoperability and are used as references for regulatory 
compliance. They also help overcome fragmentation 
in the market caused by diverging, incompatible or only 
partially standards-compliant implementations, as was 
the case for early C++ compilers or JavaScript interpreters. 
Standards force vendors with strong market positions to 
open up for competition (Docker). The processes at SDOs 
facilitate consensus building embedded in a governance 
and IPR framework that allows for compromises between 
competitors.
The reasons stated by organisations for participating in 
open source development only partially overlap with the 
reasons for participating in SDOs. Some organisations 
impose general internal policies or recommendations 
to use OSS and open hardware licences where possible. 
Participants aim at creating new technologies to 
overcome a dominant market presence of a single or 
a small group of vendors in a specific market segment. 
Examples are OpenStack, cloud infrastructure in general or 
OpenAirInterface. Collaborating on a joint implementation 
competing with incumbent businesses can help to re-
establish competition, reduce prices, increase the variety 
of solutions offered in the market and rekindle innovation. 
In other cases, joint open source implementation helped 
increase interoperability between existing or new 
solutions (e.g. Cloud Foundry, OpenStack, ONAP). Some 
study participants consider contributing to open source 
development a more suitable approach to develop 
industry standards if an implementation-first approach 
can be implemented. 
Regarding the desirability of a close cooperation 
between standards and open source development, study 
participants state benefits and costs. One benefit is the 
combination of diligent, stable, elaborate SDO processes 
with the fast pace of development in OSS, as for example 
mentioned by ECMAscript, Java or AGL. A possible cost is 
that cooperation between SDO and OSS does not realise 
benefits in itself, so that there is no solution that fits all 
setups and case by case decisions are necessary. The 
combination of SDO and open source processes may lead 
to trade-offs, especially to a slower pace of development 
and lower innovativeness. Another benefit is that in 
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areas of high technical complexity, detailed specification 
in standards and working open source implementation 
may support each other and lead to both higher quality 
standards and better code. This aspect is mentioned 
for C++ and Docker. A further potential cost is that SEP 
encumbered IPR frameworks in SDO may impose a barrier 
to innovation by limiting the potential participants.
This study originated from the observation of only 
limited cooperation between standards and open source 
development and uncertainty about whether questions 
of legal compatibility between SDO and open source 
IPR regimes may be a reason for that. The cases do not 
support this assumption. Most modern open source 
projects use licences with reciprocal conditions or explicit 
patent grants and interact productively with the SDOs 
relevant for their market segment. Those SDOs responded 
to open source related market changes by establishing 
royalty free or a choice of different IPR regimes. The 
IPR policies and processes, including procedures for the 
vesting of patent grants, are well-established and mature 
in both standards and open source development. In such 
environments FRAND-licensing of SEP is not considered 
important or there are no explicit IPR policies for it. 
Throughout the case studies, SEP do not play a significant 
role in these ecosystems for a variety of reasons, even 
though patent portfolios with essential claims may exist. 
In some cases, patent holders share their portfolios up-
front through cross-licensing or commit to limited patent 
grants. In other cases, patents covering their technology 
have expired, as for C++, or the implementers established 
a culture of royalty free licensing, as for example in AGL. In 
these projects, there is no need to reconcile SDO and OSS 
IPR policies. Except for the telecommunications subsector, 
the industry does not perceive a conflict between SDO and 
open source IPR policies. Legal incompatibilities between 
open source licences and SDO IPR policies have not been 
found in practice and are not a relevant concern for most 
cases.
Where SDO and OSS processes are combined, the 
processes and governance in the working groups and 
communities often converge, leading to parallel open 
source development processes that incubate new features 
combined with standardisation processes to establish 
consensus.
It appears that a well-working relationship develops if 
standards developers and open source implementers 
largely overlap and many entities potentially contribute to 
the development process. Where there is no such overlap 
or in situations where there is a strong concentration of few 
suppliers in the market, no cooperation develops, and the 
majority of market participants are merely (commercial) 
consumers of technology with no participation in standards 
development.
For non-differentiating technology (created by SDO or by 
OSS communities) reciprocal licensing terms or explicit 
patent grants contained in the OSS licence mean that 
neither collaborators nor users (i.e. non-participating 
organisations) can directly compete with collaborators 
based on the jointly created technology by creating 
patent-protected derivatives of the original work. Such 
IPR regimes protect contributors from future competition 
based on their investments. This was considered a 
relevant concern voiced by case study participants that 
contribute to collaborative development. An IPR regime 
with provisions to ensure that collaboratively developed 
technology stays freely available was found to encourage 
motivation to participate in these development processes.
2.5.11. Match and compatibility of SDO and open source IPR regimes
2.5.12. Cultural aspects related to innovation, standards and open source
It is apparent that IPR regimes serve partially different 
purposes in SDO compared to open source communities. 
For the latter, licences mirror and follow collaboration 
models and represent how participants envision the 
jointly created products to be used. In situations where 
a single product should serve all purposes and attract as 
much research and development investment as possible, 
as for example with the Linux kernel, a strictly reciprocal 
licence, in this case the GPL-2, is applied. Variants that 
diverge from the main product are not welcome or 
encouraged in such environments. In situations where one 
implementation is designed to be adopted as widely as 
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possible but still developed by one collaborative project 
or community, a limited reciprocal (or “weak copyleft”) or a 
permissive licence with an explicit patent grant is applied. 
Most of the cases fall into this group, with the majority 
opting for the Apache-2 licence. If there is little cohesion 
within the community or there are no assumptions about 
how and where the joint implementation is going to be 
used, a permissive licence like MIT or BSD is chosen. 
Governance in open source communities develops as a 
collaboration model first and is then reinforced through 
a choice of licence. In contrast, IPR frameworks at SDO 
regulate how participants engage and how conflicts are 
resolved. Special attention is given to how participants 
may later exit the pre-competitive cooperation at SDO 
and compete again on products that implement the 
developed standard. This rationale is foreign to open 
source communities, as they do not envision re-engaging 
in competition once a functional area is covered by an 
industry-standard open source implementation. This 
contradiction may pre-empt the idea of an open source 
community creating reference implementations to a 
standard next to other competing implementations. 
Such a thought model has not been found implemented 
in any of the cases. In the same context, open source 
communities see no benefit in engaging in standards 
development simply for the purpose of facilitating 
alternative or competing implementations.
Both SDO and OSS communities are strongly driven 
by innovation. Both consider themselves standard 
setters, however not necessarily through the creation 
of specifications. Instead, open source communities see 
joint implementation as a viable way to create industry 
standards, and open source collaboration as a means 
to facilitate innovation in a market segment. In some 
cases, for example in the case of Kubernetes, they 
consider SDO processes as unsuitable for fast-paced 
innovation.
A dynamic perspective may be attained by comparing the 
development of cases over time and the progression of 
different technical collaborations in the same market segment, 
as for example in the cases of GENIVI and AGL as automotive 
software platforms. Attitudes and priorities towards 
specification change over time. In earlier stages, industry 
actors emphasize the creation of specifications. In a later 
stage, they may move towards incubating new technologies 
using open source approaches and apply parallel specification 
and implementation or an implementation-first approach. 
Such transitions can be observed in the development of C++ 
and Java, as well as in the automotive sector.
Whether balloted and draft standards are made available 
for a fee or for free seems to have limited to no impact 
on adoption. One reason for that may be that the fees 
applied are comparatively low compared to the necessary 
investments in products and engineering expertise. 
Access to standard documents is also mostly required by 
implementers of the standard, not necessarily by users. 
While making standards available for a nominal fee may 
not be preferred, it appears to be culturally compatible 
with open source norms.
Many highly motivated, idealistic individuals are involved both 
in standards as well as in open source development. Individual 
study participants stated they enjoy the collaboration 
between standards and open source development as one of 
like-minded people driven by a joint interest in the technology 
they create. In the JavaScript community, the common 
motivation is to advance the programming language so that 
it supports the developer community as well as possible. 
In the case of the White Rabbit project, working group 
members are enthusiastic to establish a new state of the art. 
All participants seem to take pride in their visible individual 
contributions. From a perspective of personal motives and 
motivation, participants in standards and open source 
development share many values and convictions.
2.5.13. Interactions between SDO and open source communities
From the perspective of SDO, study participants consider 
their interactions with open source communities 
mutually beneficial and serving their joint interest in a 
specific technical area. The open source contributors 
help to incubate the developed technology and to test 
the specification, which helps maintain high quality in 
standards. The partner open source community often 
creates the first or only reference implementation, or as 
in the case of Java and OpenJDK becomes the de-facto 
standard implementation later in the process. Interaction 
with the open source community also inspires the 
modernisation of SDO processes, for example through 
the adoption of new collaboration methods and platforms 
and increased transparency of decision making, as in 
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the cases of JavaScript and ECMA. Since experts in the 
specific market segments are rare, there is a noticeable 
overlap between the individuals involved in standards 
development and open source implementation. The same 
people may be involved on both sides.
The open source communities also describe their interaction 
with SDOs as fruitful and productive. The collaboration and 
consensus building processes encourage the stability of 
specifications, for example in the White Rabbit case, that 
would otherwise change quickly and cause interoperability 
issues. Open source implementations sometimes 
overshoot the functionality specified in the standards 
based on the faster pace of development, as for example 
with language extensions in C++ compilers or ECMAscript 
interpreters that are not covered by the specifications. This 
may cause a shift in the scope of technical development, 
as for example in the case of network automation that 
grew functionality beyond the original scope of NFV. In 
such cases, SDOs may be slower to update working group 
mandates and charters compared to the rigorous self-
selection processes in open source development.
Larger collaborative projects with a well-defined 
purpose, as for example the Linux kernel developer 
community, see little usefulness in multiple, standards-
compliant implementations. Freedom to operate is 
a key precondition for contributors to participate in 
the development process. Confidence in access to 
the implemented functionality either through cross-
licensing, explicit patent grants in open source licences or 
contributor IPR policies is considered necessary for a fast-
paced development process. The usefulness of formal 
standardisation is not accepted per se. Specifications 
and the necessary standards development processes 
to create them need to provide tangible benefits to the 
community to justify investing effort into participation 
and slowing the development process to accommodate 
the required consensus building. To avoid that, some 
cases explicitly exclude participating in standards 
development from their organisations remit. The projects 
recognise that users of their technology have a choice 
and compete for adoption, as in the case of alternative 
programming languages. Regular, relatively fast revisions 
of standards (for example, roughly annual standard 
updates for JavaScript) are considered necessary to 
maintain market shares in a competitive environment. In 
some cases, open source inspired collaboration methods 
are adopted by SDOs, for example by hosting draft 
documents in publicly accessible Git repositories.
SDO as well as open source umbrella organisations 
facilitate the participation of industry, individual 
contributors and academia in the standardisation process. 
By providing widely accepted IPR policies or project 
charters, they help to normalise governance norms.
The Open Invention Network (OIN) creates an influential 
cross-licensing environment for some of the larger 
collaborative projects represented by the cases, for 
example AGL, Linux, Kubernetes, OpenStack, JavaScript, 
C++, Docker and Java. Participants voluntarily enter into 
the OIN cross-licensing agreement to complement the 
rights and obligations from the open source licences 
applied to the project code. This combination creates an 
innovation environment where patent litigation practically 
does not occur.
Other stakeholders that do not participate in the 
standardisation process but may be affected by the 
produced results, as for example environment protection or 
civil rights groups, are not reported by the study participants 
to be involved in the cases. Some SDO provide multi-
stakeholder platforms. Communities and SDOs are usually 
open for comments from outsiders. Beyond that, there 
seems to be few forums, like the ETSI with its ITS events, 
where outside stakeholders may formulate their interests. It 
is not clear from the cases whether or not participants see 
this as a situation that should be improved.
The cases covered mostly represent industrial standards 
development and open source collaborations. Both also 
accommodate the participation of volunteer contributors 
and academic institutions where it is applicable, which 
supports knowledge transfer.
2.5.14. Other stakeholders
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Fostering a healthy environment for competition in 
the market is a key EU policy goal. Companies are to 
compete based on the quality and price of their products 
with no unfair advantages. Both SDO and open source 
collaboration are pro-competitive, provided they follow 
basic principles of open governance and access to their 
processes and products, like defined in the guidelines on 
horizontal co-operation agreements.
SDO created carefully balanced governance and IPR policies 
that model a transition from pre-competitive cooperation 
to competition in the market based on standards-
compliant products. Commitments to FRAND licensing 
of SEP are part of that balance, as are requirements for 
transparency of decision-making processes.13
The welfare contributions of goods like standards and OSS 
are an important guideline for the public interest in their 
production. In this study, we understand the term common 
good as the benefit or interest of society as a whole (Tirole 
2017). The goals and values of the EU as well as the 
sustainable development goals of the UN are examples 
for perceptions of the abstract common good concept. A 
public good is a specific good that is non-rivalrous and 
non-excludable. It is non-excludable if individuals cannot 
be excluded from making use of it. It is non-rivalrous if the 
use of the good by one individual does not degrade the use 
of the same good by others. A statue displayed in a public 
square is a public good. The free-rider problem postulates 
that public goods are generally under-provisioned by 
private entities (Weber 2004). Ways to resolve this issue 
include the provision of public goods by the state, as for 
example with internal and external security, or voluntary 
collaborative methods, as for example in the work of 
privately funded charitable organisations.
A public good may contribute positively or negatively to the 
common good. Polluted air in a city, for example, is a public 
good that negatively affects the common good. Generally, 
public policy attempts to reduce or eliminate negative 
and encourage and foster positive contributions to the 
common good. Standards that are open to implementation 
and publicly available (even if access to them requires a 
nominal fee) are public goods that positively contribute 
to the common good by encouraging economic growth 
(Blind 2004b). According to the Open Source Definition, 
every piece of software distributed under an open source 
licence guarantees a) free redistribution of the source 
code including the right to create derivative works, making 
the software non-rivalrous, and b) no discrimination 
against persons, groups or fields of endeavour, making the 
software non-excludable. A key attribute of OSS therefore 
is that is it always a public good. Since it serves as a 
foundation for the creation of concrete ICT products and 
the mere existence of OSS cannot cause public harm, OSS 
also contributes positively to the common good (Nagle 
2019a). No scientific consensus has been reached as to 
the public good character of standards with SEP claims. 
Proponents argue that the FRAND commitment in principle 
makes the standard available to all interested parties and 
therefore a public good. Opponents argue that already 
the requirement to negotiate with a private entity or 
the possible failure to achieve agreement with the SEP 
rights holder means that parties may be excluded from 
implementing the standard, making the standard a private 
good. It can be assumed that different opinions about this 
possibly mixed private and public good character of SEP 
covered standards is one argument that underlies the open 
standards and the FRAND/SEP debate in the ICT sector.14
Open source development is considered pro-competitive 
if participation is open to all and the results are 
released under accepted open source licences. The basic 
requirements for open source licences make products 
distributed under such a licence public goods. This ensures 
that neither participating nor non-participating entities 
will be able to gain an unfair advantage from contributing 
to those goods. The governance models for large-scale, 
industrial open source collaboration are still evolving. 
However, the communities covered by the cases apply 
well-documented, accessible and transparent decision-
making processes that are open for participation to all 
parties.
In the fast-paced innovation environment of the ICT 
sector vendors usually compete for price with otherwise 
2.5.15. Market and societal aspects
13 An analysis of SDO governance processes has been performed by Baron et al. (2019).
14 By causing externalities, private goods may also positively or negatively contribute to the common good. Assessing the public versus private good 
character of SEP covered standards is beyond the remit of this study. It may, however, be crucial to the efficacy of future SDO regulation and worth 
investigating further.
136 The Relationship Between Open Source Software and Standard Setting
commoditised products like storage space, CPU count, 
memory capacity, network throughput or latency. The 
sector is characterised by a fast deterioration of prices 
for such commodities. The technical progress that causes 
the necessary efficiency gains depends on interoperability 
and low market barriers to entry. This argument assumes a 
(widely accepted) relationship between competition in the 
market, productivity increases and product and process 
innovations.
The goal of the case study report is not to provide an 
assessment of the success of the described cases. To 
deliver a complete picture of the interaction between 
standards and open source development, each case study 
contains a verbal summary of how successful the case 
is in the market. These qualitative summaries cannot be 
directly compared to each other.
When assessing the success of an individual case, 
common metrics for collaborative endeavours have 
been applied. The success of community building has 
been evaluated based on the number of participating 
entities, the number of individual contributors and the 
number of contributions raised. Market penetration and 
commercialization was assessed based on the observable 
ecosystem of market actors offering products or services 
and on industry adoption where foundational technologies 
may have become important or even business-critical for 
commercial users. The pace of innovation is assessed 
for example based on the cadence of software releases 
or revisions to specifications. These assessments are 
not directly comparable, as there is no accepted way to 
account for external variables like the existing state of the 
art or overall technical complexity in a market segment.
Proxy metrics of innovativeness like the number of patent 
applications filed in the respective market segment have 
been avoided. Open source communities not only do 
not file patents, they also actively work to reduce the 
attractiveness of patenting in the collaborative zone. 
Instruments applied towards that aim are choices of 
licences with explicit patent grant like the Apache-2 
licence, the constant creation of prior art or encouraging 
cross-licensing through the Open Invention Network.
2.5.16. Metrics and assessment of success
2.6. Observations 
2.6.1. Motivators and barriers to collaboration
2.6.2. Business and collaboration models
The cases indicate that all three layers of interaction 
identified in the expert interviews – cultural fit, governance 
models and legal framework – are relevant influences 
on the viability of collaboration between SDO and open 
source communities. Collaboration has to be possible 
and to be preferable over working separately. One key 
aspect to understanding this interaction is the principle 
of voluntary participation. Neither side can instruct the 
other to perform certain tasks or to focus for example 
on implementation versus specification. Collaboration 
probably needs to be envisioned as an integrated cyclic 
process with feedback loops between specification and 
implementation, and shared responsibility for both aspects 
between all participants. A positive influence may be the 
match of the timelines for producing results between 
SDOs and open source communities, while businesses 
may be driven by shorter development cycles under time-
to-market pressure.
It is obvious that the availability of the product of the wider 
open source community partially disrupts existing business 
models, especially if they are built on the exclusivity of 
implementation details, trade secrets and patent protection 
of functionality that gradually grows to be implemented 
as a public open source good. Usually, this is the result 
of a well-functioning market with competition between 
different collaboration models, as long as this gradual shift 
is caused by market pull. Care should be taken if business 
models are made viable or invalidated by external push. 
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Most of the presented cases developed without noticeable 
regulatory encouragement or investment, indicating that it 
can be assumed that the coordination of standardisation 
processes is achieved through competition in the market. 
Regulatory interventions into the market need to be 
assessed carefully for the balance of the possible positive 
effects and welfare losses. In the case of the interaction 
between SDO and open source communities, regulatory 
intervention affects voluntary participation and changes 
the allocation of research and development investments. 
It needs to be further investigated how regulatory 
intervention affects the viability of business models and 
competition, and how regulators can positively influence 
the market to foster innovation and economic growth.
The assumption that was raised during some of the expert 
interviews that committee work at SDOs is necessary to 
produce complex standards that cover a wide range of 
functionality across different technology areas cannot be 
confirmed. Communities like Cloud Foundry or OpenStack 
produce comprehensive software platforms that require 
research and development investment, long-term 
commitment and effective governance norms and IPR 
regimes of similar or larger efforts compared to some 
standards development efforts. All these aspects have 
been found implemented in open source communities 
as well as SDOs. The success of the development effort 
seems to depend more on momentum, the intention to 
overcome obstacles and work towards a common goal, 
and the personal motivation of the participants involved. 
The diligent review of specifications performed in SDOs 
has shown a positively stabilising effect that enables 
implementers to produce conforming products. 
2.6.3. Collaboration models for developing complex platforms
2.6.4. Creating a level playing field between standards and open source development
2.6.5. Suitable IPR regimes for physical and information goods
The expectation that “open source is welcome to join but 
must accept our established SDO governance framework” 
illustrates that especially long-term participants in 
SDO activities assume a mixed perspective of peers in 
the standardisation process and authority. As peers in 
the standardisation process, they interact with others, 
including open source communities, as equal market 
participants that compete at eye level. When they assume 
a position of authority, they project the gravitas of the 
institution (usually the formally recognised SDO) they are 
embedded in and demand that potential collaborators 
accept its relevance and follow its IPR regime. This stance 
mixes two perspectives, the macro-economic reasoning of 
the policy maker, and the micro-economic reasoning of a 
competitor in the market. The cases indicate that formal 
recognition (which with regard to this study currently only 
exists for SDOs) is helpful but not enough to entice parties 
to mutual collaboration. Other drivers for example are 
technical relevance, effective processes and a cultural fit.
Interfering with market forces to enable specific business 
models carries the risks of perpetuating historical 
developments or missing promising new approaches. 
Regulators usually attempt to create a legal framework 
for innovators that enables competition between 
alternative approaches and lets different business models 
compete in the market for viability. For further analysis, 
the questions of macro-economic competitiveness and 
micro-economic competition need to be clearly separated. 
From the perspective of the standardisation process, SDOs 
and open source communities should be considered peers 
and equal actors in a “standardisation market”, especially 
because of their partially differing characteristics that 
cater to different market needs.
Hardware and software exhibit different economics 
based on unit marginal cost being the equilibrium price in 
markets with efficient competition. The commoditisation 
and virtualisation of hardware functions in software does 
not just drive down prizes, they also transition functionality 
from physical to information goods. The growth of open 
source communities is one piece of evidence for this more 
general shift towards commoditisation and hardware 
function virtualisation. The case studies show that 
even in the same market segment, the IPR frameworks 
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applied cannot easily be transferred from hardware to 
software implementations, as they will not necessarily be 
accepted by participants. Instead, a new set of separate 
and disjunct behavioural norms for collaborative and 
competitive environments emerged. Where collaboration 
is the dominant model, the common expectation is that 
all contributing entities that form the community jointly 
act as a steward over the created technology and make it 
available to everybody. Where collaboration is not suitable, 
actors compete as before and focus on differentiating 
product features. Institutions have emerged that facilitate 
participation in the collaboration process, like the major 
open source umbrella organisations as well as SDOs like 
IETF or W3C, and that create IPR frameworks representing 
the concept of joint stewardship in the collaborative 
environment, like the Open Invention Network.
The cases organically developed a partial focus on the 
networking and telecommunications subsector. Amongst 
other factors, this is encouraged through the self-selection 
bias caused by which parties made themselves available 
as interview and study participants. Since networking and 
telecommunications technology is especially affected by 
the tensions between SDO and open source IPR regimes, 
stakeholders in these specific technologies have been 
particularly motivated to provide input to the case studies. 
However, the interaction between standards and open 
source development most noticeably affects software/
software and software/hardware interfaces, so that the 
cases still describe a representative subset of the relevant 
subject matter for the study. The following paragraphs try to 
summarise a number of take-aways from the case studies.
First, fruitful collaborations between standards and open 
source development exist, as for example in the case of the 
White Rabbit project, the different programming languages 
or the Linux operating system. The processes applied by 
these collaborations evolved over time, and continue to do 
so, resulting in well-established governance models as for 
example showcased by ECMA TC39 or ISO/IEC JTC1.
Open source approaches are suitable for the development 
of research and development heavy innovations that 
require significant up-front investments in large, diverse 
stakeholder networks, as can be observed for OpenStack, 
AGL, LFN or Linux. Open source communities are 
commonly driven by their own set of motivations mostly 
based on technical needs. Non-contributing entities have 
little impact on setting their technical roadmaps. Based 
on that, a collaboration between standards and open 
source development is difficult to enforce especially 
considering the generally voluntary nature of participation 
on both sides. Some projects even adopt implementation-
only policies, which potentially leaves a gap where no 
specifications will be produced that can be referenced by 
regulators or other stakeholders.
While individual open source projects may serve a specific 
technical need and may remain relatively small in terms of 
contributor and contribution counts, with the adoption of 
their products they become part of a complex upstream/
downstream network of continuously integrated open 
source technologies that develop in lockstep based on 
decentralized coordination and a normalised, negotiation-
free IPR regime. The cases of the CNCF, AGL, LFN or Linux 
provide examples for this effect.
Different widely adopted open source projects have 
developed IPR regimes that combine source code 
licensing and patent licensing. They all however effectively 
implement royalty-free patent licensing schemes.
In cases where larger organisations decide to participate in 
open source development, the benefit from gaining access 
to the totality of contributions made by other collaborators 
commonly outweighs the potential gains from royalty-
bearing patent licensing. Participants in the cases like 
GENIVI, AGL, LFN or Linux regularly forgo potential patent 
royalties in favour of joint implementation.
Once actors in a market segment congregate to establish 
open source collaboration for the provision of foundational 
software technologies for that segment, the focus of the 
collaboration sometimes shifts away from specification 
to joint implementation. The jointly developed solution 
effectively solves the interoperability and software quality 
problems.
Technology areas where specifications communicate 
the basic uses of the technology independent of the 
use of specific implementations, as in the case of the 
2.7. Assessment of the interaction between standards and open source 
development
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programming languages covered by the cases, remain 
standards-development driven, but adopt collaborative 
open source methods to develop new standard features. 
They may for example make draft specification or 
discussions of new features openly available, even if the 
balloted standards still need to be purchased for a fee.
In some cases, the wider open source community actively 
invests to prevent business-critical technology from being 
dominated by single or small numbers of companies, as in 
the case of Docker and the OCI. The number of independent 
contributing entities to a specific software product is an 
important metric of community health in practice. Larger 
collaborative projects like AGL, Hyperledger, CNCF, OCI or 
OpenStack have hundreds of participating entities that 
contribute under licences that usually include a patent 
grant.
Software-focused standards development projects rarely 
take the technical lead with specifications that are then 
implemented by the wider open source community as 
reference implementations. SDOs are usually not the 
entities developing new and innovative technologies. It 
is more common that vibrant open source communities 
incubate new technologies that then become candidates 
for standardisation.
One of the most successful software innovations in general, 
Java, provides an example where specification, reference 
implementation and test suite are jointly developed in 
presence of royalty-free licensed SEP, but outside an SDO.
Voluntary open source contributions and contributions 
generated through direct research and development 
investments of companies are complementary and can 
lead to similar results in terms of technical development, 
as shown by ETSI-NFV, Open Source MANO and OPNFV, 
underlining the argument that both are alternative 
approaches to the development of technical standards. 
Open source methods result in freely available 
implementations but depend on the willingness of 
contributors to create them. Proprietary research and 
development results in potentially patented inventions 
but can be funded through commercial investments. The 
approach selected for a specific scenario needs to take 
the composition and business models of the potential 
contributors to a new technology into account. Both 
approaches can be combined in a way that they compete 
for market share in the same market segment, as in the 
cases of ETSI-NFV and the LFN sub-projects.
Innovative new technologies over time become commodity 
and tend to be collaboratively implemented as open 
source technologies. This open source implementation 
then demonstrates the state of the art and rarely leaves an 
opportunity for competitive inventiveness, since this would 
require a single inventor to compete with a consortium 
representing many of the relevant stakeholders in a market 
segment. OpenDaylight, OpenStack, Linux or Kubernetes 
illustrate this effect.
The traditionally separate assessment of SDOs and open 
source umbrella organisations becomes more difficult to 
maintain. Different aspects of standards development, 
like consensus building and ensuring interoperability and 
quality levels, are increasingly provided by open source 
umbrellas as well. Membership models of industry-
driven open source organisations also show similarities to 
models applied by some SDOs. For a better understanding 
it may be necessary to assess the individual functions 
of standards development separately with a utilitarian 
approach and less focused on the established institutional 
framework.
In summary, fruitful collaboration between standards and 
open source development can be observed in the cases. 
Successful royalty-bearing licensing of SEP in combination 
with open source development cannot be observed, even 
though attempts like OpenAirInterface exist. Most SDOs 
represented in the cases as for example W3C or OASIS 
have adopted royalty-free or FRAND-Z SEP licensing 
schemes over time. Through the evolution of open source 
governance towards standardised behavioural norms, 
the wider open source community continues to build 
a commons of freely available foundational software 
technologies and grows and extends it also through patent 
cross-licensing and the increasing adoption of open source 
licences that include patent grants.
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The aim of the stakeholder survey was to gather and 
analyse the views of a broad set of stakeholders on the 
topic of the interplay between patents and OSS within 
standardisation processes in general and FRAND and OSS 
licences in particular, hereby creating a robust empirical 
representation of the opinions and issues at stake.
The approach of designing the survey follows the state-
of-the art. It reflects our experiences with similar surveys 
about IPRs in ICT (Blind et al. 2011; Blind et al. 2017). We 
took account of the structure of surveys and questionnaires 
in the study area performed by other researchers, e.g. the 
questionnaire of policy options in the ECSIP study of 2014 
and on the governance of standardisation bodies (Baron et 
al. 2019) with a focus on IPR regimes.
Based on the insights from the literature review, the case 
studies, which already followed a rather detailed interview 
guideline, the above-mentioned surveys and the interim 
workshop performed in September 2018, we started to 
design of a questionnaire. A first draft of the questionnaire 
was sent to the EC by the middle of October 2018. The 
survey format is a mix of closed and open-ended questions, 
with an emphasis on the former. This draft was distributed 
asking for feedback among the steering committee of the 
project composed of both patent owning companies and 
representatives of the OSS community, as well as legal 
experts of European standardisation bodies. There have 
been several rounds of feedback until the questionnaire 
was finalized and put online using the lime survey tool at 
the beginning of November 2018 and finally tested. 
The final structure of the survey includes the following 
topics:
— Section A: Position of the person answering the ques-
tionnaire
— Section B: Basic economic information about your or-
ganisation
— Section C: Use of Intellectual Property Rights
— Section D: Involvement in standardisation and open 
source software communities
— Section E: Interaction between OSS and standardisation
In parallel, a database of experts being active in the 
field, who have for example the workshop performed in 
the context of the other projects related to patents and 
standards, has been built up. By the middle of November, 
these experts, but also the following mailing lists have 
been informed about the survey:
— ETSI IPR Mailing List
— ETSI OSS Mailing List
— Members of the EU ICT Standardisation Multi-Stake-
holder-Platform (MSP)
— List of experts attending previous workshops and be-
ing involved in the governance project
— Linux Foundation
— Eclipse Foundation
— Free Software Foundation Europe
— Open Source Initiative
— OpenForum Europe
— Distribution of the link via Twitter.
These mailing lists and contacts assure in addition to 
the notes published at the websites of DG CONNECT 
and JRC that the consultation achieves a broad coverage 
of different types of stakeholders including a sufficient 
number of eventually filled-out questionnaires. We decided 
to go for an open stakeholder consultation in contrast to 
a closed survey approach, which allows controlling for the 
responses, because we have to open the survey for the 
OSS communities. In contrast to patenting companies, 
which can be defined according to specific criteria based 
on patent databases, individuals, companies or other 
organisations active in OSS cannot exactly be defined and 
approached, but only via the mailing lists of open source 
foundations (see already Blind et al. 2005). 
Annex 3 | Stakeholder Survey
3.1. Methodology
3.2. Results
In the following sections, we are presenting the results of 
the stakeholder survey. Overall, 315 respondents started 
to complete the survey. However, the majority of the 
respondents did not continue to answer the then following 
questions to the very end.
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In the following chapter, we are presenting the results 
starting with the profiles of the respondents and their 
organisations covering companies and different types of 
private and public institutions, their use of Intellectual 
Property Rights, their involvement in standardisation and 
open source software (OSS) communities and finally their 
interaction between OSS and standardisation.
More than 200 participants revealed their position in their 
organisation. On the one hand, around 20% are the Chief 
Executive Officers or in the top management. In general, 
responses from small organisations having below 250 
employees or younger organisations are provided by their 
CEOs, which has to be taken into account interpreting 
the differences in the answers between small and large 
organisations. Overall and in particular in larger companies, 
members of the R&D department, members of the R&D 
departments, but also of the legal and standardisation 
department have responded to the survey. Due to 
the high correlation between responses of CEOs from 
small- or medium-sized organisations, we do not further 
differentiate the answers according to the position of the 
respondents, because only those from CEOs would allow a 
differentiation based on a significant number of responses.
3.2.1. Respondents
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The location of the participants’ countries is – despite 
the limited number of answers to this question – broadly 
distributed among 20 countries with around one third of 
answers from France and Germany, but also 20% from the 
United States and Canada.
The information provided about the basic economic 
characteristics of the organisation is rather limited. 
Whereas the information about the annual turnover is 
rather incomplete and skewed with a median value of just 
above EUR 3 million, the average number of employees is 
above 20.000, but the median at 80 employees. Therefore, 
we have a significant share of small- and medium-sized 
organisations, which enables us to split the sample in 31 
organisations with more and 45 organisations with less 
than 250 employees, the official upper limit in the SME 
definition of the European Commission. This distinction will 
be used for a differentiated analysis of the responses.
In addition, only around 20 organisations provided 
information about the share of their licensing revenues 
and licensing payments as share of total turnover. In 
* Labels next to the bars in the figures indicate number of valid responses received in the survey.
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contrast, around 80 respondents provided information 
about the year of their organisations’ foundation. Here, 
the median is the year 2000, which is an option to split 
the sample in younger and older organisations. Almost 
all organisations founded after 2000 have less than 250 
employees. Therefore, we stick to the organisation size as 
an option to differentiate the sample.
In general, the business models of the respondents’ 
organisations are rather diverse as displayed in Figure 3. In 
general, organisations have between one and two business 
models, sometimes even three (see also Blind et al. 2017). 
Around 20% of the organisations are providing software, 
another 10% are independent software developers, 
i.e. 30% of the respondents have a strong software 
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background and are in more than 60% of the cases 
also small- and medium-sized organisations. Another 
third of the respondents are representing organisations 
producing final goods, supplying components, being 
systems integrators or network operators. This third are in 
two third of the cases also organisations with more than 
250 employees. In addition, almost 20% are employed 
by private or public research institutes or universities. 
Finally, respondents also represent organisations providing 
private or public services, i.e. the latter by governmental 
institutions.
The qualitative analysis of the answers about organisations’ 
core businesses reveals a quite diverse picture with more 
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than a quarter of the organisations being active in the 
software sector. More than 10% are organisations in the 
information technology. In addition, the sample includes 
more than 10% research organisations, universities and 
other organisations providing education. Furthermore, 
consulting and law companies as well as private non-profit 
and public organisations complete the large spectrum of 
organisations. Overall, the answers are consistent with the 
distribution of organisations’ business models.
In a first major section of the questionnaire the respondents 
have been asked for the application, registration or claiming 
different Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) between 2015 
and 2017. Almost one hundred respondents answered this 
question.
Not even half of the organisations has applied for global 
patent families with a median value of almost one 
thousand. This share is higher than the ratio reported 
in the German Community Innovation Survey, which is 
around 20% in Germany (Rammer et al. 2016). In contrast, 
almost 60% have registered trademarks with a median of 
two, two thirds even claim copyrights with a median value 
of ten and even three quarter have globally registered 
domain names with a median of five. Industrial designs 
have only been registered by a third of the organisations, 
but with a median of fifteen. A similar distribution has been 
found by Blind et al. (2017) in the context of a European 
survey focused on ICT patents. Finally, almost one quarter 
of the respondents use other forms of IPRs. Here, trade 
secrets are explicitly named. 
If we differentiate the answers into organisations with 
more and less than 250 employees, then it becomes 
obvious that almost 90% of the larger organisations 
applied for patents, but less than 10% of the smaller 
organisations. This structural difference can be also 
observed in the data collected in the German version of the 
Community Innovation Survey (Rammer et al. 2016). The 
discrepancy between large and small organisations is even 
higher for the registration of industrial designs, which are 
used by two thirds of the larger organisations, but almost 
by none of the smaller. For the use of the other IPRs, the 
size bias is not so drastic, e.g. three quarter of the larger 
organisations use trademarks, but also more than 50% of 
the smaller organisations. Furthermore, almost every larger 
organisations is claiming copyrights, but also almost half of 
the smaller organisations. The registration of domain names 
92  
95
94
92
91
80
0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
Global registrations of domain names 
Claiming of copyright (e.g. by proof of the creation 
date or the © symbol or open source licenses) 
Global registrations of trademarks 
Global application of patent families 
Global registrations of industrial designs 
Other forms of IPR 
FIGURE 12: USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS BETWEEN 2015-2017.
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is almost as common for smaller organisations with 77% 
compared to the 88% of the larger organisations. These 
differences are confirmed by splitting the organisations by 
turnover in more or less than EUR 2 million or by founding 
before or after the year 2000.
Since less than half of the organisations have applied for 
patents, consequently even a lower share of one third is 
licensing out or even selling patent families to third parties 
(see figure 1 in the chapter 4), which is slightly more than 
the 20% reported by Blind et al. (2017) in the context of ICT 
patents. If we just focus on those organisations applying 
for patents, 70% of them licence out their patents with a 
median value of almost 250 patent families. This value is 
rather high compared to figures below 5%, e.g. revealed in 
the German version of the Community Innovation Survey 
(Rammer et al. 2016). Regarding licensing in or buying 
patents, the share of organisations is almost identical at 
around one third and again more than the quarter reported 
by Blind et al. (2017). Obviously, there is a significant 
exchange of patent rights between the organisations 
owning patents, but the expected higher share of 
organisations licensing in patents cannot be observed. In 
addition, only five patent families are licensed in by the 
median organisation.
One third of the organisations own patents with a 
median value above 50, which refer to standards and 
open source. A slightly lower share of organisations has 
declared patent families, with a median value of around 
20, to SDOs as potentially essential. Only one quarter 
of the organisations, i.e. almost half of the patent 
owning organisations, generate revenues out of these 
standard-essential patent families based on only three 
patents as median. Slightly less than one quarter of the 
organisations have patents which are implemented with 
a median value of three in OSS projects and products. 
Finally, one quarter of the organisations are involved 
in other forms of licensing, in particular cross-licensing 
is mentioned. If we focus on the small organisations, 
then all the mentioned options are not used by more 
than 90% of the respondents. Only almost 15% of the 
small organisations mentioned that they licence in or buy 
patents and just above 10% own patent families which 
refer to standards or OSS.
In summary, the patent related activities of the responding 
organisations are concentrated at larger organisations, 
whereas the smaller organisations are almost completely 
excluded. However, the high licensing activities both inward 
and outward, which are much more than the number found 
in the German Community Innovation Survey (Rammer et 
al. 2016), are in line with both the high patent intensity of 
the sample and the need of the complex ICT industry to 
integrate technologies from producers of complementary 
products.
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The second major part of the questionnaire focuses 
on organisations’ involvement in standardisation and 
OSS communities. From the originally more than 300 
respondents, more than 200 did not answer the basic 
question about an involvement in standardisation, 
which might be an indication that two thirds are not 
active in standardisation. However, this share is rather 
50%, because around one half of those organisations, 
which responded positively to the following question 
about their involvement in OSS, are active in at 
least one of the different types of standardisation 
organisations. 
On average, an organisation is active in almost three 
different types of standardisation organisation. Most 
popular are international consortia. This dominance is 
further supported by the standardisation organisations 
mentioned under “Others”. Here, we find further 
international consortia, like OASIS, OGC and W3C. However, 
taking all types of consortia plus the category “Others” 
sums up to slightly more than 42%, whereas the naming 
of the formal standardisation bodies accumulates to more 
than 57%. This ratio is certainly specific to the focus on 
information and communication technology in general 
and software in particular, because across all sectors 
German companies are five times more active in formal 
standardisation bodies compared to consortia (Rammer et 
al. 2016). Due to this specific focus, most organisations are 
active at ETSI followed by the international standardisation 
bodies ISO and ITU in addition to the involvement at the 
national standardisation bodies, being a requirement for 
the participation at the European or international level. 
The limited number of answers about the number of 
seats in technical committees (TCs) and working groups 
(WGs) reveal median values between two to over ten, in 
particular at 3GPP.
Looking at the differences between small and large 
organisations, it is obvious that the latter are much more 
active in standardisation than the former. This phenomenon 
confirms previous studies, e.g. by Blind (2006) or Wakke et 
al. (2015). Furthermore, the differences are higher related 
to participation in formal standardisation bodies compared 
to consortia.
Whereas only around half of the respondents are active in 
standardisation, almost 90% of the responding organisations 
are currently involved in open source development 
activities, which is significantly more than the share of 
the respondents of the survey conducted by Baron et al. 
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(2019). The involvement takes different forms. In general, 
the organisations of all respondents are using OSS with a 
median value of 100 OSS projects. In particular, OSS is used 
by over 90% as input into the application level, slightly more 
than three quarter as input into the intermediate level, i.e. 
middleware, and around two thirds as input into base layer, 
i.e. into the operating system or the platform level. Here, 
the median number of OSS projects is 10. Around 80% of 
the responding organisations are occasionally contributors 
to five and regularly to ten OSS projects. In detail, the 
respondents named under the category of other forms of 
involvement the Linux, Apache and Eclipse Foundation, 
FSFE, the Open Source Initiative, OpenForum Europe and 
OW2 as those community organisations they are engaged 
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in. With regard to IP management, LOT Network was 
mentioned. The remaining organisations named by the 
respondents focus on specific technologies, like networking 
(ONAP, OPNFV, OpenDaylight, OpenAirInterface Software 
Alliance, O-RAN and TMForum), programming languages 
(Python Software Foundation, JavaScript Foundation), 
cloud computing (Cloud Foundry, Cloud Native Computing 
Foundation), geospatial technologies (Open Source 
Geospatial Foundation, Open Geospatial Consortium), web 
technologies (W3C, OASIS, OMG, IIC, Drupal and Joomla), 
smart platforms (Fiware Consortium), open hardware 
(Open Source Hardware Association) as well as regional 
organisations (GTLL for the Paris region, SOIT.SK for 
Slovakia and others).
Organisation/Consortia Median Number of Seats
National standards bodies  5
National consortia  3
International consortia  5
CEN (European Committee for Standardisation)  7.5
CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation)  5
ETSI (European Telecommunication Standards Institute)  5
3GPP 11.5
European standardisation consortia  2.5
ISO (International Organisation for Standardisation)  3
IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) 10
ITU (International Telecommunication Union)  2.5
TABLE 3: MEDIAN NUMBER OF SEATS.
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The differentiation in larger and smaller organisations 
reveals that larger organisations are, in general, more 
involved in all activities with one important exception. 
Small organisations claim slightly more often to 
be a regular contributor to OSS despite their size 
disadvantage.
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In order to identify the motivations of organisations to join 
both standardisation activities and OSS development, the 
respondents were asked to assess the relevance of a set 
of incentives, which are going back to previous studies 
related to standardisation (e.g. Blind and Mangelsdorf 
2016) and OSS (Hertel et al. 2003; von Krogh et al. 2012). 
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Starting with the incentives to standardise (see figure 2 
in chapter 4), we find that developing standards of high 
quality, carrying forward the state of the art of technology 
and finding technical solutions are most relevant for the 
respondents. The following motives, like company interest, 
knowledge creation, establishing networks, increasing 
reputation, specifying regulations, knowledge seeking 
and market access are slight above medium relevance. 
Slightly below medium relevance are shorter development 
times, personal interest, the royalty free use of standards, 
the development of non-differentiating solutions, lower 
cost for R&D and return on investment for R&D. Only of 
low relevance is the inclusion of own IPRs in standards. 
Here, we find a significant difference between the patent 
owning respondents, who assess the relevance between 
medium and low and those not owning patents, for whom 
the incentive is only between low and very low relevance. 
The incentives to join standardisation in the mechanical or 
electrotechnical engineering industries are quite different 
putting an even higher emphasis on specifying regulations 
and enforcing own content (Blind and Mangelsdorf 2016). 
Finally, the differentiation between small and large 
organisations reveals that for the former the royalty free 
use of standards is more relevant.
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FIGURE 21: INCENTIVES TO JOIN STANDARDISATION ACTIVITIES (SCALE: 1 = “VERY LOW”; 2 = “LOW“; 3 = “MEDIUM”; 4 = “HIGH“; 5 = “VERY HIGH”)  – SMO VS LO.
Looking at the motives to join OSS development (see figure 
3 in chapter 4), we find the two incentives of developing 
code of high quality, which is confirming the top relevance 
found by Blind et al. (2005) and carrying forward the state 
of art of technology on the two top position reaching an 
overall assessment above high relevance. Slightly below 
high relevance ranks finding technical solutions, company 
interest, shorter development times, knowledge creation, 
personal interest, increasing reputation, lower cost for R&D 
and establishing network. Closer to medium relevance are 
rated knowledge seeking, royalty free use of code, market 
access, return on investment and development of non-
differentiating solutions. Even below medium relevance 
is the specification of regulation, because open source 
code is not appropriate as input for regulations. Again, the 
inclusion of own IPR in OSS is rated below low relevance. 
However, there is no difference between patent owners 
and those organisations without patents. Looking at other 
incentives reveals that smaller organisations rate several 
of them as much more relevant starting with the reputation 
increasing effect, but also the establishment of networks, 
the finding of technical solutions and knowledge creation 
accompanied with a much stronger personal interest.
In addition to the listed incentives, some respondents 
underline the relevance of interoperability to be achieved 
both by standardisation and OSS. Furthermore, the 
contribution to OSS is perceived as a strategy to prevent 
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proprietary software solutions, which might create a vendor 
lock-in and consequently closes markets instead of opening 
them. Therefore, contributing own code or technology 
of high quality to OSS allows to control the roadmap of 
software development and independency of software, but 
is also perceived as a contribution to a common good, 
including humanitarian goals, and the alignment of a whole 
eco-system. Similar arguments are mentioned related to 
standardisation. This strategy also allows to deter other 
market entrants by establishing dominance in a market 
with open source products. Regarding the process, the 
speed of software development and testing via OSS by 
multiple parties are mentioned. OSS and standards not 
only allow access to global markets but also enable a rapid 
and inexpensive market development via an inexpensive or 
even royalty-free implementation of code and technologies 
among respondents’ organisations and their customers. In 
particular, SMEs benefit from open standards, also if they 
are referenced in public procurement processes. OSS is also 
the platform to identify highly qualified experts interesting 
to hire (e.g. already mentioned by Lerner and Tirole 2002). 
Finally, it is highlighted that open standards and OSS 
can help deliver good governance, societal freedoms, 
economic health, business growth, global competition, and 
technological innovation.
If we compare the assessment of the incentives to join 
standardisation activities vs OSS development, we 
observe the following patterns. First, the relevance of 
almost all incentives are rated higher for OSS with two 
exceptions. The inclusion of own IPR is slightly more 
relevant for the participation in standardisation than for 
joining OSS. Secondly, standards are obviously a more 
effective approach to specify regulations, in particular in 
the European Union in the context of the New Approach. 
Secondly, the largest differences can be found for the 
incentive of lower cost for R&D and shorter development 
times, important drivers for joining OSS. In addition, the 
personal interest is assessed to be more relevant for 
the involvement in OSS. However, in addition to finding 
technical solutions the royalty free use of code, which is 
also connected to a positive return of investment in R&D, 
is obviously much more important for an involvement than 
the royalty free use of standards.
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A further explanation for the higher assessment of 
the incentives to get involved in OSS compared to 
standardisation is the general higher importance of 
being involved in OSS development compared to 
standardisation development. This bias towards OSS 
is reinforced by the assessment that two thirds of the 
respondents expect an increase of importance of OSS 
compared to less than half related to standardisation. 
In the assessment of the current relevance, we 
observe a significant difference between large and 
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small organisations related to the importance of 
standardisation. Whereas the two thirds of the former 
assess it as very important, this is the case for less than 
one third of the latter. This assessment is consistent 
with the lower participation of smaller organisations in 
standardisation bodies. Related to OSS, we observe not 
such a significant difference. Obviously, standardisation 
plays for small compared to large organisations a less 
relevant, whereas we cannot observe such a difference 
related to OSS. Related to the future, the expectations 
related to standardisation are overall balanced 
between an increased and constant relevance and 
quite similar between large and small organisations, 
whereas the majority of all organisations, in particular 
larger organisations, expects a further increase in the 
relevance of OSS.
The last section of the questionnaire was eventually 
focused on the interaction between standardisation and 
OSS. Both in the literature review and in the case studies 
different types of interactions have already been identified. 
Surprisingly, all three options, i.e. standards as input 
into OSS, OSS as input into standardisation and parallel 
development in addition to the general interconnectedness 
of standard development and OSS activities are perceived 
by the respondents to happen on average “sometimes”. 
However, the distinction between large and small 
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3.2.4. Interaction between OSS and standardisation
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organisations reveals some more differentiated insights. 
Surprisingly, more than 50% of the organisations with 
less than 250 employees report that their standardisation 
and OSS development activities are always or often 
connected, whereas this is only the case for less than a 
third of the larger organisations. In particular, for more 
than half of the smaller organisations OSS is used as 
input for standardisation, whereas this is only claimed 
by 15% of the larger organisations. In contrast, there is 
no difference between large and small organisations in 
using standards as input into OSS development. Finally, 
more than a third of the small organisations claim parallel 
developments in standardisation and OSS, whereas this is 
claimed only by 15% of the larger organisations. Overall, 
standards development and OSS activities are much more 
interconnected for smaller organisations, which much 
more often transfer OSS as input into standardisation, 
whereas this transfer and even the parallel development 
is not so common for larger organisations. Obviously, small 
organisations contribute much more to the integration of 
OSS and standardisation than large organisations.
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In the answers to the open question about other forms 
of interaction, we find different and partially contrary 
positions. Some argue that the way modern standards 
for the Internet and the Web are defined today does not 
leave much room for the interpretation for coding, so the 
standardisation and open source development goes hand-
in-hand at all level. There are specific organisations, in 
particular OpenForum Europe (OFE), which promote both 
open source and open standardisation, representing their 
member’s opinion that both are important elements for 
an open, competitive market place and for driving and 
facilitating innovation and digital transformation. The 
OpenForum Academy also functions as a leading think 
tank in this respect also issuing publications and papers 
on the two topics.
Other experts postulate that open source and standards 
address complementary, but different topics and purposes. 
Consequently, there are – in their view – a few specific 
cases where technical specifications and software/code 
are co-developed, such as in audio, speech and video 
codecs.
Respondents involved in standardisation claim that a 
strong industry commitment towards the development 
of a specific standard is sufficient for its successful 
deployment irrespective of OSS for a reference 
implementation. In contrast, often OSS communities would 
take notice and start developing alternative independent 
OSS implementations according to their perception. 
Consequently, they also expect that if standards do not 
address market needs, open source implementations will 
also not be successful. 
First standardisation committees develop already 
reference implementations using the tools, but also some 
processes of open source projects and under licences 
compatible with the SDO’s IPR framework. The produced 
code is freely accessible to all, because providing “open 
source” test cases and material is also important for 
testing interoperability of standard implementations.
In general, some standardisation organisations realise 
that their membership covers a multitude of wants and 
perspectives, when it comes to the interaction of OSS and 
standardisation. Some of their members are interested 
only in open source projects that are non-related to 
standards. Others pursue standards with no tie back 
to open source. Still, others may want a symbiotic or 
complementary form of open source and standardisation 
projects. Standardisation organisations offer that all of 
these options and perhaps others to be explored and 
appropriately utilised through their collaboration platform 
as stakeholders identify their desired end goals and 
associated results.
Following the identification of the different types of 
interaction, the respondents have been asked for 
their assessment of the interaction between OSS and 
standardisation on their efficiency and results. Starting 
with looking at the impacts on standardisation (see 
figure 4 in chapter 4), we observe that the majority 
of the respondents expects a positive impact of this 
interconnection on standardisation. In particular, more 
than 70% of the respondents perceive a positive impact 
on the creation of specifications of technical solutions 
contributing to interoperability and only slightly less 
than 70% on the implementation of technical solutions. 
However, standardisation benefits less related to the 
ideation of new technical solutions, but also to their 
validation and eventually diffusion, because here only 
around 60% of the respondents expect positive impacts. 
Overall, less than 10% of the respondents expect negative 
impacts from the interaction on standardisation. 
The differentiation between small and large organisations 
reveals that the former are more likely to expect positive 
impacts on the identification of possible technical solutions, 
i.e. the ideation, and the creation of specifications of 
technical solutions, i.e. interoperability, whereas the latter 
see the advantages in particular in the implementation of 
technical solutions.
If we turn to the impacts of the interaction on OSS, we 
observe even higher shares of respondents perceiving 
positive impacts. Almost 80% expect positive impacts 
for the creation of specifications of technical solutions, 
in particular related to interoperability, and around 75% 
for the implementation of technical solutions. Whereas 
around 70% perceive positive impacts on OSS both for 
the identification of possible technical solutions and 
their diffusion, beneficial impulses for the validation of 
technical solutions are expected by less than 60% of the 
respondents. However, only around 5% perceive negative 
impacts. 
The differentiation between small and large organisations 
reveals in contrast to the expected impacts on 
standardisation that the former are more likely to expect 
positive impacts on the validation and diffusion of technical 
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solutions. Larger organisations see the advantages again 
in the implementation of technical solutions, but also in 
the identification of possible technical solutions in OSS.
Taking the latter insights of the interconnection on efficiency 
and results of OSS together with those on standardisation, 
it becomes obvious that smaller organisation perceive 
knowledge flows from OSS to standardisation as providing 
the latter with new ideas as inputs for technical solutions. 
Larger organisations see advantages for standardisation 
from OSS in the implementation of technical solutions. 
In contrast, smaller organisations experience positive 
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impacts of standardisation on OSS on the validation and 
diffusion of technical solutions. Obviously, there exists 
a complementarity of effects, which is explained by the 
size of the organisations. However, it has to be mentioned 
that smaller organisations are also less involved in 
standardisation confirming previous studies (Blind 2006, 
Wakke et al. 2015).
In the answers to the open questions about the impacts 
of the interconnection of OSS and standardisation, several 
additional effects have been mentioned. In general, it is 
agreed that standardisation and open source are today 
two well working ecosystems, between which well 
working interrelations have already been established. 
Further interrelations will be established case by case 
and organisation by organisation driven by the respective 
memberships’ and business’ needs. However, significant 
top-down changes are perceived to be critical, because 
they could have unintended and probably negative 
consequences. Nevertheless, there also needs to be room 
for creative new models of interactions. In general, it has 
been highlighted by the respondents that the impacts 
are always very case specific depending on the project, 
community management, the stakeholders involved, the 
available resources and the final goals.
Several additional positive impacts of OSS on 
standardisation are named. First, OSS identifies the actual 
areas of non-differentiation, because no one contributes 
to the differentiating areas. Second, OSS defines the lower 
bounds for technology use, like price and access. Other 
effects of interactions between standardisation and OSS 
can include optimization of solutions for standardisation, 
the extensions of standards and their improved robustness. 
For some standardisation projects, open source projects 
provide some complementary technology. In such cases 
a closer interrelation is certainly important and has a 
positive impact. There are, however, also standardisation 
projects where open source does not generate an impact.
From a procedural perspective, OSS can provide a 
methodology for fast paced feasibility testing and also 
enable the development of collaborative networks, which 
could be positively influencing software development in 
standardisation bodies and consequently standardisation. 
In particular, the use of OSS licensing might assist in certain 
cases where either the use of existing OSS code is needed 
or useful for an SDO’s software development purposes or 
there is a limited need for code to be developed under an 
OSS licence for external use, e.g. in case of APIs.
Overall, the respondents do see that there is likely to be 
a positive impact for identifying, implementing, validating 
and fostering technical solutions through the development 
and use of OSS outside of an SDO, and that its limited use 
and development for particular purposes in an SDO might 
be helpful in certain situations. 
In general, the positive impacts of OSS on standardisation 
outweigh the negative impacts being mentioned. In order 
to avoid negative impacts, the OSS licence both should 
not conflict with either an SDO’s IPR policy or the SDO’s 
members’ legitimate expectations, but should encourages 
contributions from all stakeholders, i.e. it does not have 
the effect of excluding certain stakeholders.
Looking at the mentioned impacts of standardisation 
on OSS (see figure  in chapter 4), it has been claimed 
that there may be many different relations between 
standardisation and OSS and each SDO has to find its own 
way regarding the best ways for making use of OSS and 
for establishing cooperation. The spectrum ranges from 
exchange of information and mutual support to standards 
bodies getting actively involved in open source work.
In particular, analysing the impacts on open source projects, 
which build on standards developments, should require a 
differentiation according to the following three situations. 
First, when standards exist before open source initiatives, 
they can help to guide open source initiatives to create their 
technical specifications, which might be a positive impact. 
Secondly, standards created at same time as the OSS 
negotiations around the new standards might slow down the 
open source community to create its technical specifications. 
In addition, there is a risk that technical specifications in OSS 
advance more quickly than standards specifications and as 
standard catches up, it ‘forces’ re-engineering of OSS. Both 
impacts could be negative. Thirdly, standards are created 
after OSS. Then, the standards might impact the existing 
ecosystem in reducing the variety in OSS. On the one 
hand, this might be negative, if this reduces the dynamic 
and ‘creative’ nature of many OSS teams competing in the 
parallel exploration of the search space to develop a winning 
or elegant solution. On the other hand, it might be positive in 
stabilising the subject area (hence, foster investment) and 
ensuring a level playing field (hence promoting competition 
by allowing smaller players to have a chance). This positive 
impact is more likely, where interoperability is important. 
Especially during the consolidation after an initial phase of 
rapid exploration of OSS solutions, the aspect of standards 
needs to be considered. 
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Negative impacts on OSS are expected when poorly 
designed standards – notably those which would force 
redefinition of the term “open source” to include alien 
components such as patents – cause substantial confusion 
and reduce the pace of adoption of OSS in general. Indeed, 
it is conceivable that some proponents of adding patents 
into an open source standardisation effort have exactly 
such an objective. 
Other stakeholders are concerned about a possible 
reduction of return on R&D investment in standardisation, 
because of unfounded OSS community-generated fears 
and uncertainty related to imposition of licensing costs 
of adhering to standardisation policies, and potential for 
licence conflicts with those policies. This in turn leads to 
reduced willingness of patent holders to contribute to 
open source projects.
Some respondents observe that OSS tends to be solution 
orientated and will revert to adopt newly developed 
standards or to participation in standardisation, once 
it reaches adoption in the market. Another observation 
is that interoperability is inherent to OSS projects as a 
precondition to efficient collaboration, scaling and to 
mitigate vendor lock-in.
In several answers to this open question related to the 
effects of the interaction, the role of IPR regimes is 
already addressed, to which the next block of questions 
is devoted.
3.2.5. IPR Regimes in Standardisation and OSS
Moving on to the IPR regimes in standardisation and OSS, 
the answers reveal the following practices. If we review 
the IPR policies applied in standardisation activities that 
the respondents are accepting, we observe the following 
pattern. In general, participation in standardisation 
activities applying royalty free schemes is much more 
common with an average value above “sometimes” 
compared to FRAND, which is likely to be between “rarely” 
and “sometimes”. In particular, less than 20% of the 
respondents never participate in standardisation activities 
which apply royalty free schemes, this share is more than 
double in case FRAND is implemented. Complementary, 
more than 50% do always or often participate when 
royalty free is implemented, but less than 40% when 
FRAND is realised. In particular, small organisations are 
almost never involved in activities under a FRAND scheme, 
whereas the size of organisations does not correlate with 
the popularity of royalty free.
In addition to highlighting that royalty free might be a 
subcategory of FRAND but does not necessarily mean no 
cost for the implementer, Non-FRAND, RAND and RAND-
ZERO are explicitly mentioned in the open category of 
other IPR regimes. The other IPR policies that are relevant 
to respondents’ participation in standardisation activities 
are non-assertion covenant agreements. Obviously, 
the guaranteed access to technologies, reciprocity and 
transferability aspects are important.
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FIGURE 32: PARTICIPATION IN STANDARDISATION ACTIVITIES WITH ROYALTY FREE OR FRAND POLICIES (SCALE: 1 = “NEVER”; 2 = “RARELY“; 3 = “SOMETIMES”; 
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FIGURE 33: PARTICIPATION IN STANDARDISATION ACTIVITIES WITH ROYALTY FREE OR FRAND POLICIES – SMO VS LO (SCALE: 1 = “NEVER”; 2 = “RARELY“; 
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In contrast to the very few IPR regimes applied in 
standardisation, several licensing models have been 
developed for OSS. Looking at the most common regimes 
among (see figure 6 in chapter 4), the respondents the 
Apache License 2.0, the MIT License and the GNU General 
Public License (GPL 2.0) are the top three followed by GNU 
General Public License (GNU) 3 and the BSD License 2.0, 
all above being rated sometimes. This ranking corresponds 
closely with the one published by WhiteSource in early 
2017.15 Between sometimes and rarely we find the GNU 
Lesser General Public License (LGPL) 2.1, the Simplified 
BSD License, the GNU Lesser General Public License 
(LGPL) 3.0 and the Eclipse Public License. Just rarely used 
is the Artistic License (Perl). Between rarely and never 
15 https://resources.whitesourcesoftware.com/blog-whitesource/top-10-open-source-software-licenses-of-2016-and-key-trends.
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the Microsoft Public License, the ISC License and the 
OpenAirInterface (AI) Software Alliance License Model are 
common among the respondents.
In addition to the significant differences between the 
general attractiveness of the various OSS licensing 
models, we can observe discrepancies between larger 
and smaller organisations. The latter have much stronger 
preferences for both the GNU General Public License 3.0 
and the GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) 3.0, 
whereas the former are inclined to the MIT License and 
the various versions of the BSD Licenses.
In the answer to the open question about other licensing 
schemes, it is again highlighted that licence choices are 
case-specific decisions. Others point out that actors 
choosing to participate in an OSS project rarely get to 
choose the licence they contribute under, as existing 
projects or the umbrella organisations that host them 
already chose a licence for the project. The question 
whether or not OSS licences only cover copyright or also 
other rights to use the code is discussed controversially, 
with some respondents assuming that even the simple 
MIT licence contains a patent grant, others insisting 
that OSS licences only cover copyright, and others 
pragmatically pointing out that the Apache 2 License, 
which includes an explicit patent grant as well as the 
BSD licences, is a suitable choices for using OSS in 
businesses. The OpenAirInterface licence is disputed, 
because several respondents question that it meets the 
OSI definition of an open source licence. 
Finally, the respondents were asked for the existence of 
conflicts between the various copyright licences and the 
licensing models in standardisation, in particular FRAND. 
Here, it becomes obvious that both the GNU General Public 
Licenses GPL 2.0 and 3.0 on the one hand and the GNU 
Lesser General Public License LGPL 2.1 and 3.0 create 
conflicts for around two thirds of the respondents. For the 
BSD Licenses only one third report conflicts. Overall, small 
organisations report less conflicts.
The detailed descriptions of the experienced conflicts 
between the chosen OSS and the licensing models in 
standardisation summarised under “Other licences” in the 
figures reveal the following positions. Some argue that OSS 
licensing and FRAND are in general incompatible and that 
only fully open licensing is acceptable, because FRAND 
excludes out small businesses and increases burdens 
on open source builders. The conflicts will increase, as 
more advanced technologies are being implemented, like 
software on top of general-purpose computers, because 
the distinction between a patent on a device and a patent 
purely on software is becoming more nebulous. Others 
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explain the conflict as of commercial as opposed to legal 
nature, as reciprocal OSS licences like the GPL-3 require a 
royalty-free patent licence, while FRAND does not imply 
royalty free licensing. This may prevent the patent owner 
from monetizing their patent portfolio. Since the patent 
owner is free to choose a different business model, the 
issue is for some respondents not a question of legal 
compatibility.
In general, it is emphasized that questions of the 
compatibility of OSS and standards licences need to 
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on the 
concrete licences and IPR frameworks. For example, one 
respondent argues that in particular complementary dual 
or even multiple licensing schemes sometimes govern the 
exact same software and companies may make software 
available under different conditions and licences. For 
example, software can be released under a GPLv3 licence 
for those members of the open source community, who 
prefer that licence, and at the same time the same software 
might be released in parallel under a BSD 3-clause licence, 
for those who prefer this option. Therefore, it is argued that 
software code or other material can be contributed to SDOs 
making the promise that the relevant patents are available 
to implementers under a licence containing an express 
royalty-free patent licence. Furthermore, those proponents 
support the perspective that FRAND licence commitment 
applies to all implementations of the specification, while 
the OSS licence commitment applies to one specific open 
source implementation. Therefore, both should be to co-
exist without conflict. This argument, however, does not 
take into account that multi-licensing is only applicable 
in the case of a single-vendor OSS development model 
and in presence of strong contributor licence agreements. 
In such cases, the copyright and patents rights holders 
are identical, which is not a case that applies to SDO 
collaboration (Riehle 2010). It is also mentioned that 
conflicts arise when not all relevant patents are disclosed 
before the publication of the standards, which is obviously 
the case (e.g. Baron et al. 2014). 
Some respondents only consider licences acceptable 
that clearly indicate that patent rights are not granted, 
like the BSD 3-Clause Clear License or the Fraunhofer 
licence. Other emphasize uncertainty from the potential 
implicit patent grant in licences that may result in courts 
at determining that patent rights have been granted with 
the OSS licence.
Another argument brought forward is that SDO FRAND 
promises and OSS licences should simply be considered 
as two different and separate promises, where no party 
is obligated to make one such promise simply because 
they have made the other. This would mean that having 
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an SDO undertake software development using an open 
source licence does not conflict with FRAND and does not 
obligate any SDO participant to agree to an OSS licence 
except on a voluntary basis.
In case of conflicts, there are – at least in theory – various 
options to solve them. Overall, the respondents have not 
very often experienced effective solutions. Most solutions 
are rated only between rarely and sometimes successful. 
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Most appropriate is the strict separation between OSS and 
FRAND licensing followed by negotiations to find solutions. If 
no solutions are found, sometimes organisations withdraw 
from standardisation. Another option is the use of copyright-
only licences explicitly excluding patent licence rights, which 
are negotiated separately. Still more than rarely used are 
more flexible IPR models in SDOs, which allow case by case 
IPR schemes, and even the withdrawal from OSS, which is 
less likely than the withdrawal from standardisation. Almost 
never are more flexible definitions of OSS, alternative dispute 
resolutions or eventually litigation at court suggested. 
Focusing on small organisations’ most preferred solution, it 
turns out that they are withdrawing from standardisation in 
addition to the strict separation. All other options are rarely 
used by them.
With regard to the question of what other solutions 
respondents would recommend reconciling SDO IPR 
frameworks and OSS licence conditions, it was pointed 
out that both IEEE-SA and OASIS have developed models 
based on voluntary commitments or patent non-assert 
clauses that successfully facilitate existing SDO/OSS 
collaboration. 
Some explained that they considered it to be unrealistic to 
expect that OSS licences or the OSD should be changed, 
since they are fundamental to OSS. In the wider open 
source community, the right to distribute OSS, that is 
developed and maintained on an open collaborative 
platform, is fundamental to the success of OSS. A small 
minority argues that any assertion that one definition 
of open source should be adopted and that this should 
be the OSD is unhelpful towards the aim of integrating 
elements of standards and OSS and consider it important 
to note that there is no one definition of open source. This 
opinion is, however, not shared by the vast majority of 
respondents. Almost all participants consider the OSD as 
the valid definition of open source.
Multiple participants point out that tensions between 
SDO and OSS IPR frameworks are not a practical concern 
for them. Some state that they have not encountered 
and do not expect to encounter conflicts between the 
OSS and standardisation licensing models that require 
them to withdraw from either the OSS or standardisation 
development work and that they have not experienced a 
need for litigation or other dispute resolution in this area. 
Others mention that the use of copyright-only OSS licences 
that explicitly exclude patent grants is very rare. It should 
not be considered OSS development in the sense that that 
the wider open source community normally expects and 
considered more like a “FRAND-based collaborative source 
code development” model. Some believe that the primary 
purpose of SDOs should be standards development and 
that they should not be implementing standards.
In a final question, we asked for an assessment of 
the effectiveness of various general approaches of 
collaboration between standardisation and OSS. In contrast 
to the rather rarely used solutions for conflicts between OSS 
and licensing models in standardisation, the assessment 
of at least some approaches of general collaboration 
between standardisation and OSS is between medium and 
even high. First, it is asked for a higher flexibility of SDOs’ 
patent policy. Secondly, new processes to integrate OSS in 
standardisation are suggested. Thirdly, not only more flexible 
patent policies are asked for but it is even suggested that 
SDOs change their patent policies towards royalty free. If 
we look at the ranking of the effectiveness of the solutions 
differentiated by the size of organisations, we find a strong 
preference of smaller compared to larger organisations 
for SDOs changing their patent policy to royalty free and 
being more flexible in their patent policies, but also for new 
processes to integrate OSS in standardisation. Obviously, 
they see in particular the requirement of changes in 
the policies of SDOs. Below medium, but above low 
effectiveness new governance and conflict solutions we 
find new governance and conflict solution models, the use 
of copyright-only OSS licences explicitly excluding patent 
licence rights and finally a direct combination of SDOs and 
OSS communities. Finally, the proposals that OSS licences 
should include FRAND-based patent grants and of more 
flexible definitions of OSS receive the assessment of being 
of only low effectiveness and even lower. Interestingly, 
larger organisations perceive these options as much more 
effective as smaller organisations.
General proposals of other approaches of collaborations 
can be grouped according to the following categories. 
Some just focus on the licensing regimes and claim to 
abolish FRAND and to establish (F)RAND-ZERO to OSS 
implementations.
Others argue more in general that co-development 
or parallel development of open source software and 
standards should be organised in a way that informs each 
other but operates under independent licensing regimes. 
The Open Connectivity Foundation’s development of 
specifications in parallel to IoTivity’s OSS project is 
mentioned as a good example.
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However, SDO can develop more source code (reference 
implementation) and later decide to work jointly with 
an OSS community to also have an “open source” 
implementation. The scope can be slightly different. Open 
source developers that are currently not SDO members 
can be integrated in a standard process, but this will 
only be successful if the open source community is 
willing to accept some of the slower structural aspects 
of the development process (e. g. contributions, use 
cases, potentially membership commitment and fees 
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etc). It is also argued that SDO governance is strong and 
seems adequate for a fair participation for all interested 
stakeholders. They also offer a declaration mechanism 
that OSS communities, which are not always transparent 
and often controlled by a few entities, do not provide. 
According to these voices, in the eventuality that a joint 
SDO/OSS is found, the SDO governance and its declaration 
mechanism shall prime. This would provide certainty on 
the licensing status of the standard/code as anyone could 
make an IP declaration (see “at the outset” in the ISO 
policy).
However, open source software and specification-
development organisations, such as OASIS, implement 
already processes to try to understand the origin of each 
OSS contribution. If the OSS contributor is not also part 
of the specification-development effort, special processes 
are used for handling and considering whether and how to 
use or integrate the OSS contribution. If the OSS project 
merely intends to implement an existing standard, then 
this question is not relevant. If the OSS project is able 
to provide feedback or tools for a standard during the 
standardisation process, then the importance of the above 
will depend on nature of the crossover between the two.
IEEE supports the ability for FRAND conditions in 
standardisation, and further, its bylaws (including those 
terms covering the Letters of Assurance) apply to open 
source projects that are also part of our standardisation 
activities. Its intellectual property review process takes 
into account any Letters of Assurance when considering 
the question as to whether or not a particular work can 
be released as open source. The IEEE offers the Apache 
2.0 licence for situations where a contributor has a patent 
claim on the covered work and they wish to make an 
explicit worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free 
patent grant. According to IEEE, these is no situation, in 
which its FRAND policies have conflicted with its open 
source activities. However, it may or may not be the case 
that its participants chose to not pursue open source as 
a form of collaboration out of concerns related to patent 
licensing.
In addition to a closer coordination between OSS and 
standardisation, others believe that generally the 
development of OSS is best done outside of an SDO, 
because it enables both communities to do what they do 
best and limits conflicts. However, under this constellation, 
it is important that a collaboration agreement is set up 
between the SDO and OSS project which governs the 
degree and nature of information exchange between 
the two, and possibly also for each community to have 
observers or access to meetings and/or documents relating 
to the other’s work. However, processes need to be in place 
in both communities to enable this and to ensure technical 
contributions are not made by one or the other, as such, 
to the other’s work (i.e. the code or the standard itself). 
Contributions should only be made by their respective 
members or contributors. One issue though may be a lack 
of a legal entity that can bind the parties as regards the 
contributors to OSS.
In instances, when an SDO wishes to develop OSS, for 
example, where there may be no external interest to do 
so, then it is claimed that clear processes are in place to 
ensure that there is a separation between contributions 
to an OSS project and the development of a related 
standard, as both will be governed by different licensing 
commitment regimes. Equally, appropriate approval 
processes should be in place to determine on a case-
by-case basis whether the benefits of developing code 
under a particular licence would outweigh the risks, 
and of course whether the development is likely to be 
successful in light of those risks and the possible costs. 
It is stressed, that the scope of any OSS project within 
an SDO should be clearly delineated. The rules and 
procedures of the SDO should be adhered to - though 
they may need to be necessarily changed to enable code 
development - and members’ interests who contribute to 
the SDO’s standards should be taken into account. SDOs 
should avoid developing implementations of the code 
for commercial purposes (not least due to competition 
law concerns) and they should manage IPR expectations 
associated with the code, especially for potential users 
of it. Therefore, it is recommended, that SDOs would be 
best served by limiting their code development to tools 
or specific reference implementations needed to guide 
associated ongoing standard developments. Providing the 
appropriate governance rules and processes are in place, 
then there should generally be no need to change the 
SDO’s IPR policy. 
However, the proponents of this proposal stress that the 
risks and concerns above are likely to be reduced if SDOs 
avoided traditional OSS licences and used an unambiguous 
copyright-only licence that is subject to their IPR policies or 
FRAND based licences such as the OAI licence. According 
to them, these types of licences are also likely to lead to 
more contributions and therefore more successful code 
development. As regards the OAI licence, it is also likely to 
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be useful for openly developing code in areas where the 
best likely contributors to the code may hold valuable IPR.
Others argue that for SDOs developing OSS the choice of 
licensing – whether non-open source or open source – can 
be made on a case by case basis depending on the needs 
of the project and the preferences of the participants. 
Suggestions that some sort of special model is necessary 
to address software development, including open source, 
at SDOs would improperly limit standards’ participants 
ability to design and implement effective, innovative 
technologies.
Most of the respondents agree that there a not very 
many combinations of standardisation and open source 
development. Where OSS and standardisation collaborate, 
the result is successful. However, there are numerous 
answers to the open question of concrete examples of 
direct combinations of standardisation and open source 
development listed in the Annex. It is obvious that the 
successful examples are mainly hosted at standardisation 
organisations following a royalty free regime.
The answers to the final open question regarding the 
subject of OSS and standardisation in general, and 
standard-essential patents or FRAND in particular confirm 
the previously revealed and discussed different positions 
of the respondents similar to the observations by Baron et 
al. (2019). 
In general, some respondents confirm that the combination 
of OSS and open standards would lead to best possible 
combination of rapid innovation and broad adoption 
eventually benefitting the end users. However, there is 
obviously also room for improvement in organising the 
interaction and the exchange of information. In particular, 
it is questioned whether SDOs are really very open for 
input from other organisations, like OSS communities. 
Furthermore, two dimensions of tension are mentioned. 
First, an open source implementation often becomes the 
main or only codebase used in most products, whereas in 
standards, there are quite a lot of corner cases and optional 
features that needs thorough testing for interoperability 
purposes. An SDO developed reference implementation 
ensures that all features are tested. The testing of 
corner cases in open source projects is not needed, when 
everyone uses the same open source code and when the 
open source code is a subset of the standard. This can 
be detrimental to product interoperability and market 
differentiation. A role could be found for open source 
implementations in standard interoperability testing to 
ensure that different code base are interoperable with a 
reference implementation. Second, standardisation and 
OSS projects often have different timeframes. When a long 
timeframe is envisaged for an SDO project, there could 
be a role for an intermediate open source implementation 
to help stabilise core concepts for intermediate market 
needs. Though, the long-term purpose should not be 
shaped by an immediate and temporary market demand. 
In order to respond to the increasing time pressure, another 
trend is mentioned to produce standards in a lesser 
descriptive way but in the form of software code – at least 
in some contexts, e.g. regarding standards for software 
interoperability but also other technical standards that 
may in the future be able to implement by activating a 
runtime engine and thus shortening implementation time 
and effort tremendously. In this context, the requirement 
of the European Commission to ensure that ICT-related 
standards are set in a way that is more responsive to policy 
needs, agile, open, more strongly linked to research and 
innovation, better joined-up, and thus that they ultimately 
have more impact for the wider European economy has 
also to be mentioned. It is admitted that such challenges 
will require a lot of new thinking around new forms of 
standardisation including the option of integrating OSS. 
In addition, room for rather generic instead of prescriptive 
and incremental institutional and procedural innovations 
of SDOs is needed, which might be hindered by their 
internal, more restrictive governance (Baron et al. 2019). 
From a technical and business view, OSS and 
standardisation are not competing from the perspective 
of other respondents, because they do not address the 
same issue, i.e. standardisation is more a functional model, 
whereas OSS focuses on implementation. Others see open-
source and proprietary just as two extremes of a continuum 
of business models and ask for ensuring technology access 
and business model neutrality for all participants on both 
open source and open standardisation. In this context, 
new business models based on OSS and patents, but 
not necessarily on SEPs are mentioned. Furthermore, the 
definition of open source according to OSI should not be 
questioned or changed. However, the role of patents related 
to software is perceived to be rather critical, in particular 
patents on software-implemented innovations should be 
not granted confirming the results of the stakeholder survey 
by Blind et al. (2017) focusing on ICT patents. 
There is on the one hand a significant group of stakeholders 
which confirm their position of perceiving a fundamental 
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incompatibility between OSS and FRAND questioning 
the later regime and the concept of standard-essential 
patents in general (see also Blind et al. 2017). In contrast, 
other respondents claim that FRAND licensing promises 
and open source licensing can readily co-exist in the 
marketplace and mention the ETSI OSS Mano project is a 
particularly successful example of such collaboration.
Finally, the closer integration of standardisation and OSS 
will also challenge the existing business models of SDOs.
Despite of the limited response to the stakeholder survey, 
the analysis of the responses reveals sound and internally 
consistent results. In addition, the results are also in line 
with the insights from methodologically similar analyses. 
The differentiation of the sample into large and small or 
medium-sized organisations, which is almost identical to 
a separation into patent owning and not patent owning 
companies, reveals interesting insights, which also guide 
the derivation of policy recommendations.
3.3. Summary
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